An examination of the politics of privatization of water and sanitation services in Africa, Europe, and Latin America (1990-2004) - Cases from Finland and Greece by Castro JE et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International 
License 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Castro JE, Seppälä O, Katko T, Pietilä P, Kallis G, Coccossis H.  
An examination of the politics of privatization of water and sanitation 
services in Africa, Europe, and Latin America (1990-2004) - Cases from Finland 
and Greece.  
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Working Papers 2017, 4(1), 1-181. 
 
 
Copyright: 
The WATERLAT-GOBACIT Working Papers by WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network are licensed under a Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Permissions beyond the scope of this 
license may be available at www.waterlat.org. 
Publisher website: 
http://waterlat.org/publications/working-papers-series/  
Date deposited:   
18/06/2017 
PRINWASS PROJECT: An examination of the politics of 
privatization of water and sanitation services in Africa, Europe and 
Latin America.  Cases from Finland and Greece. 
WORKING PAPERS
RESEARCH PROJECTS SERIES
ISSN 2056-4856 (Print)
ISSN 2056-4864 (Online)
Working Paper Vol. 4, Nº 1  
(In  English)
Newcastle upon Tyne and Buenos Aires,  March 2017
WATERLATGOBACIT
494
Cover picture:  Tammerkoski River, Summertime at the industrial city of Tampere, 
Finland, 11 June 2005 
Source: WATERLAT-GOBACIT Flickr collection (Attribution-NonCommercial Creative 
Commons)
WATERLAT-GOBACIT
WORKING PAPERS
Working Papers Vol. 4, Nº 1
Research Projects Series
PRINWASS Project
“An examination of the politics of privatization of water and 
sanitation services in Africa, Europe, and Latin America 
(1990-2004) – Cases from Finland and Greece”
José Esteban Castro (Editor)
Newcastle upon Tyne and Buenos Aires
March 2017
WATERLATGOBACIT
ISSN 2056-4856 (Print)
ISSN 2056-4864 (Online)
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom
E-mail: waterlat@ncl.ac.uk – Web page: www.waterlat.org
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Working Papers 
General Editor
Jose Esteban Castro
Emeritus Professor,
Newcastle University
Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom
E-mail: esteban.castro@ncl.ac.uk
Editorial Commission: (click here)
Research Projects Series
PRINWASS Project
An examination of the politics of privatization of water and sanitation services in Africa, 
Europe, and Latin America (1990-2004) – Cases from Finland and Greece
Jose Esteban Castro (Editor)
Keywords:   Water and sanitation, public policies, political ecology of urban water, public 
services, privatization, neoliberal politics, Finland, Greece. 
Corresponding Editor:
Jose Esteban Castro 
Emeritus Professor,
Newcastle University
Newcastle upon Tyne,
United Kingdom
E-mail: esteban.castro@ncl.ac.uk
Corresponding authors:
For comments or queries about the individual articles, contact the relevant authors. 
Their email addresses are provided in each of the articles.
WATERLAT-GOBACIT  Working Papers
Research Projects Series - PRINWASS Project  - Vol 4 Nº 1 / 2017
WATERLATGOBACIT
Table of Contents
 
Presentation of the Thematic Area and the Working Paper  
Article 1: The experience of Finland
Osmo Seppälä - Finnish Water Utilities Association (FIWA), Finland
Tapio Katko - Tampere University of Technology, Finland 
Pekka Pietilä - Tampere University of Technology, Finland
Article 2: The experience of Greece
Giorgos Kallis - Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), Spain
Harry Coccossis - Department of Planning and Regional 
Development, University of Thessaly, Greece
 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT  Working Papers
Research Projects Series - PRINWASS Project  - Vol 4 Nº 1 / 2017
WATERLATGOBACIT
1
3
67
Page
WATERLATGOBACIT
WATERLAT-GOBACIT  Working Papers
Research Projects Series - PRINWASS Project  - Vol 4 Nº 1 / 2017
1
Presentation of the Working Paper
We are glad to present another issue of the PRINWASS Project Series (SPIPRW). The 
SPIPRW Series has the objective of making available edited materials based on the 
final reports of the PRINWASS Project (www.prinwass.org). This project was carried out 
between 2001 and 2004 and was funded by the European Union’s Fifth Framework 
Programme. PRINWASS is a major landmark for our Network, as WATERLAT-GOBACIT 
was created by a group of PRINWASS partners after the project ended to continue 
working together on the politics of water and water services. 
Although some time has passed since the project ended, the topics addressed and 
the project’s findings have significant relevance and can contribute towards better 
understanding some of the challenges currently facing the implementation of progressive, 
egalitarian water politics. In short, PRINWASS’ main objective was to examine critically 
the policies of privatization of water and sanitation services implemented worldwide 
during the 1990s, looking at specific cases from Africa, Europe and Latin America. 
The project carried out case studies in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, England and Wales, 
Finland, Greece, Kenya, Mexico, and Tanzania, and developed comparative analyses of 
the main findings. Although the original reports were freely available by request, and 
we produced several specific publications based on the project’s findings, much of the 
material remains largely unknown and, for this reason, we launched the SPIPRW Series 
to facilitate the dissemination of research results.
This Working Paper features two articles presenting edited materials based on the 
original reports from the case studies carried out in Finland and Greece. These two 
cases provide examples from constrating experiences, which have important lessons 
for current debates on the privatization of essential public services. The Finnish cases 
examined in Article 1 illustrate a tradition of water services management strongly based 
on municipal control of essential public services. Although there has been historically 
a strong interaction between the public and private sectors, the provision of essential 
water and sanitation services is under municipal control, and the standards of provision 
are very high in terms of quality and coverage.  Still, being part of the European Union, 
Finland has also been under pressure to allow stronger private-sector participation in 
the provision of essential public services, and the article highlights different scenarios 
facing the provision of water and sanitation services in the country resulting from 
these pressures. Article 2 presents a very detailed analysis of the privatization policies 
implemented in Athens in the late 1990s. The provision of water and sanitation services in 
Greece constrasts sharply with the Finnish situation, as the introduction of privatization 
policies in the country resembles more clearly the general pattern of neoliberal policies 
implemented worldwide during the 1990s. The original reports were written in 2003 and 
2004, and therefore the articles sometimes contain references that may be outdated. 
We hope that the readers will find this material useful and that it may contribute to 
the work of researchers, students, activists, and others in their activities to understand 
better the internal workings and the huge impacts of water privatization processes. 
These policies are not only very much alive, but are also experiencing a worldwide revival. 
Therefore, we believe that the findings and lessons that emerged from the PRINWASS 
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Project deserve this publication effort. We wish you all a pleasant and fruitful reading.
Jose Esteban Castro
General Editor and Working Paper Editor
Newcastle upon Tyne and Buenos Aires, March 2017
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ARTICLE 1 
 The experience of Finland 
Osmo Seppälä - Finnish Water Utilities Association (FIWA), Finland.
Tapio Katko1  - Tampere University of Technology, Finland.
Pekka Pietilä - Tampere University of Technology, Finland.
Abstract
The article presents a synthesis of research results from the study of Finnish water 
and sanitation services. It addresses the role of the public and private sectors in the 
provision and management of these services, placing emphasis on the importance of 
municipal authorities and consumer-managed cooperatives in rural areas. The paper 
discusses the wide range of options that can be found in the cooperation between 
public and private entities, which is a long-term historical characteristic of the country’s 
water and sanitation services sector. In the Finnish case, “private sector” in water and 
sanitation services refers mainly to a range of actors outside the public sector, most of 
which are small and medium scale providers of support services and manufacturers, 
and privately-run small cooperatives in rural areas. The article presents evidence of the 
levels of efficiency and quality of water and sanitation services, and offers a discussion of 
scenarios for the analysis of the main challenges facing these services, and suggesting 
likely trends and future developments.
Keywords: Public-private cooperation; water and sanitation services; water and 
sanitation cooperatives; municipal services; Finland
1  Corresponding author: Tapio Katko. E-mail: tapio.katko@tut.fi
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Resumen
El artículo presenta una síntesis de resultados de investigación del estudio de servicios 
de agua y saneamiento en Finlandia. El trabajo aborda el papel de los sectores público y 
privado en la provisión y gestión de estos servicios, colocando el énfasis en la importancia 
que tienen las autoridades municipales y las cooperativas gestionadas por los propios 
consumidores en las áreas rurales. El trabajo discute el amplio rango de opciones que 
se registra en las formas de cooperación entre entidades públicas y privadas, lo que 
es una característica histórica de largo plazo en el sector de los servicios de agua y 
saneamiento del país. En el caso finlandés, “sector privado” en los servicios de agua y 
saneamiento se refiere principalmente a un rango de actores afuera del sector público, 
la mayoría de los cuales son proveedores de servicios de apoyo y de manufacturas 
de escala pequeña y mediana, además de pequeñas cooperativas gestionadas por 
actores privados en las áreas rurales. El artículo presenta evidencia de los niveles de 
eficiencia y calidad de los servicios de agua y saneamiento, y ofrece una discusión de 
escenarios para el análisis de los principales desafíos que enfrentan estos servicios, así 
como también sugerencias sobre las tendencias y desarrollos futuros más probables 
del sector.
Palabras clave: Cooperación público-privada; servicios de agua y saneamiento; 
cooperativas de servicios de agua; servicios municipales; Finlandia
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Introduction
The Finnish case study looks into the key principles and practices of public-private 
cooperation in water services based largely on local government (municipality) owned 
utilities which cooperate with the private sector. Such systems have a long tradition in 
larger Finnish cities and townships though many of them are fairly small compared with 
other European countries. In any case, this is the most common management model 
of water services in the EU member countries. It is important to note that the public 
involvement includes not only the state level, but also the regional and municipal (local) 
level. In the Finnish case, private sector involvement is understood in a broad manner, 
including also outsourcing non-core and support services and goods, incorporation 
of utilities, commercialisation of utilities, (small) private water associations and co-
operatives, etc.
This option of municipality-owned utilities has several alternatives like the traditional 
municipal utility, an autonomous utility, a company owned by the municipality or an 
inter-municipal utility. In sparsely populated areas, joint water service systems are 
managed by private water cooperatives whose founding and operation are nevertheless 
in most cases supported by municipalities. Consumer-managed water and sanitation 
cooperatives in dispersed rural areas and small villages are largely private of their 
nature. Supra- and inter-municipal cooperation of water utilities is an increasing trend 
in Finland. 
From Finland three (3) specific utility level case studies were selected, which 
elaborate the above mentioned issues in a practical manner. These case studies aim 
at contributing to the following overall objectives of the PRINWASS project. The three 
selected Finnish case studies are:
1)  LV Lahti Water Ltd is a joint-stock full service water company owned by the city 
of Lahti in the southern part of Finland. 
2)  Kangasala Municipality Water and Sewerage Works is a municipal water and 
sewerage utility, which has been reformed as an autonomous municipal enterprise 
since 2002. It is responsible for drinking water supply and distribution, wastewater 
sewerage, and storm water drainage. The utility serves about 19,000 people within 
the area of Kangasala municipality.
3) Lappavesi Ltd is a bulk water supply (joint-stock) company owned by the 
municipalities of Lapua, Nurmo, Kuortane and Kauhava in the region of Southern 
Ostrobotnia in Western Finland (Map No 1). The population within the service area 
of Lappavesi Ltd is about 35,000. Lappavesi Ltd was established in 1972.
Lapua Sewerage Ltd is a joint-stock sewerage company owned by the municipalities 
of Lapua and Nurmo, and the Atria Oyj food processing company. Lapua Sewerage 
Ltd was established in 1973.
The case studies are based on collection and analysis of background material collected 
from the utilities; mainly annual reports and economic data (financial statements etc.). 
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Personal interviews were carried out with the Managing Directors of utilities and the 
Financial Manager of LV Lahti Water Ltd.
LV Lahti Water Ltd
LV Lahti Water Ltd was selected as a case study as an example of a medium-sized 
town water utility, which is one of the first incorporated municipal water utilities in Finland. 
It was incorporated in 1994, and until then it was a semi-autonomous department of the 
city’s technical department.
The main objective of selecting LV Lahti Water Ltd as a case study in PRINWASS 
project is to assess how incorporation of a municipal utility to a joint-stock company 
affects the performance and efficiency of the utility. Although the company is fully 
owned by the city, it operates strictly according to commercial operational principles. 
The case study will examine whether an incorporated municipal company can operate 
as efficiently as a private enterprise. Cooperation between the company and private 
enterprises in various types of supporting services is also studied.
Kangasala Municipality Water and Sewerage Works
Development of water supply in Kangasala started in the 1950s. Since the 1970s, 
Kangasala has had active cooperation with the neighbouring municipalities in water 
supply. The development stages of the water utility have had various interesting 
features. The role of small private water works was important in the development of the 
municipal water utility.
Lappavesi Ltd and Lapua Sewerage Ltd
Lappavesi Ltd is a bulk water supply (joint-stock) company owned by the municipalities 
of Lapua, Nurmo, Kuortane and Kauhava in the region of Southern Ostrobotnia in 
Western Finland (Map No 1). The population within the service area of Lappavesi Ltd 
is about 35,000. Lappavesi Ltd was established in 1972. Lapua Sewerage Ltd is a 
joint-stock sewerage company owned by the municipalities of Lapua and Nurmo, and 
the Atria Oyj food processing company. Lapua Sewerage Ltd was established in 1973.
Lappavesi Ltd and Lapua Sewerage Ltd were selected as case study utilities for the 
following reasons:
•    Lappavesi Ltd as an example of wide supra-municipal cooperation in bulk water 
supply. The bulk supply company has clients among the municipalities (4) and 
several water cooperatives. 
•   Lapua Sewerage Ltd as an example of sewerage and wastewater treatment 
cooperation between municipalities and an industrial company.
The location of the three Finnish case study utilities is shown in Map No 1.
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Map No 1.: Map showing the location of the Finnish case-study utilities
Environmental conditions and water resources
General
The United Nations World Water Development Report: Water for People, Water for 
Life (UNESCO, 2003) considers the water in Finland cleanest in the world. The report 
ranked 122 countries based on the quality of their water and their ability and willingness 
to improve it. Finland also scored the highest number of points on the overall Water 
Poverty Index which graded 147 countries according to their water use.
Finland has large resources of high quality raw water. About 60 per cent of drinking 
water is derived from groundwater, of which some 10 per cent is artificially recharged 
groundwater, and it usually requires little or no treatment. The rest of the drinking water 
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is obtained from surface waters, i.e. from rivers and lakes. Water quality is classified as 
good or excellent in about 80 per cent of the country’s lakes and in 40 per cent of the 
rivers. Surface waters must be treated due to their high concentration of natural organic 
carbon which can, for example, lead to bad taste and odour.
Agricultural activities are presently the highest single source of nutrients to surface 
waters. The primary problem caused by these discharges is eutrophication of surface 
waters. Groundwater pollution caused by nitrate leaching from fields is a local problem. 
Nitrogen levels have been increasing, but the main reason may be the exceptionally 
warm and rainy winters in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The pulp and paper industry 
is clearly the most prevalent water polluting industrial sector in Finland (FEI, 2003).
LV Lahti Water Ltd.
Lahti city gets its raw water mainly from the aquifer area of the Salpausselkä ridge 
in east-west direction and from the crush structure of Vesijärvi-Laune in north-south 
direction. The aquifer area is about 20 km2. It yields about 20,000-25,000 m3/d of 
ground water. The entire yield of groundwater aquifers within Lahti city area is about 
30.000 m3/d.
There is another significant aquifer area in Hollola municipality area, called Hälvälä-
Sairakkala aquifer area, which is about 45 km2 wide. Its yield is about 45,000 m3/d.
The ridge formation of Salpausselkä acts as a natural filter and purifies the groundwater 
to such a level that it could be used as drinking water even without treatment. Groundwater 
is basically well protected from the effects of air pollution, radioactive fallout, bacteria, 
and from other potential contaminants. Salpausselkä groundwater has high oxygen 
content and does not contain excess iron, salinity, or other substances harmful to colour 
or taste. On the other hand, the aquifer areas are mainly located within the constructed 
city area, and need careful monitoring and protection to avoid gradual contamination 
through human activity.
The oldest groundwater intake in Lahti (Laune) had to be closed in 2001, because 
initially a small concentration of pesticides was detected and later the concentration 
exceeded the permissible level. The pesticide was called atratzine, which was commonly 
used until 1993 against weeds and pests.
LV Lahti Water Ltd made in 1994-1995 a groundwater protection plan for its groundwater 
intakes. This plan included a survey on the hydrogeological conditions and potential 
risks to groundwater. The most potential risks to groundwater quality were identified as 
(LV Lahti Water Ltd, 2003):
• Fuel stations and oil tanks
• Road and railway traffic
• Industrial chemicals
WATERLATGOBACIT
WATERLAT-GOBACIT  Working Papers
Research Projects Series - PRINWASS Project  - Vol 4 Nº 1 / 2017
9
• De-icing chemicals (salts) used for roads
• Leaking sewers and infiltration of wastewater into ground
• Use of pesticides and fertlisers in gardens and parks
• Abstraction (excavation) of soil materials
• Excess soil landfills
• Car washing in unpaved areas.
The protection plan identified and proposed several alternative means and activities 
to reduce groundwater contamination risks. Many of these proposals have already been 
implemented, and the contamination risks have reduced for the most common risk 
activities. However, the groundwater contamination risk due to various solvents and 
pesticides persists also in Lahti. The closing of Laune groundwater intake in 2001 was 
a clear indication of this.
Kangasala
Kangasala municipality gets its raw water from groundwater aquifers that are located 
along the ridge formations in north-west – south-east direction. The biggest water 
intake is Riku, which is located along Lake Vesijärvi about 4 km from the centre of the 
municipality. The raw water of Riku intake is mainly groundwater infiltrated from the 
lake. It is abstracted through four groundwater wells. The raw water is disinfected and 
pH is adjusted using soda.
Lapua
Water resources for the use of Lappavesi Ltd are abstracted from the Lappakangas 
groundwater aquifer area in Kuortane municipality. The main reason for looking for 
regional cooperation in water supply was the unavailability of good quality raw water 
within the consumption area of most of the concerned municipalities (especially 
Lapua, Nurmo and Kauhava). Lappakangas area was the only significant good quality 
groundwater aquifer area in the neighbourhood. 
Surface water resources (mainly rivers) in the area are not anymore in a condition that 
would favour their utilisation as a raw water source for drinking water purposes. The 
current surface water quality is also not suitable for artificial recharge of groundwater 
due to high concentration of organic matter.
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Characteristics and trends of the water and sanitation services
Characteristics of water and sanitation services
Summary of the main characteristics and trends of water supply and wastewater 
services in the case study utilities are presented in Tables No 1 and 2.
Table No 1: Water supply services data.
Parameter LV Lahti Water Ltd Kangasala
Connections 11,550 
3,656 households
19,730 cap
Water supplied:
- billed (m3/d)
- UFW (%)
21,400
10.00
2,830
21.00
Service coverage (%) 97.90 87.40
Table No 2: Wastewater services data.
Parameter LV Lahti Water Ltd Kangasala
Connections 11,480
3,296 households
18,810 cap
Wastewater amount:
-  billed (m3/d)
-  led to Tampere (m3/d)
- leakages (%)
22,190
-
25.00
2,706
4,239
56.60
Service coverage (%) 97.30 83.40
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Recent trends in water and sanitation services are described in Tables 3.3 to 3.5, which 
show selected key performance indicators of LV Lahti Water Ltd from 1996 to 2001.
Table No 3: Selected performance indicators of LV Lahti Water Ltd in water supply from 1996 to 
2001
INDICATOR 
(Water supply)
Unit 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Water abstraction Mm3/a 9.40 9,20 9.00 8.60 8.20 8.10
Water sales Mm3/a 7.80 7.80 7.80 7.70 7.60 7.60
Max. 
consumption
m3/d 32,300 31,800 30,934 30,059 30,967 26,625
Min. consumption m3/d 17,900 16,700 15,034 16,371 11,639 12,889
Unaccounted-for 
water
% 16.40 14.60 13.10 10.90 8.10 6,.80
Energy 
consumption
kWh/m3 0.401 0.406 0.406 0.411 0.408 0.413
Water distribution 
network
km 443 443 444 446 447 458
Network 
maintenance 
costs
EUR/m 1.04 1.08 1.16 1.14 1.06 1.38
Network length 
per customer
m/
customer
40.40 40.00 39.60 39.20 38.80 39.10
Customers 
(connections)
Number 10,964 11,098 11,240 11,378 11,528 11,703
Service coverage % 97.70 97.70 97.70 97.70 97.80 97.90
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Table No 4: Selected performance indicators of LV Lahti Water Ltd in wastewater services from 
1996 to 2001.
INDICATOR 
(Water supply)
Unit 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Service coverage % 97 97 97.10 97.20 97.20 97.30
Billed wastewater Mm3/a 8.20 8.20 8.40 8.20 8.20 8.10
Treated wastewater
- total
- Kariniemi
- Ali-Juhakkala
Mm3/a 12.30
8.10
4.20
11.60
7.80
3.80
12.80
8.60
4.20
11.30
7.60
3.70
12.40
8.30
4.10
10.70
7.20
3.50
Infiltration into 
sewers
% 33 30 34 27 35 25
Sewerage network km 410 410 410 411 413 418
Storm water 
sewerage network
km 267 272 278 284 295 300
Network 
maintenance costs
EUR/m 0.72 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.75
Average age of 
rehabilitated sewers
years 35 37 37 38 40 37
Sewage pumping 
stations
Number 51 52 52 52 53 54
Pumping energy kWh/m3 0.081 0.081 0.088 0.09 0.092 0.093
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Table No 5: Selected performance indicators of LV Lahti Water Ltd in wastewater treatment and 
load to receiving water bodies from 1996 to 2001.
INDICATOR Unit 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
BOD
7
:
- Kariniemi
- Ali-Juhakkala
tn/a
tn/a
67
26
82
22
55
28
42
31
52
39
34
21
Ammonium nitrogen:
- Kariniemi
- Ali-Juhakkala
tn/a
tn/a
14.60
5.70
28.20
2.40
31.80
9.30
19.10
6.80
8.40
7.70
8.40
1.80
Total nitrogen:
- Kariniemi
- Ali-Juhakkala
tn/a
tn/a
184
143
129
130
138
119
98
123
103
137
79
135
Phosphorus:
- Kariniemi
- Ali-Juhakkala
tn/a
tn/a
2.30
1.40
3.60
1.60
2.10
2.00
2.30
2.60
2.70
2.00
1.70
0.90
Bio-efficiency 
(BOD
7
 + amm.N)
kg/
kWh 1.20 1.27 1.15 1.55 1.67 1.64
Phosphorus/
ferro-efficiency 
P kg/
Fe tn 72.50 71.5 63.3 71.5 65.2 62.30
Energy consumption kWh/m3 0.65 0.75 0.70 0.71 0.65 0.72
Treatment costs EUR/m3 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.24
Figures No 1 and No 2 show the schematic operational structure of Lappavesi Ltd and 
Lapua Sewerage Ltd.  
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Figure No 1: Bulk water supply system of Lappavesi Ltd.
Figure No 2; Sewerage system of Lapua Sewerage Ltd.
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Private sector involvement in water and sanitation services 
Finland has a long and extensive experience in public-private cooperation in the 
water supply and sewerage sector, although perhaps not in the sense that public-private 
partnership is often understood (i.e. private finance initiative). Outsourcing of services 
– especially non-core services – of public water utilities in Finland is very extensive. 
Outsourced services can form as much as 60-80 per cent of the utility’s turnover (cash 
flow) in many utilities. According to Metsälä (2001) the average cash flow of water 
utilities to private sector services varies between 21-65 per cent, the average being 40 
per cent. In the actual operation and maintenance of utility operations, private sector 
services have mainly been used in pumping stations and sludge treatment. Figure No 
3 illustrates the typical Finnish type of public-private cooperation, where water utilities 
are in municipal ownership but autonomous enterprises that outsource majority of their 
non-core services and goods from private companies.
Figure No 3: The Finnish model of public-private cooperation in water services
             Source: Hukka and Katko, 2003.
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The relative shares of the public and private sector in the development of water and 
sewerage services in Finland have changed over time, as illustrated roughly in Figure 
No 4. The figure includes the authors’ view of the main affecting events and factors in 
the relative shares.
Figure No 4: Relative shares of public and private participation in the development of water and 
sewerage services in Finland and the main factors affecting the changes.
     Source: Modified from Hukka and Katko, 2003
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Private sector participation in the case study utilities
LV Lahti Water Ltd is a joint-stock company fully owned by the City of Lahti (all 20 
shares are owned by the city). Yet, the utility operates mainly according to the commercial 
principles in a similar way as any private enterprises. The economic performance of LV 
Lahti Water Ltd has been very good since the incorporation.
In Kangasala the role of small private water works was important in the development 
of the municipal water utility.  
A strong feature of Lappavesi Ltd is its supra-municipal cooperation (cooperation 
between several municipalities). The main driver for the supra-municipal cooperation 
was the unavailability of good quality raw water within the area of most partner 
municipalities, except Kuortane. The experiences for already 30 years from the bulk 
water supply company have been positive. 
Lappavesi Ltd has different types of cooperation with the smaller water cooperatives 
in the area. Some water cooperatives buy water in bulk from Lappavesi Ltd, but some 
have their own groundwater intakes. Water cooperative probably remain independent as 
long as they still have willing and capable managers and champions. The municipalities 
seem rather unwilling to merge water cooperatives into their municipal water and 
sewerage works. Lappavesi Ltd sells some services to water cooperatives, but in a fairly 
limited scale. These include services related to water treatment processes, leakage 
detection, and alike. In fact, Lappavesi Ltd gives these services in most cases free as a 
sign of good public relations.
All three case study utilities are outsourcing services and activities substantially 
from the private sector (Charts No 1 to 7). The share of the private sector of the total 
expenditure varies between 45 and 80 percent on an average, but for Lapua Sewerage 
Ltd it has been as high as about 90 per cent on an average. The main activities and 
services that are outsourced from the private sector include:
• Construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure
• Materials supply (pipes and equipment)
• Instrumentation and automation works
• Maintenance and service.
• Laboratory services
• Sludge handling (1/3 of the annual turnover)
• Instrumentation and automation works
• Maintenance and service.
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Demo-geographic and socio-economic characteristics
Selected indicators of the demo-geographic and socio-economic characteristics of 
the municipalities and service area of the case study utilities are shown in Tables No 6 
to 8.
Table No 6: Population in the municipalities of the Finnish case study utilities. 
Municipality
Population  
(1.1.2003)
Total area (km2)
Population density 
(cap/km2)
Lahti 97,968
Kangasala 23,010
Lapua 13,998 751 18.60
Nurmo 11,323 362 31.30
Kuortane 4,366 462 9.50
Kauhava 8,161 485 16.80
The population of Kangasala has during the recent years grown strongly. The net 
population growth has been:
• Year 2000:    357  people
• Year 2002: 434  people  ( + 1,9 %)
Kangasala aims strategically at about 100 people’s net growth annually. The fact 
that the growth has been much bigger has caused increasing pressure also for water 
and sewerage services in form of investments into new water infrastructure. Population 
growth is mainly directed to existing housing areas in order to reduce network 
construction pressure for new areas. (Äikäs, Juuti and Katko, 2003).
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Table No 7: Age and gender distribution of the population.
Municipality
Total 
population 
(1.1.2003)
0-14 years 
(%)
15-64 
years (%)
65- years 
(%)
Male
(%)
Female
(%)
Lahti 97,968 15.90 68.20 15.90 47.00 53.00
Kangasala 23,010 20.40 66.80 12.80 49.30 50.70
Lapua 13,998 18.30 63.00 18.70 49.60 50.40
Nurmo 11,323 23.90 66.80 9.30 50.00 50.00
Kuortane 4,366 15.90 61.40 22.80 50.50 49.50
Kauhava 8,161 18.20 63.40 18.40 49.20 50.80
Table No 8: Employment and income development pattern. 
Municipality
Agriculture and 
primary production
(%)
Secondary 
production
(%)
Services
(%)
Unknown (%)
Lahti 0.3 31.6 66.5 1.6
Kangasala 2.8 31.1 64.8 1.3
Lapua 10.9 35.1 51.1 2.9
Nurmo 4.3 29.5 64.3 1.9
Kuortane 17.7 28.6 50.5 3.2
Kauhava 11.4 30.3 55.1 3.2
The biggest industrial employer in Lahti city is Isku-Yhtymä Oy – the furniture 
manufacturing company, which has about 1.160 employees. Lahti city has about 6.050 
employees. In Lapua area the biggest employer in the area is Atria Oyj – the food 
processing company in Nurmo municipality, which has about 1750 employees. Nurmo 
municipality has about 500 employees.
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Techno-institutional development and innovation
Characteristics of the system’s infrastructure
LV Lahti Water Ltd
Water intake and treatment: 
LV Lahti Water Ltd has seven (7) own groundwater intakes, which are located within 
the area of Lahti City and Hollola municipality. LV Lahti Water Ltd has an abstraction 
permit for 32,500 m3/d, and in addition it is allowed to purchase 3,000 m3/d groundwater 
from Hollola area from the federation of municipalities (between Lahti and Hollola). This 
federation was established in 1972 for raw water abstraction.
The groundwater is treated against pipe corrosion by dosing lime and sodium 
hydroxide. Small dosage of chlorine (0.1 g/m3) is added to prevent microbial growth in 
the network.
The current total capacity of the groundwater pumping stations is about 31.000 m3/d, 
as follows:
• Jalkaranta:  17,000  m3/d
• Urheilukeskus:   4,500  m3/d
• Laune:    4,500  m3/d   (closed in 2001)
• Renkomäki:    2,500  m3/d
• Riihelä:    2,000  m3/d
• Kunnas:    1,000  m3/d
• Kärpänen:    1,000  m3/d
• Kuntayhtymä:   3,000  m3/d  (water purchased from Hollola)
Water supply network:
LV Lahti Water Ltd has a water distribution network with total length of 450 km. 
About 50 per cent of the network consists of plastic pipes. There are altogether five (5) 
elevated water reservoirs (Löyttymäki, Mustankallio, Pirttiharju and Nikkilä).
The specific domestic water consumption is about 160 l/cap,d. The coverage is 98 
per cent, which means that there are almost 95,000 people connected to the water 
supply network.
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Sewerage and storm water drainage  network:
LV Lahti Water Ltd has a sewerage network with totals length of 410 km and a storm 
water drainage network of 290 km. The sewerage network is divided into two main 
drainage areas (northern and southern). The city centre still has a combined system 
of wastewater and storm water sewerage. The system has over 50 sewage pumping 
stations.
Wastewater treatment:
LV Lahti Water Ltd has two wastewater treatment plants:
• Kariniemi wastewater treatment plant for the northern drainage area
• Ali-Juhakkala wastewater treatment plant for the southern drainage area.
The two treatment plants treat altogether over 36,000 m3/d of wastewater in a 
biological-chemical process. Kariniemi treatment plant applies total nitrogen removal 
for part of the year. Both plants apply ammonium nitrogen removal. Phosphorus removal 
is achieved by using ferrous sulphate and ammonium nitrogen removal is assisted by 
using lime.
Treated wastewaters from Kariniemi are led in a rock tunnel (length 4,5 km) to River 
Porvoonjoki near the Ali-Juhakkala treatment plant. The rock tunnel is flushed every 
two weeks using lake water from Lake Vesijärvi. There is a balancing and settling basin 
for the flushing water in Ali-Juhakkala (area 1.5 ha and volume 62,000 m3). The settled 
sludge is treated at Ali-Juhakkala treatment plant.
Sewage sludge is treated at both treatment plants using digestion, drying and 
composting. Composted sludge is utilised for gardening and agriculture.
Kangasala
Water intake and treatment:
Kangasala water and sewerage utility has three (3) own groundwater intakes. 
Groundwater is disinfected and also the pH is adjusted using soda. There are also 
two connections to the water distribution network of Tampere Water, through which 
Kangasala can draw 300-600 m3/d in exceptional situations.
Water supply network:
Kangasala water and sewerage utility has a water distribution network with total 
length of 185 km. There is a stripe shaped network from Huutijärvi villaga to Vatiala, 
and from Vatiala to Asema, Ruutana and Haviala villages. Raikku village has about 2 
km of separate water distribution network. About 70 per cent of the network nowadays 
consists of plastic pipes (Äikäs, Juuti and Katko, 2003, p. 88).
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There are three (3) elevated water reservoirs in the system (Kirkkoharju, Harjunsalo 
and Lentola) with a total storage capacity of 2.111 m3. There are also six pressure booster 
stations in the system (3 for domestic customers and 3 for industrial customers).
The specific domestic water consumption is about 143 l/cap,d. The coverage is about 
87 per cent, which means that there are about 19,700 people connected to the water 
supply network.
Sewerage and storm water drainage  network:
Kangasala water and sewerage utility has a sewerage network with total length of 
166 km and a separate storm water drainage network of 21 km. The system has 46 
sewage pumping stations and four storm water pumping stations.
Wastewater treatment:
Kangasala does not anymore have its own wastewater treatment facilities, because 
all wastewaters from the centralised sewerage system of Kangasala municipality have 
been transmitted to Tampere since 1980. The annual amount of wastewater transmitted 
to Tampere is about 1,5 million m3/a. The wastewater amount billed from customers is 
about 1,0 million m3/a.
Lappavesi Ltd and Lapua Sewerage Ltd
Water intake and treatment:
Lappavesi Ltd has altogether 33 groundwater intakes (wells) in a series of four aquifer 
areas. The intakes are located as follows:
• Menkijärvi and Lakajoki: 2 wells (1991)
• Kuopiontie and Akanristi: 3 wells (1993)
• Hirvikangas: 2 wells (1996)
• Hirvikangas / Perikytö: 2 wells (1997)
• Lahdenkangas / Kuortane: 2 wells (1999)
• Porrasoja: 4 wells (1999).
The ground water quality is reasonably good, but Lappavesi Ltd applies some 
treatment to the raw water. Iron and humus removal is done in Porrasoja treatment plant. 
The flotation sludge is dried using centrifuges. Disinfection is done using ultraviolet 
radiation. The current water use is about 15,500 m3/d. Industry uses about 4,500 m3/d 
and domestic customers about 11,000 m3/d.
WATERLATGOBACIT
WATERLAT-GOBACIT  Working Papers
Research Projects Series - PRINWASS Project  - Vol 4 Nº 1 / 2017
23
Water supply network:
Lappavesi Ltd owns and operates the main transmission lines. Distribution networks 
and water reservoirs belong to the municipal water works in Lapua, Nurmo, Kauhava 
and Kuortane municipalities.
Sewerage network:
Lapua Sewerage Ltd owns and operates the main transmission sewer lines (about 
18 km) and main pumping stations (5). Since 2002 the pumping stations have been 
operated and monitored using a remote controlled SCADA-system. Sewerage collection 
networks within the municipalities belong to the municipal water and sewerage works. 
Wastewater treatment:
Lapua Sewerage Ltd operates the wastewater treatment plant which is located in 
Lapua town, constructed in 1993. The current population equivalent of the municipal 
wastewaters is about 9,000 (Lapua 7,000 and Nurmo 2,000). Industrial wastewater 
load is about 60 per cent of the total load. In addition to the main wastewater treatment 
plant, the system comprises a balancing tank (for industrial wastewaters) and alkaline 
dosing.
Stormwater drainage:
Stormwater drainage is the responsibility of the municipalities.
Capacity and innovations
Human resources and organisation
LV Lahti Water Ltd has about 100 employees. The number of employees has gradually 
decreased since the incorporation in 1994 (Table No 9). Distribution of staff to various 
departments and activities is shown in Figure No 4.
Table No 9: LV Lahti Water Ltd personnel 1996-2001.
Personnel Unit 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Permanent staff Employees 107 105 102 100 98 96
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Kangasala water and sewerage utility has nowadays 15 permanent employees (5 on 
monthly salary and 10 on hourly salary), and one temporary employer. In addition, there 
are 10 persons employed by the municipality who carry out tasks for the water utility, 
but are not paid by the utility.  
Lappavesi Ltd has altogether six (6) employees (½ + ½ + 4) and Lapua Sewerage Ltd 
altogether four (4) employees (½ + 3). This means that some of the staff, such as the 
Managing Director, are shared between the two companies. (Figures No 5 and 6).
The water and sewerage works of the owner municipalities have the following sector 
personnel:
• Lapua: seven (7) employees (for water, sewerage, waste management, streets)
• Nurmo: five (5) employees
• Kauhava: 3-4 employees
• Kuortane: two (2) employees.
Figure No 5: Organisation and staffing of LV Lahti Water Ltd.
Owner
Management 
Board
Operative 
Management
Operations
MANAGING 
DIRECTOR
Lahti City
Water 
production 
(7)
Water 
distribution 
(19)
Sewerage 
Network 
(14)
Sewerage 
treatment 
(22)
Installation 
inspections 
(1)
Electr. & 
automation 
(7)
Survey 
(7)
P&D and 
construction 
(5)
Billing 
(5)
Clerical 
(1)
Finance 
(3)
ADMINISTRATION 
AND FINANCES
WATER 
SERVICES
 O&M
SEWERAGE 
SERVICES 
O&M
PLANNING, 
DESIGN AND R&D
LV Lahti Water Ltd 
BOARD  (8)
CUSTOMERS
WATERLATGOBACIT
WATERLAT-GOBACIT  Working Papers
Research Projects Series - PRINWASS Project  - Vol 4 Nº 1 / 2017
25
Figure No 6: Management system and staffing of Lappavesi Ltd.
Figure No 7: Management system and staffing of Lapua Sewerage Ltd.
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Plans for future regional cooperation
LV Lahti Water Ltd has cooperation in water abstraction with Hollola municipality. 
There have been negotiations and plans on more active cooperation between the two 
utilities, but currently they are not progressing substantially. 
There are plans for increased supra-municipal cooperation in water supply within 
the Tampere-Valkeakoski region (so called TAVASE-cooperation). Kangasala is also 
involved in this cooperation. According to these plans, all municipalities (13) in the area 
move gradually entirely to use groundwater. 
According to TAVASE plans, a raw water intake and an artificial groundwater infiltration 
plant will be constructed in Vehoniemi area in Kangasala (Map No 2). 
Map No 2: Schematic plan for TAVASE water intake areas and treatment plants. 
       Source: TAVASE, 2001.
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Technological innovations
Lappavesi Ltd has taken some innovative technologies in use among the very first 
Finnish water utilities. Some examples include:
• Vortex type flotation process as the third water utility in Finland
• Centrifugal drying of iron concentrated water treatment sludge as the first water 
utility in Finland
• Ultraviolet radiation disinfection (in use only in about 10 water utilities in Finland).
Policy-institutional environment
Institutional framework of water and sewerage services in Finland
The institutional framework of water and sewerage services in Finland is described in 
Figure No 7. Water resource management at the central (state) level is the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) and the Ministry of the Environment 
(MOE). These ministries are in charge of water and environmental policy and strategy 
development and legislation. Under these ministries the Finnish Environment Institute 
(FEI) operates as a national advisory body. Other national level key authorities are the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MOSAH) and the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MTI). MOSAH gives the guidelines for drinking water quality, and MTI through its Finnish 
Competition Authority currently supervises the economic activities and competition in 
the water and sewerage services sector. 
At the regional level water utilities are supervised by the regional environment centres 
that also are responsible for regional planning, monitoring and guidance in water 
issues within their area. The Environmental Permit Authorities are giving the permits 
in accordance with the Water Act. They issue the permits for the utilities having the 
substantial environmental impacts.
Municipalities are responsible for the provision, i.e. the enhancement and development 
of water and sewerage services in their jurisdiction. The municipal council makes 
decisions concerning the general bases for charges for municipal and other services. 
The water and sewerage utilities, which are mainly owned by the municipalities, produce 
water and sewerage services in their service territory. Utilities are monitored and 
controlled by the municipal health protection and environment protection authorities.
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Figure No 8: The role of central-, regional- and local level water administration in Finland.
Source: Modified from Vehmaskoski, Pietilä & Seppälä, 2002.
EU directives are put into effect by Finnish legislation. In 2001, an EU water policy 
framework directive came into force which established goals, minimum requirements 
and an action plan for water pollution control and sustainable use of water resources. 
The Water Act (1961) is currently amended. It deals with the water resources management 
in general.
The Environment Protection Act (2000) is a general law which governs activities 
which pollute soil, waters and air. 
The Water Services Act (2001) sets a general obligation for the development of 
water and sewerage services by municipalities aimed at supplying a sufficient amount 
of domestic water of a good hygienic standard at a reasonable cost as well as proper 
sanitation from the viewpoint of environmental protection. 
The Health Protection Act (1994) includes provisions on the quality of domestic water 
and its monitoring as well as several provisions on water works. 
The Land Use and Building Act (2000) emphasizes the significance of environmental 
issues. The Act makes it easier to consider the conditions for organizing water and 
sewerage services.
Municipalities are obligated to chart the need for protection of waters and the 
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environment. They issue environmental protection orders for the building and 
maintenance of waste water systems.
Water Services Act
The legal and institutional environment for water and sewerage utility operations in 
Finland is defined in the new Water Services Act (119/2001) (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, 2001).
The Water Services Act (119/2001), which conforms to the EU Water Framework 
Directive (2000/60/EC), contains provisions for the organisation of the water supply 
as well as for waterworks and charges. The Water Services Act repeals the earlier Act 
on Public Water and Sewerage Systems (1978) and the Act on Wastewater Rates (1974). 
Necessary minor revisions were made in the Health Protection Act (1993), Water Act 
(1961), Land Use and Building Act (1999), and in the Act on Assistance for the Community 
Water Supply Measures (1980).
Water Services Act harmonises the regulation of the water supply and sewerage and 
the related contract procedures and payment systems between the waterworks and 
their customers. According to the Water Services Act all contracts and charges related 
to water supply will be governed by the private law. According to the earlier act, the 
relationship between the utility and the customer was ambiguous, partly governed by 
the public law and partly a contractual relationship based on private law. The delimitation 
and procedures were also not fully clear, which could not be considered satisfactory in 
terms of the legal protection of neither the customer using the water nor the waterworks.
Water Services Act also contains provisions on consumer protection related to 
water services similar to those laid down in the Consumer Protection Act, in order to 
guarantee a minimum level of consumer protection in water issues. The purpose is to 
secure a minimum level of water services so that everyone will have access to healthy, 
high-quality household water at reasonable cost and that sewerage and purification of 
wastewater is appropriately organised in terms of health and the environment.
Water Services Act provides a more accurate definition of the relationship between 
the utility and customers in order to secure the availability and quality of services in 
changing conditions, such as the incorporation of municipal waterworks, and to clarify 
the responsibilities of municipalities, waterworks and real estates. Efforts are also made 
to improve the availability and level of water services in the population centres and 
sparsely populated areas outside the current territories of the waterworks.
The new Water Services Act regulates all water supply services for population and 
connected productive or leisure activities, whereas the former act was concerning only 
(public) water utility operations. The new act clarifies the roles and responsibilities of 
various stakeholders so that the municipality, water utility, households and regulatory 
authorities have better defined responsibility areas. 
Municipalities have the responsibility to develop all water service within their area 
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according to the principles of the new act, and the water utility is responsible for utility 
services in their operational area. Household owners are responsible for their water 
supply by connecting to the utility’s network and by taking care of their water supply 
equipment. Regulatory authorities are responsible for controlling that households 
connect to the network. The new act aims at harmonising the regulations in drinking 
water supply and wastewater disposal, and improving transparency of water utility 
economy and charges, and customer protection. 
Three main types of water and sewerage services
Finnish WSS utilities can be classified into three main categories based on the 
organisational and functional model:
1. Small private water associations serving country communities and sparsely 
populated areas within municipalities.
2. Municipal utilities serving population centres and municipalities.
3. Supra-municipal utilities.
In 2001 the total number of the two first categories including those serving more than 
50 people was some 1970. The small systems, water associations can be partnerships, 
water cooperatives, or joint-stock companies owned mainly by municipalities. There 
were about 1 000 associations in 1988 and the number has increased in dispersed rural 
areas. The number of municipal water utilities in 1998 was about 500 and some 460 
in 2001, slightly over the total number of municipalities. The small water associations, 
mainly cooperatives, usually provide water supply services, whereas sewerage services 
are provided by municipal utilities. 
The water and sewerage utilities of bigger municipalities have been merged, although 
many of them still call themselves ‘water utility’. 
Institutional development stages of the case study utilities
In the following the development stages of the three case study utilities are described 
more in detail, to give an idea of the impact of (i) overall policy and legal framework and 
(ii) local level decisions and issues (Tables No 10 a-e).
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Table No 10a:  Development stages of legislation and administrative changes in Finland and the 
case study utilities.
Year Legislation Lahti Kangasala Lapua
1951
The first 
Financing Act
1953
Kangasala Water and 
Sewerage 
Cooperative 
1955
Central Village 
Waterworks Company 
joins Kangasala 
Water and Sewerage 
Cooperative.
1957
Lapua Water 
and Sewerage 
Ltd 
1959
Municipal water 
and sewerage utility 
established. Water 
supply committee 
changed to the 
Management Board 
of the water utility.
1961 Water Act
The committee 
for technical and 
real estate affairs 
changed to a 
technical committee.
Public works 
committee 
established. 
Management Board 
of the water utility 
abolished.
1968
Regional planning 
covers the entire 
country 
The position of a 
Municipal Engineer 
established.
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Table No 10b:  Development stages of legislation and administrative changes in Finland and the 
case study utilities.
Year Legislation Lahti Kangasala Lapua
1969
Water and sewerage 
operations centralised 
by establishing a water 
and sewerage works 
under the technical 
department.  The WS 
works has its own 
director (previously 
under the Town 
Engineer; sewerage 
and wastewater 
treatment was under 
the construction 
department).
1970
Water adminis-
tration (National 
Water Board 
established)
1971
Electricity committee 
established. Electricity 
works under the 
electricity committee.
Sewerage works 
are separated as an 
autonomous part 
of the water utility
1972 Lappavesi Ltd established
1973
Act on the 
Water Protection 
Measures for 
Communities
. Lapua Sewerage Ltd established
1974 Act on the Waste-water Rates.
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Table No 10c:  Development stages of legislation and administrative changes in Finland and the 
case study utilities.
Year Legislation Lahti Kangasala Lapua
1976
Ilkko and the 
central village water 
cooperatives join 
the municipal water 
utility
1977
Act on the public 
water utilities
1978
Cabinet decision 
of the water supply 
works. Customer 
Protection Act.
1980
Act on Assistance 
for the Community 
Water Supply 
Measures.
1981
Technical committee 
established.
1989
Water supply works 
became an autonomous 
municipal enterprise as 
Water and sewerage 
works. Transferred 
together with the 
electricity works under the 
new municipal enterprise 
committee and technical 
deputy mayor.
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Table No 10d:  Development stages of legislation and administrative changes in Finland and the 
case study utilities.
Year Legislation Lahti Kangasala Lapua
1990
MAF decision on the 
terms of loans for 
water supply and water 
protection measures.
Lahti Energy Ltd is 
established and the 
committee for the public 
utilities is abolished. 
Water and sewerage utility 
back under the technical 
committee.
1991
EU Urban Wastewater 
Treatment Directive.
1992
Competition 
Restriction Act. 
Public Procurement 
Act. EU Directives on 
Public Procurement:
92/50/EEC
1993
Health Protection Act.
EU Directives on Public 
Procurement:  93/36/
EEC and 93/38/EEC
1994
LV Lahti Water Ltd: 
Managing Director, 
Management Board, 
Supervisory Board.
1995
Finland joins EU.
Local Government Act 
amended.
Decree on Assistance 
for the Community Wa-
ter Supply measures. 
O&M of storm water 
sewers is trans-
ferred from the road 
board to the water 
utility
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Table No 10e:  Development stages of legislation and administrative changes in Finland and the 
case study utilities.
Year Legislation Lahti Kangasala Lapua
1998
EU Urban Wastewater Treatment 
Directive.
EU Drinking Water Directive. 
1999 Land Use and Building Act.
2000
Environmental Protection Act.
EU Water Framework Directive.
2001
Water Services Act.
Land Use and Building Act.
Water Act amended.
Health Protection Act amended.
Supervisory 
Board is 
abolished.
2002
Water utility 
becomes an 
autonomous 
municipal 
enterprise.
Economic and financial aspects
Financing and economy of the Finnish water services sector
The government financing in water services sector increased in real terms until the 
1980s, but was never more than 10 percent of total investments. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
the government provided finance for groundwater investigation and, especially, larger 
WSS and water protection projects to foster the establishment of supra-municipal 
cooperation. The government’s share has been rather small, and it has been used solely 
for the advancement of common projects. The water and sewerage utilities together 
with the municipalities have assumed main responsibility for the projects. 
Initially, municipalities financed projects through taxation, but, especially in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the finance has come increasingly through water and wastewater charges. 
The new Water and Sewerage Services Act interestingly stipulates that WSS charges 
can include no more than a reasonable rate of return for investments.
Most water utilities of the largest cities in Finland are economically very profitable, 
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and they have applied commercial bookkeeping already since the late 1980s. Most 
large urban water utilities adopted a water-pricing system during the last decade that 
made the earlier used ‘hidden taxation’ more visible. Although these municipal utilities 
originally aimed at reasonable cost recovery, many of them earned excessive profits for 
the owner organisations. Tariffs were not always based on full cost recovery but on the 
need to subsidise other public sector activities or to finance activities of the municipal 
central administration. Some of these utilities have annually gained profit to their owner 
municipalities as high as 8-15 per cent as a rate of return on capital and 30-40 per cent 
of the annual turnover. Water charges were used to repay again for the infrastructure 
investments that already have been paid for, and eventually reimburse the returns to the 
municipality. Customers in Finnish water utilities pay on average EUR 17-35 per capita 
per annum as return on capital to the municipal owner of utility. Some of these large 
utilities will in the future face high pressure of reducing their charges.
According to the Water Services Act, all municipal water utilities should have adopted 
the commercial bookkeeping principles by the end of 2001. Thus, they would all become 
autonomous municipal enterprises. In practice the transition period seems to become 
longer. Water utilities should clearly separate their economy from the general municipal 
economy. Utilities should use capitalised costs based on the original purchase values 
as the book value of their fixed assets, as stated in the bookkeeping act and decree. 
Utilities should annually make their own financial statement and balance sheet.
Water and wastewater charges and pricing
Water charges in Finland are in general reasonable, and form only a small portion of 
the overall living costs. The relationship between the price and the quality of service is 
so strong that it cannot be significantly changed. Better possibilities to lower charges 
are with utilities that have set their tariffs rather according to the average national 
tariffs than according to their own real costs. It is easier to reduce water charges in the 
short-term by neglecting maintenance and by increasing risks. One alternative is to 
compensate volumetric consumption charges with basic charges. Large utilities seem 
to charge higher tariffs than necessary for cost recovery purposes, because they have 
been able to bring substantial profits to their owner municipalities. On the other hand, 
the smallest municipal utilities overate heavily at loss, and need municipal subsidies 
through tax revenue.
In principle, most municipal water utilities in Finland aim at the Full Financial Cost 
Recovery (FFCR). According to the new Water Services Act, charges should on the long 
run cover all water supply investments and operation and maintenance costs. Charges 
may include only a reasonable rate of return on capital investment. Water supply 
investments can be subsidised by the municipality, the state, and the European Union.
According to the new Water Services Act (119/2001) the municipality decides also on 
the service charges of the water and sewerage utility. In practice, this does not anymore 
mean that in all cases the municipal councils would decide on the water and sewage 
charges as it used to be earlier. All municipal water utilities should (gradually) become 
autonomous municipal enterprises. Thus, their Board would decide on the charges. In 
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joint-stock companies – whether municipality or privately owned – the Board decides 
on the charges. In all types of private operators, including water cooperatives, the Board 
decides on the charges. The charges of all water utilities are now based on private law. 
Thus, there are no judicial differences in the charges between municipal utilities, joint 
stock companies and cooperatives.
The guidelines and recommendations for water utility charges were renewed recently. 
The guidelines aim at harmonising the principles of charging and tariff structures, but 
certainly not the tariff levels. These guidelines include a proposal on how the regulations 
of the Water Services Act are applied in practice. These guidelines are an internal tool 
for the utility and municipality and they are not distributed to the customers. Instead, the 
revised tariff and service charge schedules are distributed to the customers when new 
service agreements are being made or agreements are being amended. Water utilities 
that are organised in form of joint-stock companies or cooperatives have flexibility 
to define their tariff structures, but in practice they follow the same principles as the 
municipal water utilities. 
The new Water Services Act enables the utilities better to renew their tariff structures 
to comply with their actual cost structure. According to the Act the tariffs and charges 
now always consist of:
1. (Volumetric) user charges, which can cover all types of operational costs
2. (Fixed) basic charges (if relevant separately on water and sewerage), which can 
only cover fixed operational costs
3. Connection charges, which can cover investment costs
4. Other charges, such as various service charges.
Water utility must charge a user charge, which is based on the amount of water 
used and on the amount and quality of wastewater discharged. In addition, the utility 
can charge a connection fee, a basic charge, and other charges for its services. Other 
charges except the (volumetric) user charge can be different in different areas within the 
utility’s operational area.
These service charges include e.g. water meter inspection fee, meter reading fee 
(in case that the customer has not submitted the meter reading to the utility in time), 
construction charges for service lines and opening charges of blocked sewers. Other 
service charges include fees for the use of fire fighting equipment, closing and opening 
charges for valves at the request of the customer, and other services that customers 
may order from the utility.
The new Water Services Act also enabled the utilities to collect fixed charges on 
sewerage. Earlier sewerage charges were mainly volumetric, and were based directly 
on the quantity of water used. According to the recommendations, fixed charges should 
not usually exceed one third of the total amount of fixed and user charges. Utilities can 
also justify fixed charges, if they do not intend to apply connection charges.
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The revision of the pricing structure in Finland was justified also to correct the 
previous discrepancy in the cost recovery practice. In most water utilities the bulk of 
the revenue (over 90 per cent) used to come from variable income (revenue based on 
volumetric charges according to water use) and only a small portion (less than 10 per 
cent) from other (fixed) revenue. On the other hand, the actual cost structure in water 
utilities is practically just the opposite. Majority of the costs (80-90 per cent) are fixed 
and fairly independent on the volume of operations, such as capital costs, maintenance 
and depreciation of fixed assets, and personnel costs and administration. The recent 
amendments aim at increasing the share of revenue from fixed charges to 25-35 per 
cent of all water revenue income.
Finland applies the common EU principles of “polluter pays” also in water services. 
Wastewater charges are typically environmental taxes, and in Finland they are applied 
fully according to the polluter-pays-principle. Sewerage charges are collected by water 
utilities as customer charges, including volumetric user charges, basic charges, and 
connection charges. 
Charges in the case-study utilities
Table No 11: Water and wastewater tariffs in LV Lahti Water Ltd from 1996 to 2001.
TARIFF Unit 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Water charge EUR/m3 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
Wastewater charge EUR/m3 1.03 1.03 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19
Table No 12: Water and wastewater tariffs in Kangasala water and sewerage utility from 1996 to 
2002.
TARIFF Unit 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Water charge EUR/m3 1.05 (0,86)
Wastewater 
charge
EUR/m3 1.55 (1,27)
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Lappavesi Ltd sells bulk water to municipalities at a rate of 0.24 c/m3. The same 
bulk water rates are applied to all municipalities. Municipal water tariffs for domestic 
customers are on average 0.8-1.0 EUR/m3. Water cooperatives mainly apply the same 
water tariffs as the municipalities (at least in Lapua town).
Financial and economic analysis of the Finnish case-study utilities
LV Lahti Water Ltd
The annual turnover of LV Lahti Water Ltd is about EUR 14 million. Total expenditure 
of LV Lahti Water Ltd has varied in the 1990s between FIM 92,8 million (EUR 15,6 million) 
and FIM 114,0 million (EUR 19,2 million) (Chart No 1).
Chart No 1: LV Lahti Water Ltd, total expenditure and the share of private and public sectors in 
1990-2001.
The annual turnover (in 2001) is divided so that the share of water sales is 33,5 per 
cent, wastewater charges 58,5 per cent, and other services 8.0 per cent (LV Lahti Water 
Ltd, 2003). The profit in 2001 was FIM 3,0 million (about EUR 0,5 million). In 2000 the 
profit was FIM 4,0 million (EUR 0,67 million).
The company had debts for FIM 3,8 million (EUR 0,64 million) at the end of 2001. 
The closing figure in the balance sheet (2001) was FIM 420,3 million (EUR 70,7 million). 
Liabilities were 0.7 per cent of the closing figure in the balance sheet. The rate of self-
financing based on income financing of investments was 109.4 per cent. The company 
did not need loan capital to finance investments in 2002. (LV Lahti Water Ltd, 2003).
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The costs of fixed assets in 2001 were FIM 30,4 million (EUR 5,1 million), of which 
the personnel costs were about 4 per cent (FIM 1,2 million). Costs of purchasing and 
rehabilitating buildings and related machinery and equipment were FIM 24,6 million. 
New equipment were purchased for FIM 1,3 million.
The economic performance of LV Lahti Water Ltd in 2001 was even slightly better than 
planned, and it was achieved without any increments in the water and wastewater tariffs, 
which yet were very reasonable when compared to the average tariffs in Finland (LV Lahti 
Water Ltd, 2003).
Kangasala
The annual turnover of Kangasala water and sewerage utility is about EUR 2,8 million. 
Total expenditure of Kangasala water and sewerage utility has varied in the 1990s 
between FIM 9,2 million (EUR 1,5 million) and FIM 22,1 million (EUR 3,7 million) (Chart No 
2).
Chart No 2: Kangasala water and sewerage utility, total expenditure and the share of private and 
public sectors in 1990-2001.
Kangasala water and sewerage utility is outsourcing services and activities 
substantially from the private sector (Charts No 2 and 3). The share of the private sector 
of the total expenditure varies between 45 and 70 percent on an average.
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Chart No 3: Kangasala water and sewerage utility, services purchased from the private sector in 
1990-2001.
Operational costs in 2000 were about FIM 8,0 million (EUR 1,3 million). In addition there 
were FIM 0,6 million of water utility expenditure which was recorded as expenditure in 
other municipal departments. The biggest single expenditure item was the wastewater 
treatment fee to Tampere City, about FIM 3,7 million. 
Water sales revenue in 2000 was FIM 12 million. The operating margin in year 
2000 was 33 per cent, which was rather good. This means that about FIM 4 million per 
annum of the water sales revenue will remain available for investments and as return 
on investment (ROI).
The book value of the fixed assets of the water utility in 2000 was FIM 37 million. The 
cumulative acquisition value of the fixed assets is over FIM 100 million, which means 
that the book value is about one third.
The oldest part of network has been constructed almost 50 years ago. The biggest 
part of network has been constructed in the late 1960s and in the 1970s. This means 
that a substantial part of the network is soon reaching its reasonable operational life 
time. Rehabilitation and replacement investment needs for networks are emerging. The 
utility has estimated that the annual replacement investments (for networks and plants) 
in the coming years will be about FIM 3,9 million (EUR 0,5 million). Total cumulative 
rehabilitation and replacement investments since 1989 have been about FIM 7 million 
(EUR 1,2 million), which means annually only FIM 600.000 (EUR 100.000).
Based on the rapid population growth and increase of customers, the need for new 
investments has been estimated at FIM 2,5 million annually. There will be large seasonal 
variation in the new investments. New investments are mainly covered by connection 
fees and operational margin of the utility. Only if these will not be adequate to cover 
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investment costs, the owner (municipality) will have to spend additional capital to the 
utility. Another possibility is that the utility takes additional loans from the municipality 
or from external borrowers. The utility had liabilities in 2000 for about FIM 3 million, 
with interest payable for about FIM 30.000.
The gross investments of Kangasala municipality in 2000 into water and wastewater 
services were as indicated in Table No 13.
Table No 13: Kangasala municipality, gross investments in water supply, 2000.
INVESTMENT FIM total FIM / inhabitant
Water distribution network 2,965,076 133
Sewerage network 4.353.709 198
Sewerage equipment 7,000 0
TOTAL 7,325,785 331
Lappavesi Ltd
The annual turnover of Lappavesi Ltd has been during the recent years about 1 million 
euro. Total expenditure of Lappavesi Ltd has varied in the 1990s between FIM 4,2 million 
(EUR 0,7 million) and FIM 15,1 million (EUR 2,5 million) (Charts No 4 and 5).
Lappavesi Ltd is outsourcing services and activities substantially from the private 
sector. The share of the private sector of the total expenditure varies between 60 and 
80 percent on an average. 
Chart No 4: Lappavesi Ltd, services purchased from the private sector in 1990-2001.
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Chart No 5: Lappavesi Ltd, total expenditure and the share of private and public sectors in 
1990-2001.
Lapua Sewerage Ltd
The annual turnover of Lapua Sewerage Ltd is about 1,8 million euro. Total expenditure 
of Lapua Sewerage Ltd has varied in the 1990s between FIM 2.4 million (EUR 0,4 
million) and FIM 11.4 million (EUR 1,9 million) (Charts No 6 and 7). Lapua Sewerage Ltd 
is outsourcing services and activities substantially from the private sector. The share of 
private sector of the total expenditure has been about 90 per cent on an average.
Chart No 6: Lapua Sewerage Ltd, services purchased from the private sector in 1990-2001.
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Chart No 7: Lapua Sewerage Ltd, total expenditure and the share of private and public sectors 
in 1990-2001.
These figures are based on the income statement of the companies. Therefore, they 
may contain even rough estimates. However, the figures have partly been cross-checked 
through personal communication with the Managing Director.
Lappavesi Ltd used to have very low debt rate in the past, but during the recent years 
it has increased its debt financing and invested more. Bulk water tariffs have been kept 
reasonably low due to increased debt financing. The amount of debts is currently about 
EUR 1 million, which is roughly equivalent to the annual turnover. The operational margin 
of Lappavesi Ltd is currently about 40 to 50 per cent. Since 1997 Lappavesi Ltd has 
been taxed for its annual income.
Lappavesi Ltd’s annual turnover (expenditure) is roughly divided to the following:
• Personnel about EUR 0,23 million
• Equipment and materials about EUR 2,3 million
• Depreciations about EUR 0,33 million
• Financing costs about EUR 0,05 million
• Other costs about EUR 0,05 million.
For the last five years the investment level of Lappavesi Ltd has been about EUR 
0,67…0,83 million. Lappavesi Ltd applies personal securities for the loans, which keeps 
loan servicing costs low. The company can decide independently on its investments. 
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This ensures dynamic operation. Even in the case of debt financing the total time 
required for availing the funding after investment decision may be maximum 1,5-2 
months. The flexibility of the joint-stock company is much bigger than it would in the 
case of municipal water works subjected to municipal council decision-making process.
Socio-cultural and political aspects
Water services are discussed fairly little in Finland. The debate is mainly concentrated 
among the sector professionals. The public and customers are not much involved in the 
discussion. Water services function traditionally well, which may explain why there is 
not much public debate on it.  It seems, however, that majority of the Finnish citizens 
still prefer that water and sewerage services would be retained as a municipal service 
(KTV, 2003). In a recent survey (KTV, 2003), 51 per cent of the interviewees consider that 
water services are essential basic services that should be provided by the municipalities 
also in the future.
There is a current heated debate in Finland about the number of municipalities. Finland 
has still over 400 municipalities (448 in 2002), but there is an ongoing debate whether 
the number of municipalities should be reduced and to what extent. Municipalities 
have during the recent years had increasing economic problems. Especially small 
municipalities have difficulties in carrying out all their service obligations. This is caused 
by: (1) the growing number of duties and obligations set to the municipalities, (2) the 
reducing number of inhabitants and taxpayers in small municipalities, and (3) decreasing 
state subsidies for municipalities.
The smallest municipalities have increasing difficulties to manage their water 
utilities in an efficient and economically self-sufficient manner. On the other hand, 
larger municipal water utilities are doing economically well, and actually have earned 
substantial profits to their owner municipalities. In most cases these profits have not 
much been used to develop water services, but they have been used as “hidden taxes” 
to finance municipal services in other – less profitable – sectors.
There are no actual “social tariffs” in use in Finland, meaning that in domestic use 
water tariffs would be progressive or be based on increasing-block rates. Basically, all 
domestic customers within the same utility pay equal volumetric charge per m3 of water 
used, independent on the quantity. Also the new Water Services Act states that the 
volumetric user charges should be uniform throughout the utility’s service area, but 
other (fixed) charges may vary. Block rates may be used for commercial and industrial 
customers in some cases.
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Summing up
Finland has abundant resources of high quality raw water. About 60 per cent of 
drinking water is derived from groundwater, of which some 10 per cent is artificially 
recharged groundwater, and it usually requires little or no treatment. The rest of the 
drinking water is obtained from surface waters, i.e. from rivers and lakes. 
Finnish water and sewerage utilities can be classified into three main categories 
based on the organisational and functional model:
1. Small private water associations serving country communities and sparsely 
populated areas within municipalities.
2. Municipal utilities serving population centres and municipalities.
3. Supra-municipal utilities.
Municipalities are responsible for the general development of water and sewerage 
services in their jurisdiction. The municipal council makes decisions concerning the 
general bases for charges for municipal and other services. The water and sewerage 
utilities, which are mainly owned by the municipalities, produce water and sewerage 
services in their service territory. Utilities are monitored and controlled by the municipal 
health protection and environment protection authorities.
In the Finnish case, private sector involvement is understood in a broad manner, 
including also outsourcing non-core and support services and goods, incorporation 
of utilities, commercialisation of utilities, (small) private water associations and co-
operatives, etc.
Finland has a long and extensive experience in public-private cooperation in the 
water supply and sewerage sector, although perhaps not in the sense that public-private 
partnership is often understood (i.e. private finance initiative). Outsourcing of services 
– especially non-core services – of public water utilities in Finland is very extensive. 
Outsourced services can form as much as 60-80 per cent of the utility’s turnover (cash 
flow) in many utilities.
The selected Finnish case studies (LV Lahti Water Ltd, Kangasala municipal water and 
sewerage utility, Lappavesi Ltd and Lapua Sewerage Ltd) all clearly follow this common 
trend of substantial outsourcing of non-core services and goods from the private sector. 
The share of private operations in the annual turnover or cash flow of these water utilities 
has varied between 45 and 90 per cent. Since most of these private services are procured 
on the basis of competitive tendering usually on a rather short-term basis, this model 
has provided for high efficiency and competition within the publicly owned utilities. The 
largest Finnish water utilities are doing rather well in economic and financial terms. This 
applies also to the case study utilities, which are economically healthy and profitable.
The “Finnish type of public-private cooperation” has worked well over a long period 
of time, and thus there has not been high pressure towards other types of private sector 
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involvement, such as private ownership of utilities or operational concession contracts. 
There have also been substantial efforts in improving the efficiency and transparency of 
the municipality owned water utilities in the recent years. These have included adoption 
of commercial operational principles and net-budgeting towards increasing autonomy 
from the municipality, and enforcement of new water services legislation which has 
enabled diverse types of service provision and management. Incorporation of municipal 
water utilities has gradually increased, and there is also a strong trend towards 
regional cooperation on a supra-municipal basis – often involving establishment of 
stock companies owned by several municipalities. Direct private sector involvement 
in operations and management of water services is also emerging, but currently at a 
reasonably low key.
Synthetic analysis of results
The Finnish case study was looking into the key principles and practices of public-
private cooperation in water services based largely on local government (municipality) 
owned utilities which cooperate with the private sector. Such systems have a long 
tradition in larger Finnish cities and townships though many of them are fairly small 
compared with other European countries. In any case, this is the most common 
management model of water services in the EU member countries. It is important to 
note that the public involvement includes not only the state level, but also the regional 
and municipal (local) level. 
In the Finnish case, private sector involvement is understood in a broad manner, 
including also outsourcing non-core and support services and goods, incorporation 
of utilities, commercialisation of utilities, (small) private water associations and co-
operatives. This option of municipality-owned utilities has several alternatives like the 
traditional municipal utility, an autonomous utility, a company owned by the municipality 
or an inter-municipal utility. In sparsely populated areas, joint water service systems are 
managed by private water cooperatives whose funding and operation are nevertheless 
in most cases supported by municipalities. Consumer-managed water and sanitation 
cooperatives in dispersed rural areas and small villages are largely private of their 
nature. Supra- and inter-municipal cooperation of water utilities is an increasing trend 
in Finland. 
From Finland three case study utilities were selected:
1. LV Lahti Water Ltd is a joint-stock full service water company owned by the city of 
Lahti in the southern part of Finland (population about 100,000). 
2. Kangasala municipality water and sewerage works is a municipal water and 
sewerage utility, which has been reformed as an autonomous municipal enterprise 
in 2002. It is responsible for drinking water supply and distribution, wastewater 
sewerage, and storm water drainage. The utility serves about 19,000 people within 
the area of Kangasala municipality.
3. Lappavesi Ltd is a bulk water supply (joint-stock) company owned by the 
municipalities of Lapua, Nurmo, Kuortane and Kauhava in the region of Southern 
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Ostrobotnia in Western Finland. The population within the service area of 
Lappavesi Ltd is about 35,000. Lapua Sewerage Ltd is a joint-stock sewerage 
company owned by the municipalities of Lapua and Nurmo, and the Atria Oyj 
food processing company. 
This report highlights the key findings from the Finnish case study in the first section. 
These are based on the three case study utilities and also on other relevant studies 
done by the CADWES research group at TUT/IEEB. In the second section, 3 tentative 
scenarios for alternative futures for WSS services in Finland are presented, with a view 
to the role of PSP in future WSS services. Section three provides a brief conclusion of the 
key findings from case studies and developed scenarios. 
Key findings of the Finnish case study
The key findings from the Finnish case study are based on the PRINWASS case study 
report  and other relevant studies carried out by the CADWES research group. The key 
findings are structured around the three key analytical dimensions of PRINWASS:
• Policy-institutional dimension
• Economic-financial dimension
• Socio-political and cultural dimension.
In brief, the main findings from the Finnish case study are the following:
• Water services in Finland are still predominantly owned and managed by 
municipalities (local authorities), which have been recently transformed into 
autonomous municipal enterprises, operating with commercial and self-financing 
principles.
• Private sector involvement is still mainly limited to extensive outsourcing 
of non-core services and goods from different types of private companies 
(consultants, contractors, suppliers, etc.). Private operation of water utilities is 
emerging, but is currently still at a low level.
• Regional cooperation is increasing. Municipalities look for increased cooperation 
in providing water services, and also some regional water and sanitation companies 
– owned by several municipalities – have been established recently.
• The Finnish legislation on water services was renewed in 2000/2001. The new 
legislation treats both public and private water service providers equally. There is 
not yet, however, any detailed economic regulatory system in place.
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Policy-institutional aspects
Finnish water and sewerage utilities can be classified into three main categories 
based on the organisational and functional model:
1. Small private water associations serving country communities and sparsely 
populated areas within municipalities.
2. Municipal utilities serving population centres and municipalities.
3. Supra-municipal utilities.
In Finland municipalities are responsible for the general development of water 
and sewerage services in their jurisdiction. The municipal council makes decisions 
concerning the general bases for charges for municipal and other services. The water 
and sewerage utilities, which are mainly owned by the municipalities, produce water 
and sewerage services in their service territory. Utilities are monitored and controlled by 
the municipal health protection and environment protection authorities.
In the Finnish case, private sector involvement is understood in a broad manner, 
including also outsourcing non-core and support services and goods, incorporation 
of utilities, commercialisation of utilities, (small) private water associations and co-
operatives. Finland has a long and extensive experience in public-private cooperation 
in the water supply and sewerage sector, although perhaps not in the sense that public-
private partnership is often understood (i.e. private finance initiative). Outsourcing 
of services – especially non-core services – of public water utilities in Finland is very 
extensive. Outsourced services can form as much as 60-80 per cent of the utility’s 
turnover (cash flow) in many utilities.
The “Finnish type of public-private cooperation” has worked well over a long period 
of time, and thus there has not been high pressure towards other types of private sector 
involvement, such as private ownership of utilities or operational concession contracts. 
There have also been substantial efforts in improving the efficiency and transparency of 
the municipality owned water utilities in the recent years. These have included adoption 
of commercial operational principles and net-budgeting towards increasing autonomy 
from the municipality, and enforcement of new water services legislation which has 
enabled diverse types of service provision and management. Incorporation of municipal 
water utilities has gradually increased, and there is also a strong trend towards 
regional cooperation on a supra-municipal basis – often involving establishment of 
stock companies owned by several municipalities. Direct private sector involvement 
in operations and management of water services is also emerging, but currently at a 
reasonably low key.
Finnish regulations and laws related to water and sewerage services can be categorised 
into four main groups: water services legislation, health protection legislation, water and 
environmental protection legislation, and other related legislation. EU directives are put 
into effect by the Finnish legislation. Thus, directives as such are not directly binding on 
a Finnish citizen, only on the State of Finland.
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The national legislation related to water resources and services in Finland was to a 
large extent renewed in the beginning of the 2000s. The most important law regarding 
water services provision in Finland is the Water Services Act (119/2001), which was 
enacted in 2001. It is based on the EU Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and 
it contains provisions on the development of the water services as well as organisation 
of water services and rates. Other important laws affecting water services are the 
Environmental Protection Act (86/2000), amended Health Protection Act (120/2001), 
the Local Government Act (365/1995), and the amended Water Act (121/2001). The Water 
Act is currently under review and the new Water Act is expected to be enacted in 2004. 
The Government Decree on Treating Domestic Wastewaters in Areas Outside Sewer 
Networks (542/2003) was enacted in 2004. This Decree imposes substantial changes 
for wastewater treatment in rural areas.
Water Services Act clarifies the liabilities of the municipality, and defines that 
municipalities have the responsibility for overall development and organising of water and 
sewerage services in their jurisdiction. In practice, this means that the municipality has 
to make water services development plans to cope with the municipality development. 
On the other hand, the water and sewerage undertaking is responsible for taking care 
of the water services management within its water services area. Water Services Act 
is applied to all water and sewerage undertakings regardless of their ownership or 
management model.
Water Services Act also defines that the key principle is that charges should cover all 
the investment and operating costs. In principle all types of water service undertakings 
are treated on equal basis. Municipal water undertakings should separate their budgeting 
and accounting from the general municipal budget. In practice, most of the larger utilities 
have already reformed their utilities to autonomous municipal enterprises.
Water Services Act does not stipulate in details the roles and responsibilities of 
the different regulatory authorities, and thus their powers and general and based on 
the statutory powers of the respective authority (the Regional Environment Centre, 
the municipal health protection authority and the municipal environmental protection 
authority). The Consumer Ombudsman will control the compliance with the law of the 
general supply conditions in respect of consumer protection (Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry, 2001 and 2002).
Economic-financial aspects
The municipality-owned and managed water and sewerage utilities in Finland perform 
on average fairly well in economic and financial terms – especially the largest utilities. On 
the other hand, the smallest municipalities have increasing difficulties to manage their 
water utilities in an efficient and economically self-sufficient manner. Because many 
municipalities in Finland have had severe economic and financial constraints – partly 
due to continuously increasing service obligations and decreasing state subsidies – 
they have considered selling their utilities to generate funds and easy cash flow. Some 
municipalities have already sold their electricity utilities, but none have sold their water 
utilities, although some municipalities have considered it.
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The selected Finnish case studies (LV Lahti Water Ltd, Kangasala municipal water and 
sewerage utility, Lappavesi Ltd and Lapua Sewerage Ltd) are economically healthy and 
profitable, and actually have earned substantial profits to their owner municipalities. In 
most cases these profits have not much been used to develop water services, but they 
have been used as “hidden taxes” to finance municipal services in other – less profitable 
– sectors. The fact that the larger utilities in Finland have been able to produce high 
rates of return to investment to their municipal owners is an indication that water and 
sewerage charges in many cases have been set at a higher level than would have been 
necessary for self-sustaining operations. The new Water Services Act (2001) touches 
the high rates of return by stating that utilities can only impose a “reasonable rate of 
return”, which however is not clearly specified. The Competition Authority also has not 
been able to interpret the term “reasonable” clearly. 
The case study utilities follow the common trend of substantial outsourcing of 
non-core services and goods from the private sector. The share of private operations 
in the annual turnover or cash flow of these water utilities has varied between 45 and 
90 per cent. The share has been high especially during periods of large investments, 
since municipalities and their utilities use extensively private companies in planning, 
design and construction of WSS infrastructure. Since most of these private services are 
procured on the basis of competitive tendering usually on a rather short-term basis, 
this model has provided for high efficiency and competition within the publicly owned 
utilities. 
Regional cooperation between municipalities and utilities has increased in Finland 
in recent years. Cooperation is seen as a means of improving efficiency and ensuring 
adequate resources especially in the case of small municipal water utilities, which have 
had difficulties with their economy.
Socio-cultural and political aspects
Water services are discussed fairly little in Finland and they do not raise a lot of 
attention among the general public and customers. Water services function traditionally 
well, which may explain why there is not much public debate on it.  It seems, however, 
that majority of the Finnish citizens still prefer that water and sewerage services would 
be retained as a municipal service (KTV, 2003). In a recent survey (KTV, 2003), 51 per 
cent of the interviewees consider that water services are essential basic services that 
should be provided by the municipalities also in the future.
Participation mechanisms
The Constitution of Finland (731/1999, Finlex 2004d) stipulates that the powers of 
the State in Finland are vested in the people, who are represented by the Parliament. 
Democracy entails the right of the individual to participate in and influence the 
development of society and his or her living conditions. The exercise of public powers 
shall be based on an Act. In all public activity, the law shall be strictly observed.
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In accordance with the Local Government Act (365/1995), the municipal council has 
to take care of that the inhabitants and the users of the services have the possibilities 
to participate in and influence the activities of the municipality. The participation and 
influence can be enhanced particularly, among other issues:
1. by nominating representatives of the service users into the municipal bodies; 
2. by notifying about the municipal matters and by organising the hearings; 
3. by finding out the inhabitants’ opinions before the decision-making; 
4. by arranging cooperation in the municipal duties management; 
5. by assisting the inhabitants’ spontaneous action regarding the management, 
preparation and planning of activities; and 
6. by arranging municipal referendums. 
In practice, many municipal water and sewerage undertakings have actively 
advocated the inhabitants living outside the water services area of the water and 
sewerage undertakings, how to establish and organize water services associations, 
their management, and given advice about the planning, construction and operations 
and maintenance of the undertakings. The municipalities can also nominate the 
representatives of the service users to the board of the directors of the undertakings, 
and normally they have nominated the members only on political grounds. 
The inhabitant also has the right to take the initiatives to the municipality concerning 
its activities in accordance with the Local Government Act. The municipality has to notify 
the inhabitants on the matters under preparation in the municipality, on the corresponding 
plans, on the decisions made and on the subsequent impacts. The municipality has 
to prepare, if deemed to be necessary, the briefs concerning the municipal services, 
economy, environmental protection and land use. The inhabitants have to be informed 
also, how the questions and opinions can be expressed to the municipal officials and 
the decision makers.
In accordance with the Water Services Act (119/2001), the municipality must make sure 
that appropriate measures are taken to establish a water and sewerage undertaking to 
meet the needs, to expand the water services area or to otherwise secure the availability 
of sufficient water services. Before taking the measures, the municipality must reserve 
an opportunity for property owners and occupiers in the area to be heard. A municipality 
will approve the water services area of water and sewerage undertaking operating 
within its territory and, when necessary, will amend an approved water services area 
on the submission of the undertaking or, if the undertaking has presented no such 
submission, after hearing the undertaking. Before the approval or amendment of the 
water services area, a statement on the matter must be requested from the control 
authority, and an opportunity must be reserved for the property owners and occupiers 
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in the area to be heard. Furthermore, the Water Services Act stipulates that a water and 
sewerage undertaking must notify the customer well before: i) any modifications to the 
general conditions of water services contract; ii) how and when the charges and other 
conditions will change; and iii) what is the reason for the modification. 
Scenarios for the development of water services in Finland and the role of PSP 
Scenarios for the alternative futures of water and sanitation services sector in Finland 
have been developed utilising several previous studies and findings from the Finnish 
case studies of PRINWASS. An important starting point was the preliminary study done 
in the late 1990s for the National Technology Agency (Tekes) about the future of Finnish 
water services sector in the 2000s (Vikman, 1999). The CADWES research group at 
IEEB/TUT has thereafter carried out a number of futures-oriented studies, which have 
produced useful background material for scenario development. In connection with the 
strategy development for Vaasa water utility, relevant scenario material was developed 
in cooperation between IEEB/TUT and Vaasan Vesi (Vaasa Water) (Hahto, 2004).
The Management and Economic Committee of the Finnish Water and Waste Water 
Works Association (FIWA) prepared a publication “Development and survival strategy 
of water and sewerage utilities” (FIWA, 2003) to be used as a guideline for its member 
utilities in their strategic development. The publication does not include any scenarios 
for alternative futures of Finnish water utilities or WSS sector, but it discusses thoroughly 
the changing operational environment and includes a SWOT analysis. Thus, it can be 
effectively used as a tool in developing scenarios and strategies for the Finnish WSS 
sector. The publication includes a concise appendix showing the strategic goals and 
objective for water and sewerage utilities up to the year 2020. 
In the following, a general SWOT analysis is presented on the current situation with 
water services in Finland. This SWOT analysis is a combination of contributions from 
several sources.
WATERLATGOBACIT
WATERLAT-GOBACIT  Working Papers
Research Projects Series - PRINWASS Project  - Vol 4 Nº 1 / 2017
54
Table No1: SWOT analysis of the water services in Finland (modified from Vikman, 1999; Katko 
et al, 2000; FIWA, 2003).
STRENGTHS (S) WEAKNESSES (W)
• Abundant and high quality water resources.
• Covering and high quality water services in 
population centres.
• Stable institutional environment (legislation, 
permit procedures, authorities, ownership).
• High technology and professional skills. 
Utilities have experienced and knowledgeable 
staff.
• Water infrastructure is in general fairly new 
and in good condition.
• Drinking water quality is good in international 
comparison.
• Wastewater treatment is at a very high level.
• Customers appreciate and value water 
services and utilities.
•Water services are considered one of the 
most important municipal services, together 
with basic education and health care services.
• Financing of water services operations can 
be well covered by customer charges. Good 
willingness- and ability to pay and stable 
revenue base.
• Outside the organised water and sewerage 
systems there are problems with drinking 
water quality and wastewater treatment.
• Small size of systems / utilities limits 
technological and economic development.
• Political interference in municipalities affects 
decision making and development in water 
utilities (although autonomy is increasing).
• Bureaucratic and conservative culture within 
the authorities.
• Unclear ownership policies.
• Inadequate attention to strategic and 
visionary management in water utilities. Poor 
preparedness for institutional changes.
• Inadequate preparedness for exceptional 
situations and crises.
• Inadequate investments to rehabilitation 
and replacement of infrastructure.
• Low interest towards water services among 
general public and politicians, because 
service is good.
OPPORTUNITIES (O) THREATS / LIMITATIONS (T/L)
• Increasing efficiency and productivity by 
(1) merging utilities, (2) promoting regional 
cooperation, and (3) outsourcing and 
competition.
• Utilisation of new technologies (ICT, GIS, 
etc.).
• Successful “capturing” of competent and 
motivated young water sector professionals.
• Promoting export and international trade 
through the image of high quality water 
services (e.g. foodstuff industries).
• New potential for companies specialising 
in O&M of small water and wastewater 
treatment facilities (rural and peri-urban 
areas).
• Networking of actors in water services.
• International and foreign companies may 
bring additional resources and capacity to the 
decreasing Finnish market in water services.
• Deterioration of raw water sources and/or 
other exceptional situations.
• Lack of competent and experienced sector 
professionals (current staff is ageing).
• Inadequate or inappropriate education and 
training systems in water services.
• Increasing competition for economic and 
other resources.
• Increasing uncertainty about future 
operational environment (decreasing 
predictability).
• Changes in the municipal administration 
may cause unpredictable changes in water 
services.
• Uncontrolled monopoly situation.
• More stringent requirements by the EU and 
other authorities. Expansion of EU.
• Intrusion of large multinational companies 
into the Finnish water services market. 
Opening of markets.
Four overall scenarios have been built based on the SWOT analysis and various 
material related to the analysis of the Finnish water and sewerage services sector. 
These scenarios have the following working titles and main features:
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S1 : ”Business-as-usual”           “BAU”
S2 : ”Public sector predominance” “IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST”
S3 : “Diversified and balanced” “INSDIVERSITY”
S4 : “Private sector predominance” “PRIVATE EFFICIENCY”
The four scenarios have the following common features:
• Environmental issues become important
• Discharge limits and drinking water quality requirements become more stringent
• Legislation, including “reasonable ROI”, privatisation is legally allowed
• Financing is based on revenues from customer charges
• Demand for transparency
• Population is ageing
• Development of information society sets increasing requirements for education
The scenarios have the following main differences between them:
• Set of values
• Influence of economic life and business society
• Hard competition in commercial and industrial life
• The role of EU in water services regulation and legislation
• Economic situation of Finland and its municipalities
• Regional cooperation
• Concentration vs. dispersion of population / settlements
• Ownership and operation of water utilities, private vs. public
• Competition for employees
• Quality and coverage of services
In the following, some main features and key driving forces of these scenarios are 
presented.
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S1: “Business-as-usual”  
No major changes in the overall situation of water supply and sanitation and the 
general organisation of basic services in the country until 2025. The overall scenario is 
characterised by the following driving forces and trends:
In WSS, this scenario means that municipalities continue owning water utilities, but 
private sector still has an important role as the producer of goods and services through 
outsourcing and competitive bidding. The requirements set by the European Union will 
have an increasing impact on the regulatory framework, and competition will increase 
over the national borders.
Dynamic driving forces and trends in this scenario:
• Economy is an important factor in politics
• Global and liberal economy, hard economic competition, sensitive to 
economic cycles
• Overall concentration: population, jobs, companies, …
• Hard competition for (educated) labour
• Work is a mean of self-fulfilling, career is important
• Retirement age will be raised
• High technology
• Finnish primary production competes with purity
• No major changes in attitudes and practices
• Polarisation of society
• Imbalanced development of the country
• Competition between municipalities (and regions) 
• The influence of municipalities in politics decreases, but their responsibility 
for financing increases
• Municipal mergers are common
• Citizens are selective customers, but their influence is limited
• Municipalities change from service producer to service facilitator, trend 
for privatisation through competitive bidding for services
• Social services are financed by customer charges
• Ownership of water infrastructure remains with municipalities, but 
operations are delegated and outsourced from private sector 
• Some (largest) incorporated water utilities do well in competition and 
expand their services to other municipalities 
• Competition includes also international companies and multi-utilities, e.g. 
some energy companies 
• Due to increased competition economic regulation is increased 
• Achieving more stringent wastewater treatment standards complicated 
systems and processes are needed, which leads to large, supra-municipal 
treatment plants 
• Charges are clearly increasing due to more complicated and expensive 
treatment and ICT technologies 
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S2: “Public sector predominance”
WSS will continue being predominantly in public hands – i.e. owned by the 
municipalities and controlled by public authorities – until 2025.  The overall scenario is 
characterised by the following driving forces and trends:
Dynamic driving forces and trends in this scenario:
• Scattering, localisation: power, jobs, education, housing, culture 
• Networking, cooperation; the network is flexible and diversified
• Information and communication networks become increasingly 
important
• Social and cultural issues become important, weekly working time gets 
shorter
• Second homes” become common
• Difference in lifestyle between rural and urban areas: e.g. independent 
initiatives vs. organised services; citizens’ activity and demands are an 
important driving force
• Changing ways of life: sustainable development, decreasing 
consumption patterns
• Environmental awareness and problems become more important
• “Think globally, act locally”
• Differentiation of continents, key trading markets of Finnish companies 
are Europe and Russia
• Companies are deciding their location based on logistical reasons
• Decelerating economic growth – emphasis on quality instead of 
quantity
• Interest towards privatisation fades out in the EU; opening up water 
services for market stops; municipalities retain ownership and 
operation of water services
• Outsourcing of non-core services from the private sector remains 
extensive
• Staff of utilities establish their own companies e.g. for network 
maintenance and sell their services for several utilities
• Regional water service companies and/or regional cooperation of 
municipal water utilities become common – yet regional companies 
remain rather small; more cooperatives established in rural areas
• More stringent environmental standards (nitrogen removal, chemicals, 
etc.); better raw water quality due to gradually decreasing pollution and 
easier treatable wastewaters; sludge reclamation increases; separating 
and composting toilets become more common (both in urban and rural 
areas)
• Charges for water abstraction and wastewater disposal will be imposed; 
water consumption will decline; water reuse and recycling increases; 
dual water systems
• Increasing risk of terrorist attacks also in water supply even in Finland
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In WSS, this scenario means a slightly more determined and informed decision to 
develop basic services along the public service domain than in the BAU scenario (which 
is based on a more undetermined development).
S3:	 “Diversified	and	balanced”
In this scenario the organisation of WSS will be characterised by a diversity of 
arrangements between the public and private sectors regarding ownership, operation 
and control of the systems. The overall scenario is characterised by the following driving 
forces and trends:
In principle, this scenario continues and strengthens the ongoing trend of diverse 
institutional and management arrangements in the provision of WSS services in 
Finland. Experiences from different arrangements facilitate competition and efficiency 
among the utilities and lessons from the successful arrangements can be utilised in 
other areas. Flexibility and adaptation to local and regional conditions is a leading 
Dynamic driving forces and trends in this scenario:
• Finland’s economy is doing well 
• Yet, sudden structural changes may affect the economy and municipalities
• International economy and increasing international competition affects 
both the public and private sector
• Success of international organisations and companies boosts also the 
Finnish economy
• Water services sector is directly benefitting from the success of Finnish 
water sector companies
• Concentrating in key sectors, e.g. export of environmental technology
• Environmental policy and environmental values influence 
• Division of power between the EU and the national parliament 
• Municipalities have a high degree of self-government 
• Citizens are active and have reasonably good avenues for influencing 
issues  
• Development of the Nordic welfare model regains support; reorganisation 
of services
• Water services will be retained mainly in municipal ownership; yet the 
private sector may even own some WSS utilities, and outsourcing of 
goods and services from the private sector will be increased even from 
the present high level
• Instead of straight-forward competing, benchmarking of costs and quality 
will become important for water utilities
• Regional thinking and cooperation is important; regional water and 
sewerage companies become more common
• Resource banks are developed to alleviate lack of human resources in 
public utilities
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principle. The regulatory framework will be developed to cope with the wide range of 
arrangements, but also the regulatory system will be rather lenient to allow flexibility 
and self-regulation to a certain degree.
S4:  “Private sector predominance”
In this scenario, WSS will increasingly become managed and in many cases also 
owned by the private sector – until 2025. This development is mainly caused by the 
gradual failure of public (municipality owned and managed) water utilities to perform 
their service obligations properly. The overall scenario is characterised by the following 
driving forces and trends:
Dynamic driving forces and trends in this scenario:
• Global, tough competition, slow economic growth 
• Decision-making power shifts from the national parliament to the EU – 
including budget decisions 
• Finland continues being an ”obedient student” in the EU, being among 
the first counries to act 
• Internal subsidies of the EU decrease drastically 
• New recession, increase of unemployment and reorganisation of welfare 
society  
• Financial responsiblity of municipalities increases and their self-
government increases, but municipalities have severe difficulties to carry 
out their duties 
• Small municipalities are forced to cooperate, rural areas become desolate 
• Municipal infrastructure deteriorates due to inadequate maintenance 
funds 
• Municipalities incorporate their technical services and some sell their 
utilities
• The employees of municipalities are ageing and staff is reduced 
• EU tightens up its environmental policy and taxation, discharge standards, 
etc. 
• Finland has to invest also in its neighbouring regions and especially in 
environmental problems in the Baltic Sea region 
• Municipalities get more responsibility in environmental issues, for 
instance they raise environmental charges
• Citizens’ possibilities to influence are limited )continued)
• Regulation and control of water services shifts to the EU 
• A regulatory system similar to the energy sector will be established for 
water services  
• Wastewater treatment is becoming more expensive due to stringent 
environmental requirements 
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This scenario is characterised by an increasing and strong private sector entrance 
to WSS sector, both as operators and owners of utilities (Finnish and international 
companies). Economic efficiency gains determine most of the strategic decisions 
regarding technical services.
Some of the latest developments in Finland have signs that may be related to 
the last scenario (S4). In Lahti city, there have been proposals and discussion about 
arrangements with the municipality owned energy and water services companies that 
can be considered ethically questionable.
First, regarding LV Lahti Water Ltd, a couple of years ago there was discussion about 
cross-border leasing of utility assets (water supply networks) to USA with an aim to 
evade taxes. This plan, however, never materialised. 
Second, in 2004, external corporate consultants made proposals to divide and re-
incorporate the current municipality-owned companies (Lahti Energy and LV Lahti Water 
Ltd). Both companies would be divided into two separate companies: one for running the 
service operations and one for owning the network assets. In the next stage, Lahti city 
would sell the shares of its network assets owning companies to a newly established 
company (NewCo). The proceeds of this sale would be tax exempted for the city. At the 
same time, Lahti city would buy shares of NewCo and thus gain decision-making power 
(nomination of board of directors) in the network owning company.
The proposed arrangements have raised criticism among the municipality and other 
stakeholders. The arrangement also evades energy market regulations and the EU 
competition regulations. Besides tax evation, this arrangement cannot create any fresh 
capital. Instead, the network owning company – which has no other source of income 
expect its distribution network income – has to draw its costs from Lahti Energy and LV 
Lahti Water Ltd. This again, in the long run, may cause pressures to increase customer 
charges considerably.
(continued)
• Desolution due to migration causes water charges revenue to decline 
in rural areas, but yet old infrastructure requires rehabilitation and 
maintenance 
• Municipalities sell their water utilities to incur cash in their poor financial 
situation; e.g. banks and pension schemes are interested buyers 
• BOT contracts become common in larger towns, but they have typical 
problems with large multinational companies 
• Vandalism against water systems increases as a result of declined socio-
economic situation of some vulnerable groups 
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Conclusions 
In Finland, water services are still predominantly owned and managed by municipalities 
(local authorities), which have been recently transformed into autonomous municipal 
enterprises, operating with commercial and self-financing principles. Private sector 
involvement is still mainly limited to extensive outsourcing of non-core services and 
goods from different types of private companies (consultants, contractors, suppliers, 
etc.). Private operation of water utilities is emerging, but is currently still at a low level. 
Recently, there have been different types of proposals to incorporate municipal water 
utilities or merge them with energy utilities, but yet very few of these proposals have 
been materialised.
Finnish water utilities are on average very small. The smallest municipalities and 
their water utilities are not doing well in economic terms. This is one of the reasons 
why regional cooperation between municipalities and their water utilities is increasing. 
Municipalities look for increased cooperation in providing water services, and also some 
regional water and sanitation companies – owned by several municipalities – have been 
established recently.
The Finnish legislation on water services was renewed in 2000/2001. The new 
legislation treats both public and private water service providers equally. There is not 
yet, however, any detailed economic regulatory system in place. It is expected that in a 
few years time an economic regulatory agency – most likely similar as has already been 
established for the energy market – will be established for the water services sector.
The role of private sector in WSS in Finland has a long tradition and is extensive 
in the form of outsourcing goods and services. Different scenarios (S1-S4) have been 
developed to envisage the long-term future development of the WSS sector and the 
role of private sector in Finland. Two of these scenarios (S1 and S2) are still based on the 
assumption that municipalities continue having the main responsibility for owning and 
running WSS services in Finland, although private companies still have an important role 
as producers of goods and services. The third scenario (S3) is based on a wide diversity 
of management arrangements and flexibility in institutional framework. Municipalities 
continue being the key players, but also private operators and in some cases private 
owners of urban water utilities will get increasingly involved in WSS services. The fourth 
scenario (S4) is based on a strong market approach, assuming that private companies 
will become in many areas the main service producers of WSS services. Efficiency and 
profit gains also result in various arrangements to incorporate municipal water utilities, 
often involving even questionable arrangements to evade taxes. 
Strategically, in the long run, the most successful and promising policy and institutional 
arrangements for the Finnish WSS sector could be found among the most diverse and 
flexible options. Thus, scenario S3 looks as the most encouraging way forward for 
Finland and could be adopted also by many other countries.
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Abbreviations 
c/m3  coulomb per m3
cap  population
cap/km2 population per km2
EUR  Euro
EUR/m Euros per meter
EUR/m3 Euros per m3
FIM  Finnish Markka (until 2001)
g/m3  gram per m3
km2  square kilometer
kWh/m3 kilowatts per m3
m3  cubic meter
m/customer meters per customer
m3/d  m3 per day
m3/a  m3 per annum
Mm3/a million m3 per annum
l/cap,d liters per capita per day
BOD7  Biological Oxygen Demand, 7 days
tn/a  tonnes per annum
kg/kWh kilograms per kilowatt
P kg/Fe tn Phosphorus kilograms per iron tonne 
ROI  return on investment
UFW  unaccounted-for water
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Acronyms
CADWAS Capacity Development in Water Services
EC  European Commission
EU  European Union
EUR  Euro
FEI  Finnish Environment Institute
FIM  Finnish Markka (until 2001)
FIWA  Finnish Water and Waste Water Works Association
IEEB  Institute of Environmental Engineering and Biotechnology
KTV  Kunnalliset työntekijät ja viranhaltijat (KTV Trade Union)
MAF  Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
MOE  Ministry of the Environment
MOSAH Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
MTI   Ministry of Trade and Industry
PPC  Public-private cooperation
PPP  Public-private partnership
PSP  Private sector participation
SWOT Strengths – Weaknesses – Opportunities – Threats
Tekes  National Technology Agency (Teknologian kehittämiskeskus)
TUT  Tampere University of Technology
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WSS  Water supply and sanitation
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ARTICLE 2
The experience of Greece
Giorgos Kallis1 - Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), Spain
Harry Coccossis - Department of Planning and Regional Development, University of 
Thessaly, Greece
Abstract
The article presents a synthesis of research results from the study of the part-
privatization of Athens’ water and sanitation services in 1999. It discusses the broad 
context that characterizes the provision of these services in the country, which until 
the 1990s had been almost entirely in the public sector. The paper provides a detailed 
account of the privatization reforms introduced in the country and examines the pros 
and cons of these policies drawing lessons from the Athens’ case. It argues that 
national and international socio-political and ideological factors have been the main 
drivers of these pro-privatization policy changes, and will likely remain key factors in 
the future development of the water and sanitation sector in the country. Also, the 
analysis of main findings shows that, despite the rhetoric about the improvements 
that privatization would bring, the public sector remains central in the delivery of these 
services. Therefore, the article concludes that private sector involvement is no substitute 
for the much-needed modernisation and strengthening of the public sector. There is a 
need for structural policy and legal reform to enhance the public sector’s capacity to 
deliver quality water and sanitation services run according to the principles of social and 
environmental sustainability.
Keywords: Privatization; water and sanitation services; regulation; financing; public 
sector reform; Athens; Greece
1   Contact author: Giorgos Kallis. E-mail:  giorgoskallis@gmail.com
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Resumen
El artículo presenta una síntesis de resultados de investigación del estudio de la 
privatización parcial de los servicios de agua y saneamiento de la ciudad de Atenas en 
1999. Discute el amplio contexto que caracteriza la provisión de estos servicios en el país, 
que hasta la década de 1990 habían sido estado casi enteramente a cargo del sector 
público. El trabajo provee información detallada de las reformas privatizadoras que se 
introdujeron en el país y examina los puntos en contra y a favor de estas políticas públicas 
sobre la base de las lecciones aprendidas de la experiencia de Atenas. Argumenta que 
los factores socio-políticos e ideológicos, tanto a nivel nacional como internacional, 
fueron decisivos en la introducción de estos cambios en las políticas públicas a favor 
de la privatización y que muy probablemente seguirán siendo factores decisivos en el 
desarrollo futuro del sector de los servicios de agua y saneamiento en el país. También, 
el análisis de los hallazgos de investigación más importantes demuestra que, a pesar de 
la retórica acerca de los beneficios que traería la privatización, el sector público continuó 
teniendo un papel central en la provisión de estos servicios. Por lo tanto, el artículo 
concluye que la participación del sector privado no es un substituto de la necesaria 
modernización y fortalecimiento del sector público. Es necesario introducir reformas 
estructurales en las políticas públicas y en el marco legal para mejorar la capacidad 
del sector público para proveer servicios de agua y saneamiento de calidad, que sean 
gestionados de acuerdo a los principios de la sustentabilidad social y ambiental
Palabras clave: privatización; servicios de agua y saneamiento; regulación; 
financiamiento; reforma del sector público; Atenas; Grecia
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Introduction
This paper presents a synthesis of the PRINWASS Project’s Greek case study. Its 
main goals are to: 
• identify the structural continuities and emerging trends regarding private sector 
involvement (PI) in Water and Sanitation Services (WSS) in Greece and more 
specifically in Athens, where such developments have taken place.
• produce expert knowledge and information and assess the implications of the 
recent shifts towards more private involvement in WSS in Athens. 
Metropolitan Athens is the city where 40% of Greece’s population lives. It is the 
industrial and services’ centre of the country. Athens is located in a semi-arid region 
with limited local resources. The growth of the city and the urbanisation of Athens’ basin 
have been accompanied by a series of water resource works which have reached rivers, 
as far as 250 km away from the city. Water resource management has been central in 
the development and urbanisation process of the city. 
Until recently, Athens’ water management was solely a state affair. The government 
has a tight control of water resources’ allocation and is responsible for the planning 
and execution of all water works. Athens’ water company (EYDAP), responsible for the 
provision of water and sewerage services in Athens’ (“Attica”) region, was since 1980 a 
Ltd enterprise, all shares owned by the State. The Government appointed the President 
and General Manager of the Company and had control over all key decisions (such 
as pricing, network extension to new areas, execution and financing of new works). 
In 1999, EYDAP was partially privatised. The Government made available 39% of the 
company’s shares to private investors through Athens’ stock exchange market. Plans 
are to gradually increase the participation of the private sector during the following 
years (up to 49% shareholding in a first phase, and potentially to a majority in a second 
phase). This model of dispersed private participation through a so-called “equitisation” 
has been implemented in other public utilities. Recently it was also implemented for 
Thessaloniki’s (the second largest city in Greece) municipal water utility. There are 
indications of government’s plans to promote similar schemes for other municipal water 
utilities too.          
According to government and EYDAP officials, this shift towards private participation 
has led to a “modernisation” of the company, an amelioration of its customer services 
and an improvement of its financial and economic situation. It also contributes to a 
more “rational” management of water resources and an improvement of the company’s 
environmental performance (Xenos, Dedousis, et. al., 2001; Xenos, Xanthakis, et. al., 
2001). The present study examines and assesses independently these claims with 
empirical data, for the first time since the partial privatisation of EYDAP in 1999. 
The theoretical approach adopted relates to the problem-oriented, spiraling 
methodology of PRINWASS research. In contrast to standard, neo-classical economic 
analyses, “privatisation” is not considered as a universal model or a common set of 
principles, which by definition leads to more “efficiency”. The framework adopted relates 
to – “heterodox” – institutional economic approaches, which view “privatisation” primarily 
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as a change in the set-up of institutions (Bromley, 1989, 1990, 1991, Livingston, 1993, 1995, 
Swaney, 1988, 1992), or a “re-regulation” (Bakker, 1999), with different implications for 
different dimensions/criteria and social actors/ groups. There is not a universal model 
of privatisation, but different institutional arrangements, with different mixes of public, 
private and community control. Nor is there a universal efficiency criterion, but multiple 
criteria with multiple levels of importance for different social actors (Kallis, 2003). 
The objectives of this research are to:
1. trace the causal factors behind the partial privatisation of EYDAP and analyse in 
detail the new institutional arrangements accompanying it, 
2. identify the new incentives and disincentives that the new institutional framework 
sets and hypothesise on its effects,
3. relate hypotheses with empirical results and trends in the 1999-2003 period, 
4. relate claims and counterclaims before privatisation with the actual empirical 
results.
In turn, this analysis will feed back into the policy process by identifying the key 
issues and conditions for a successful “re-organisation” of Athens’ water services. 
Athens’ case study is important in the context of PRINWASS comparative research 
approach, for the following reasons:
1. In terms of socio-economic and political characteristics, Athens stands “in-
between” the developed cases of Northern Europe (England, Finland) and those 
of Latin America. According to Leontidou (1989), Greece’s urbanisation pattern, 
characterised by a rapid rural-urban migration and an over-population of the 
country’s capital, and its social and economic roots, bear much more similarity 
to those of cities in Latin America than those of Western Europe. The centralised, 
“clientelistic” administrative system of Greece, and the - relatively to other 
European countries - recent democratisation of the political system (1974) is also 
similar to the Latin American cases. On the other hand, being part of the European 
Union, Greece’ economy and political organisation has in many ways converged 
with the rest of Europe. In addition, the high degree of social homogeneity and the 
low (though increasing) income disparities, differentiate Athens from most Latin 
American and many European cities (Leontidou, 1997).
2. The new regime of Athens’ water utility is unique. It is the result of a compromise 
from a government elected with an “anti-privatisation” agenda (after popular 
demands against the attempts for full privatisation of public utilities) but trying 
also to satisfy the criteria of convergence of the Greek economic model with the 
rest of Europe. The State retains the majority of the company’s ownership and 
changes are comparatively modest. In Greece, this model has been coined also 
as “popular privatisation”, as the majority of the shares are distributed to small, 
individual shareholders through a broad distribution in the stock-exchange market. 
Comparing the advantages and disadvantages of this “half-way” privatisation 
model and positioning it with respect to the rest of the PRINWASS cases will help 
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in developing a more complete picture of private participation cases and results 
around the world. 
Sources of information include: factual statistics (annual water supply and service 
data, Hellenic bureau of statistics ten-year reports on demographic data, Ministry of 
Environment annual reports for environmental quality data); government and water 
company studies and reports (e.g. for specific projects, Athens’ water supply master plan, 
report for the introduction of the company in the stock-exchange market, government 
reports on urban water services, etc); water company publications (monthly magazine, 
etc); media reports and newspaper articles; government reports accompanying 
regulatory reforms; and, proceedings of the discussions in the Hellenic parliament over 
relevant laws or parliamentarian’s questions. Qualitative, semi-structured interviews 
were also carried out with water company and government officials and personnel, NGO 
representatives, consultants and engineers.
The structure of the study reflects the key dimensions and topics addressed in all 
PRINWASS’ cases. Part A describes the characteristics of the case of Athens, and Part B 
assesses the results of the new regime. Finally, Part C presents a synthesis of findings 
and potential future trends, drawing key policy conclusions of broader relevance based 
on the evidence provided and the assessment of scenarios. 
In Part A, the first section presents the key demographic, socio-economic and spatial 
characteristics of the city. The second section describes its water resources and their 
river basins as well as the water distribution, use and sewerage/treatment systems. 
In the third section, the key trends and issues in the development of the system are 
identified as a reference for the discussion that follows. The fourth section examines 
the institutional (regulatory plus governance) system of Athens’ water resources. First, 
the water services legal framework pro-privatisation is presented. This is followed by a 
presentation of the political process that led to private participation, highlighting the main 
claims and counterclaims. Then, the key characteristics and changes of the new regime 
are outlined. The legal frameworks for water resource management, environmental and 
public health protection are also presented. The chapter concludes with a recap on the 
governance system of Athens’ water services.
In Part B, the first section assesses whether the new regime is delivering what it 
promised in terms of improvements in the financing and the economic performance 
and effectiveness of EYDAP. First, the financial arrangements for the new, privatised 
EYDAP are presented. Then the changes in the financing capacity and sources and 
the progress with the investment programme of the company is assessed. Changes in 
pricing are also presented. This is followed by an appraisal of the economic relationships 
first, between EYDAP and the State and second, between EYDAP and Local Authorities 
(both were highly problematic in the past). The second section looks into changes in 
the operation of EYDAP as a utility. The claims that the partial privatisation of EYDAP 
will lead to business modernisation, more accountability to the public, improvement 
of productivity due to independence from the state, a more efficient personnel policy 
and better service performance, are examined. The third section investigates the social 
implications of recent policy changes. First, equity concerns related to the potential 
subsidisation of a partially private company from the public purse are discussed. 
Then, it is examined whether the partial privatisation of EYDAP has led to a more open 
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administrative structure and a “democratisation” of decisions. Third, the potential social 
impacts from privatisation-related price changes are discussed. Finally, the impacts in 
terms of connecting previously locally-serviced municipalities to the central water and 
sewerage networks are examined together with the issue of the uneven relationship 
between Athens and the periphery from where it draws its water resources. The fourth 
section focuses on the implications of the new regime in terms of water resource 
management and environmental protection. The incentives set by the new regulatory 
regime which passes the ownership and responsibility of resource assets to the State 
constraining EYDAP to network services are discussed. The hypothesis that these will 
sustain a pattern of growth in water demand and pressure for new resource development 
is formulated and tested with respect to empirical data on recent patterns in water 
consumption and management.  
Part C outlines the findings from the research of the outcomes of PI in WSS in the capital 
of Greece, Athens and based on those develops alternative policy scenarios about PI and 
its impacts in Greece. Appraisal of the strong and weak points of each scenario leads 
to the identification of policy recommendations for the future development of WSS in 
Greece, and the role of PI on those.  The first section presents briefly the current state of 
PI in Greece and examines the key lessons from the investigation of Athens’ case study. 
Emphasis is on the three key dimensions of PRINWASS (socio-political, economic and 
institutional) and the test of the key claim, i.e. whether PI leads to improvements in WSS 
performance or not. The second section structures four alternative PI policy scenarios 
and examines their impacts for the reference year 2015 (although Millennium Goals 
are not relevant for Greece, 2015 has been taken as the reference year for comparative 
purposes with Latin American and African cases). Scenarios include a “business as 
usual” trend scenario with no big changes, a “public sector predominance” scenario, a 
“private sector predominance” scenario and a “diversified and balanced” scenario. The 
main characteristics of each scenario in terms of private and public sector division of 
responsibilities are provided. Then each scenario is assessed separately. The likelihood 
of each scenario and the drivers that could lead to its realisation are first discussed. 
The strengths and weaknesses of each scenario are then examined with reference to 
the key PRINWASS dimensions. This is followed by an analysis of opportunities and 
threats, i.e. factors than can contribute to the success or failure of each PI scenario. 
The final section draws some key policy conclusions of broader relevance based on the 
evidence provided and the assessment of scenarios.
The report closes with the Conclusions, where an overall appraisal of the positive 
and negative elements of the recent partial privatisation of Athens’ water utility is 
performed. The key policy issues with respect to the dominant trends are raised and 
some suggestions are put forward. The key message is that PI is no substitute for sound 
financing, pricing, regulation and participation policies for the WSS sector.
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Part A – The Case of Athens
The Urban Area of Athens: Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics
Geography
Athens is situated in the region of Attica, in the central-southern part of Greece (see 
Map No 1), a peninsula connected with the mainland by two mountainous formations: 
Kithairon and Parnitha. The Athens basin occupies the Northeast part of the peninsula 
and is surrounded by a natural, mountainous crown consisting of four mountains with 
an average height of a thousand meters. The total land area of the department of Attica 
(including the “urban islands” of Aegina and Salamis) is estimated at 322 ha out of 
which 147.6 ha (46%) are considered suitable for urban development (Coccossis and 
Schubert, 1989). 
Athens has a typical Mediterranean climate. The mean temperature is 18.50C and the 
mean total precipitation 368 mm. Rainfall is almost non-existent in Summer months. 
Humidity is 50% in July and the average maximum temperature is 310C in August. 
Rainfalls are characterized by high intensity and short duration creating favourable 
conditions for flood events, which are exacerbated dramatically in the last years by rapid 
urbanisation and blockage of natural local streams. Athens is located in a semi-arid 
basin, and the availability of local natural water resources in the area, with the exception 
of a few mountainous streams and aquifers, is negligible. 
The urban area of Athens is part of the wider Attica region (Map No 2). The two major 
“poles” of the city are Athens centre (historic and present day centre around Acropolis) 
and to the south, the port of Piraeus. To the east of this axis is the coast of Athens, with 
relatively affluent suburbs around the old airport (“Ellinikon”) and urbanising secondary-
turn-fist housing to the north. In the north-east part of Attica the semi-rural but fast 
urbanising Messoghia plain is located with the new airport at “Spata”. The northern 
part of Attica is rural; agricultural production is centred around the area of Marathon. To 
the north-west, low-income suburbs are located (“Ano Liosia”), and further to the west 
and beyond the basin is the Thriassion plain, where most of the heavy industry has 
been concentrated along the coast together with some agricultural production in the 
hinterland (around “Aspropyrgos”). To the north of the city’s centre and along both sides 
of the axis to the northern suburb of “Kifissia”, the city’s middle and high class suburbs 
have developed. Map No 2 illustrates this general orientation of the city and divides the 
region of Attica geographically into four groups: Athens basin, north Attica, East Attica, 
West Attica and the islands.
Administratively, Athens belongs to the prefecture of Attica. The prefecture is 
sub-divided into two major groups: “Athens-capital” and “Rest of Attica”. Athens-capital 
includes the larger part of the municipalities within the Athens basin and is divided 
into two sub-sectors: the Athens and the Pireaus sector. The “Rest of Attica” includes 
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all the municipalities of the prefecture of Attica beyond Athens-capital. During the last 
decades, and as the city “spilled over” the basin and a practical continuum of the city 
extended to cover gradually the Attica region, we can talk of a “metropolitan area” of 
influence of Athens. This is a conceptual but not an administrative or geographical 
division. Therefore we can approximate the wider Athens metropolitan area to the 
prefecture/region of Attica, though some parts in the north and west of Attica and the 
islands to the south, accounting for only about 1% of total population, are not urbanised.
Map No 1; Athens, Attica and Greece
History of Athens’ urbanisation
For most of the 19th century, Athens was a small settlement with practically no 
industry, living by its administrative function as the capital of liberated Greece (Burgel, 
1981). Its fortunes shifted at the turn of the century with the gradual migration to 
Athens of the wealthy Greeks of the diaspora (from Europe and urban centres in the 
retreating Ottoman empire), bringing with them their funds and industrial knowledge 
and linking Athens to international capital, which was repositioning its investments 
to peripheral regions (Leontidou, 1987). The major national infrastructure (roads, port, 
etc.) was designed with Athens at its centre. The city’s history was punctuated by the 
expulsion of the Greeks of Minor Asia in 1922 and the exchange of populations with 
Turkey. Many of the refugees concentrated in the capital resulting in the doubling of 
the city’s population (see Chart No 1). Whole industries moved from Turkey’s coast to 
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Athens, while the immigrants provided a numerous and skilled labour force (Coccossis 
and Schubert, 1991). A process of industrialisation took off, though industries remained 
– as till today – small-scale and oriented towards consumer goods and the local market 
(Burgel, 1981).
Map No 2.; Attica Region
The city’s history was punctuated again at the end of the 2nd world war and the 
following Greek civil war and the exodus of the famine-struck rural population primarily 
to Athens and to western Europe. Faced with an acute housing problem, a lack of public 
funds for social housing, the lock-out of domestic savings from the market and limited 
industrial opportunities, the state allowed, if not facilitated with its loans policy, the 
emergence of a peculiar construction-based economy (Vaiou et al, 1995). First, “illegal” 
self-built housing (i.e. in areas not committed to housing in the urban plans, which were 
thus cheaper to develop) was tolerated by the state and legalized ex-post as a response 
to popular demands. This was paralleled by an internationally unique institutional system 
of pre-selling and exchange arrangements between small land owners and developers 
(“antiparochi”), which allowed the erection of multi-storey apartments at a low cost, with 
almost no need for start-up funds (Vaiou et al, 1995). As domestic savings were channelled 
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to Athens’ housing market and rural population and funds attracted to the capital, a 
self-perpetuating, construction-based growth, with increasing job opportunities and the 
flourishing of construction-supporting, manufacturing industries. Athens in the 1960s 
was the site of the Greek “economic miracle” with rising productivity in the context of 
fast urbanisation (Leontidou, 1997). The urbanisation of Athens provided a means for 
creating wealth with limited demands from the State. It allowed the lower classes both 
to house themselves and to prosper from the booming housing market, alleviating the 
intense social tension of the immediate post-war era (Burgel, 1981, Leontidou, 1987). 
Demographic and socio-economic characteristics and trends
Demography and urbanisation
Chart No 1 shows the evolution of Athens’ population. The recent trend of stabilisation 
of the city’s population is followed by a relative increase of population in the suburbs 
of Athens-capital and of intensifying urbanisation of the Messoghia plain and the 
coastal region of Attica. Chart No 2a,b illustrates this process whereby the population 
of Athens’ centre is decreasing but the population in the suburbs and the rest of Attica 
is increasing. Population also in the peripheral to Athens cities and summer visitors to 
the islands of Argosaronikos are also increasing. 
Chart No 1: Growth of Athens population
            Source: National Censuses.
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Chart 2a: Population in different groups of Athens’ municipalities 
     Source: National Censuses.
Chart 2b Population in different groups of Athens’ municipalities 
            Source: National Censuses.
The average household size is decreasing from 2.93 persons/household in 1981 to 
2.78 in 1991 (ESYE, 1981, 1991), leading to an increased land-ownership fragmentation 
and further extension of the urban fabric. One-person households are increasing, 
especially in the inner city, where the population is rapidly ageing. This trend is expected 
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to continue in the future and provide a driving force for the city’s expansion.   
A main trend is this of a decreasing natural rate of population growth (i.e. births vs. 
deaths). The average annual rate of natural increase in the 1981-87 period was 0.6% (for 
the whole of Greece, Germanopoulos, 1990), which lately has been reported to fall to 
0.3% (Leontidou, 1997). This is accompanied by a related ageing of the population (see 
Table No 1 for Athens). 
Table No 1. Age distribution for Athens spatial agglomeration:
Year
Age group (as % of total)
1-14 15-39 40-64 >65
1981 22.1 37.3 29.7 10.7
1991 18.1 37.8 31.0 12.8
Source: ESYE, 1991.
An unknown but possibly crucial factor, which can lead to the underestimation of 
the dynamics of the population and demographic size of the city, is the number of 
unregistered economic immigrants. In the prefecture of Attika, according to data from 
the Organisation for Employment, 194,000 foreigners had submitted (until 1998) their 
papers for a resident’s permission. This number is estimated to be 50 to 70% of the 
real number of foreigners in the city. A large number of the newcomers resides in 
neighbourhood clusters in the centre of Athens, in houses rented by locals who moved 
to the periphery. Another substantial part finds residence in the outskirts of the city and 
is mainly occupied in construction or agricultural activities (Leontidou, 1997). 
Economy and income distribution
A process of de-industrialisation in the last two decades has been accompanied 
by a growth of the service sector, especially banking and public service-related. As an 
indication, employment in banks and insurance in the wider metropolitan area grew by 
an annual rate of 2.29% in the period 1978-1988. Similarly employment in other services 
grew annually on average by 3.29%. In comparison, employment in the manufacturing 
industry has been falling by 1.31% per year (1% for the whole of Attica) (Attico Metro, 1998). 
The end of the 1970s and beginnings of the 1980s were characterised by an important 
expansion of employment in the administration and the public sector, the ratio of state 
employees to productive workers in Athens reaching a 1:1 ratio in 1983 (Leontidou, 1997). 
This trend has slight been reversed since then.
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Table No 2 indicates the division of production and employment between economic 
sectors. It is clear that in the 1980s the service sector grew comparatively more, without 
however the other sectors contracting. This was an era when the de-industrialisation 
process gradually stabilised; agricultural production is small and relatively still grows.
Table No 2: Economic activity per sector
Sector
% of Regional 
GDP (1991)
GDP growth 
(1981-91)
% of Regional Employment
1991 1981
Primary 2.1 21.6 1.6 1.8
Secondary 26.5 10.3 27.8 38.2
Tertiary 71.4 26.3 70.6 60.0
Source: ESYE, 1991.
Table No 3 gives more detailed data on the various economic activities in the Attica 
region. The table highlights that Athens has a dominant role in Greek economy. With 
the exception of agriculture and mining, Athens is still the centre of economic activity 
of the country, especially with respect to the tertiary sector and accounts for a higher 
proportion in employed population than its share to total national population. Utilities 
contribution to sectoral GNP is higher than the proportion of Attica’s population, 
indicating a higher economic activity and investment than justified by a mere scale 
effect. Tourism in the basin has been declining the last decades (a decline of 18.9% in 
the number of foreign tourists/nights for the period 1981-91). The causes for this are 
often referred to the concentration of the main hotel units at the polluted and congested 
centre of the city and the introduction of new charter flights that by-pass Athens to 
reach other destinations in Greece.
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Table No 3: Economic production in the Attica región
Sector
GDP, 1996
(in Billion 1994 
drachmas and 
as % of total)
% Contribution 
to sector’s GNP 
% Contribution to 
National 
Employment in 
the sector
1994 1981 1996
Primary sector 109 (1.8%) 5.4 3.9 2.5
Mining, quarrying 3 (0.0005%) 1.6 4.3 9.5
Manufacturing 
industry
1,000 (17.3%) 41.8 40.6 38.9
Electricity, gas, water 169 (2.9%) 41.9 29.2 42.9
Construction 273 (4.7%) 27.5 27.0 31.8
 Commerce, 
Restaurants, Hotels
963 (16.6%) 44.9 44.5 52.3
 Transport, 
Warehouses, 
Communications
578 (10%) 51.1 52.4 55.4
Banks, insurance 258 (4.4%) 54.1 66.7 72.1
Services 2,425 (41.9%) 37.1 45.7 62.9
Public Administration 
– National Security
- 41.9 41.9 45
Health – education - 42.4 46.2 48
Total 5,779 (100%) 36.5 35.5 42.1
Source: Attica Metro report, 1997; ESYE, 1991 &1981 census data.
The Greek economy as a whole continues to grow and Athens, its driving force, 
shapes this trend. GNP in the period 1981-1991 grew by 20.1% and in the region of Attica 
by 21.6% (KEPE, 1996). Scenarios for the future consider an average annual GDP growth 
in the region at about 2.5-3.5% (Attico Metro, 1998).
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Athens scores exceptionally well in almost all “social”/“equity” indicators and 
consists of a spatially homogenised society (Leontidou, 1997). It is one of the capital 
cities with the least crime rates in Europe and a very low income disparity. Spatially, 
there is no sharp class segregation in Athens as reported in many Western metropolis. 
Whereas in the pre-war and first post-war decades Athens’ neighbourhoods developed 
as spatially desegregated regional clusters of defined socio-economic characteristics, 
the situation gradually changed as the city grew. The general income depolarisation 
(enhanced by the informal economy) and the creation of a middle class, as well as 
the inheritance of family residences as working-class parents passed their property 
to middle-class descendants, combined with rigidities in the housing market (due to 
high transaction taxes), “dissolved” this pre and post-war class polarisation. Moreover, 
state policies in the dictatorship period (1968-74) aimed at dispersing working class 
neighbourhood enclaves. Coupled with the increasing construction of multi-storey 
apartment blocks, these led gradually to a “vertical” (i.e. within buildings), instead of 
a “horizontal”, neighbourhood differentiation (Leontidou, 1997). Homelessness, in a 
northern European sense, is absent largely due to self-built housing and the important 
role of family in the wider distribution of wealth, owner-occupation and unemployment 
relief. Social cohesion is partly the result of important informal relationships, such as 
family support and income sharing to unemployed youngsters, which on the other hand 
creates a dis-incentive for employment, and partly a side effect of the sizeable informal 
economy. Irregular work, secondary jobs, part-time contracts and un-registered jobs 
form part of this wider informal socio-economic environment, which makes hard the 
accurate depiction by statistics of the real situation in employment and level of income 
(Leontidou, 1997).
The first half of the 1980s has been an era of closing income disparities. The ratio of 
highest to lowest salary dropped from 4.2 in 1980 to 2.3 in 1988; in the same period real 
wages for high-income labour fell by 55% while they increased by 20% for low-wage 
employees. This however, may have partly provided a disincentive for economic 
productivity or inversely, may have been the cause of the lack of industrial incentive for 
technological and managerial innovation (Leontidou, 1997). 
Following the end of this period and the relative de-industrialisation of the city, 
unemployment started growing (Table No 4) This follows the wider European trend 
of economic restructuring and is related to the quest of Greece to enter the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) and to control the expansion of the public sector which absorbed 
a great portion of employment needs in the past decade. In Athens, the socio-spatial 
homogenisation of the city may is changing as nuclei of poverty and homelessness are 
created in the inner and northern parts of the city by illegal, underpaid immigrants in 
short-term jobs. Given the rising unemployment of local population, it seems that the 
long-term stability of the city’s remarkable social equality and homogenisation may be 
at stake.
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Table No 4: Employment in the Athens metropolitan área2
Year Total employment Unemployment  (%)
1971 830,584 4.3
1981 985,828 1.9
1991 1,231,436 8.6
1996 1,504,321 -
Source: ESYE, 1991 census data; adapted from Demathas and Tsilenis, 1985; 1996 data from 
Attico Metro Report, 1998.
The economic future of the city will be determined in an increasingly globalised 
and competitive international landscape. Athens lies outside the traditional European 
development and transport corridors, and in a more general sense it is not part of the 
major European and global networks. The typical industry in Athens has been traditional 
and non high-tech and the city is characterised by small scale, labour-intensive industrial 
units and a large informal sector (Leontidou, 1997). The service sector is still domestic 
market oriented. More importantly, a complex set of institutional, economic and social 
factors puts major barriers to real innovation as reflected in R&D activities. On the other 
hand, Athens is positioned at a strategically important geo-political location, with the 
Balkans providing a potential economic hinterland. Greek enterprises are developing in 
the Balkan regions and services and utilities (including electricity, telecommunications 
and more recently, water) are central sectors in this penetration. Privatisation of state 
enterprises in order to reduce public deficit and inflation-control policies shape the 
contemporary economic environment in the city. The banking and investment sectors 
grew on the expectation of entrance in the EMU but are facing a recession since, related 
to similar trends at an international level. 
Piecemeal development and spontaneous/speculative behaviour have predominated 
the economic attitudes of the capital’s population since its first years and in a way drove 
the construction and economic development of the post-war era (Leontidou, 1997). 
This was once again the case, with the “speculative ethos” as high as ever, a three-fold 
increase of the stock exchange market in 1998-99 followed its “collapse” after.
The city’s economy continues to grow at high rates (2-3%) unlike the typical developed 
and stabilised western economies. A new series of structural investments take place in 
the city as part of the allocation of European structural and cohesion funds and the 
quest for economic growth. The organisation of the 2004 Olympic games provides 
an opportunity to “redevelop” the city and enhance its economy. The new airport in 
Messoghia plain, the previous agricultural heart of Attica and one of the few undeveloped 
2   Data for 1971 and 1981 refer to the Athens agglomeration; data for 1991 and 1996 to the Attica region; 
numbers come from different sources and given the inaccuracy of estimations one should consider them 
only to the extend of demonstrating the general trend.
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areas in proximity to the metropolitan area. A number of other road and facilities 
construction works are also planned as part of the organisation of the Olympic games. 
The Urban Water System 
The local water basin
Greece is divided into fourteen regional water districts. The water district of Attica 
includes almost the entire Attica region where metropolitan Athens is a part of, and a 
small part of the Korinthia and Viotia regions (ΥΒΕΤ, 1988). The water district of Attica 
(in yellow in Chart No 3) is the most arid of all the fourteen districts in the country.  Most 
recent calculations estimate the total surface drainage within the Attica region to be 
251 hm3 per year and the potential hydrogeological reserves to be 277-297 hm3 (YPAN, 
1996). Underground water resources are contaminated, with the concentration of nitric 
derivatives to surpass by far the EU maximum level for drinking water supply (EKPA, 
1994). The carstic hydrogeological units have an open face to the see and as a result 
many of the underground waters are salinated (YPAN, 1996).  The only carstic units 
potentially available for water supply are situated on the mountainous area (Penteli, 
northeast Parnitha). Within the district there are three hydrographic basins (Attikos, 
Kifisos, Sarantapotamos and Xaradros). Kifisos and Ilisos the two known ‘ancient’ rivers 
of Attikos Kifisos, do not exist any more since they have been completely covered 
by built areas.  Xaradros, which springs from the eastern end of Parnitha caters the 
first water reservoir of the city, that of Marathon, with approximately 7-10 hm3 per year 
(Koutsogianis et al, 1990).
Chart No 3: Available water resources for the fourteen water districts in Greece
      Source: Ministry of Development 1987.
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The Gulf of Saronikos
The Gulf of Saronikos is a semi-enclosed sea, which is surrounded from the north and 
east by the coast of Sterea Ellada and to the west-southwest by the coast of Peloponisos. 
It has and area of 26,000 km2 and it is connected with the Aegean through a narrow 
opening, of 50 km width in its northwest end, between Sounio and Poros. The region 
is divided into five sea masses: the gulf of Eleysina, the Internal Sronikos, the Central, 
West and External Saronikos.  
The water quality of the Saronikos gulf with respect to nutrients is characterised by a 
wide range of trophic conditions. Apparently, apart from the special physical-geographic 
characteristics that contribute to the formulation of a negative environmental condition 
(semi-enclosed gulf), the disposal of wastes is an important polluting factor because 
it increases the concentration of amonic and phosphoric algae.  Mean annual values 
of nutrients suggest that the areas of Eleysina, Psitalia and West Saronikos from 1993 
to 1997 have developed the highest levels of nutrients.  During the summer months a 
stratification of the water is observed and the diluted oxygen is seriously decreased in 
depths below 20m. A characteristic example is the area of Eytaksia (depth 33m), where 
during the summer in the seabed there is a very high concentration of ammonia (due to 
lack of oxygen). Eutrofism occurs especially in the western areas (Aspropirgos), where 
all the wastes of Athens end up and at the same time it is the area where many of the 
industrial activities of the city are concentrated (oil refineries, cement).  More specifically 
in the area of Psitalia there are high levels of ammonic, nitric and phosphoric recorded, 
high levels of nitric and silicon in the west Saronikos and high levels of chlorophyll in 
the gulf of Eleysina, which is also characterised by the high concentration of silicon and 
phosphoric. The lowest nutrients value is found in “external” Saronikos (as expected), 
due to the mixing with the cleaner, oligotrophic waters of the Aegean Sea.  On the 
other hand, the frequent refresh rate of the sea masses and its distance from human 
activities, are factors, which play an important role in preserving the low concentration 
of nutrient algae and chlorophyll in the internal Saronikos gulf. A general observation is 
the presence of concentrations of heavy metals in the gulf of Eleysina and in the area of 
Psitalia. In more detail, the north east coastal zone of the gulf of Eleysina suffers more 
due to the high density of industrial activities in the area.  It is also worth mentioning that 
there are concentrations of heavy metals recorded in the external Saronikos in levels 
comparable to the rest of the areas although the stations are situated in great distance 
from dry land activities. A range of polyaromatic hydrocarbons have been detected in 
high concentrations in the waters of the Gulf.
The hydrosystem of Athens and the source river basins
Given the lack of local water resources, the water supply system of Athens has 
expanded to distant water basins (Map No 3), to the regional department / water district 
of “Western Sterea Ellada”, the second most abundant in water resources (Chart No 3)
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Map No 3; The Hydrosystem of Athens
Basic data for the major water sources of Athens are presented in Table No 5. Under 
normal circumstances the drinking supply of the city comes from the artificial reservoir 
in river Mornos, which is additionally supplied by a reservoir at the river Evinos (partial 
operation since 1995, full operation since 2002). The lake Iliki which was the main source 
of water supply for the city until the operation of Mornos, is only used circumstantially 
due to the high water conveyance cost since relating to the need for water pumping (Iliki 
is at a lower altitude than Athens).  Lake Iliki, which gets 90% of its water from the river 
Biotikos Kifisos loses up to 50% of its inflows to underground seepage (Koutsogianis 
et al, 1990). Losses increase with water level since the higher beds were not part of the 
natural system of the lake (the water reached this level only after the diversion and 
drainage of the neighbouring lake Kopaida in the end of the 19th century).  Most of the 
groundwater boreholes around lake Iliki, its aqueduct and river Biotikos Kifisos were 
constructed in emergency during a recent drought (1993) and remain stand-by in case 
the reserves of the city run out again. The lake of Marathonas, the first hydraulic project 
of the capital, due to its small size in relation to the current levels of consumption, serves 
basically only as a large service reservoir for the network.
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Table No 5: Data for the water sources of Athens
Source
Year 
put in 
operation
Distance 
from Ath-
ens (km)
Size Catchment 
Area
(km2)
Average 
run-off  
(hm3/yr) 
Safe yield
(hm3/yr)  Surface 
(km2)
Volume 
(hm3)
Mornos 
Reservoir 1981 192 18.5 780 585 235
380
Evinos 
Reservoir 2002 221 3.5 140 352 295
Marathon 
Reservoir 1929 21 2.4 41 119 7-10 140
Lake Iliki 1957
85
24.5 600
422 
2010 
330
Nr of 
bore-
holes
Drilling 
capacity 
(hm3/yr)
Estimated 
aquifer 
annual 
recharge 
(hm3/yr)
Available 
recharge 
for Athens’ 
boreholes 
(hm3/yr)
Iliki 
boreholes 1992 45 85 30 20
Biotikos 
Kifissos 
Boreholes
1993 - 28 136 200 – 250 0 – 55 
N.Parnitha 
Boreholes 1993 - 43 64 300 60 – 80 50
Source: ΕΥDΑP, 1995, 1996, Κoutsogiannis et al, 1990, 2000, YPAN, 1996.
The water supply system of Athens depends on and influences three major 
watersheds. Those of the rivers Mornos, Evinos and Biotikos Kifisos (lake Iliki and 
boreholes). The basic data for these water basins is summarized in Table No 6. The 
reservoirs of Mornos and Evinos are situated on the upper flow of the rivers, while Lake 
Iliki receives the discharge of Biotikos Kifisos. The competition between water supply 
and other uses and the quality pressure are, as expected, much grater for the case of 
Iliki.  The lake gets the flows, from the irrigation returns in the plain of Kopaida (heavily 
polluted due to agricultural use), and from the middle route of Biotikos Kifisos. Although 
prohibited, there are cultivations in the surrounding area and even at the bank of the 
lake. The increasing banking and abstractions from Biotikos Kifisos for irrigational 
uses upstream of the Lake has led to a reduction of the inflow to the lake (Mamasis, 
Nalbantis, et al 1995). During the irrigation period superficial dykes prevent the river flow 
from passing through the tunnel of Karditsa and reroute the water for the irrigation of 
neighboring fields (YPAN, 1996). Wirdrawals for agricultural use take place also from 
lake Iliki itself where the irrigation organization of Kopaida has a pumping station. In 
total approximately 100 hm3/per year from the potential inflow of the lake are used for 
irrigation.  
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The drillings of EYDAP are situated all around Lake Iliki, collecting part of the 
underground seepage of the lake, and in the basin of Biotikos Kifisos, which is especially 
rich in underground water resources (regulated reserves 500 hm3/yr – YPAN, 1996). 
Still the pumping from these drillings during arid periods of water shortage has created 
tension with the neighbouring communities and farmers, who also pump groundwater 
(Dandolos and Papapetrou, 1994). The estuary of V. Kifisos regardless of its degradation 
due to agricultural activities is still very important part of a European network of important 
biotopes (Hatzibiros and Papagrigoriou, 1994).
Table No 6: The river basins of the hydrosystem of Athens
River Basin
Basin 
area 
(km2)
Annual 
river run-
off (m3/s)
Population 
in the whole 
basin
Irrigated surface 
(ha)
Nature
Mornos 998 15
305,000
900 (estuary)
700 (upstream 
route)
Mornos delta and 
estuary
Evinos 1,111 28
2,400 
(downstream of 
reservoir)
Evinos River
Messologhi 
lagoons  (Ramsar 
Convention 
protected site)
Biotikos 
Kifissos 2,432 11 560,000
13,850 (upstream 
of lake Iliki)
20,300
(for the whole of 
the basin)
Fisheries –
Yliki lake habitat
Riverine Ecosystem 
of Biotikos Kiffissos
The water reserves of Mornos and Evinos are situated in mountainous locations. 
The surrounding areas are among the least developed of the country.  The GDP of the 
district of Western Sterea Ellada is 75% of the mean for all regions of the country (YPAN, 
1996). The lack of human activities or large settlements around the reservoirs (with 
the exception of some irrigative drillings in the Mornos area), ensures both the quality 
and the quantity of water for the reservoirs. The dam in Mornos collects and reroutes 
towards Athens the flow of the river. The deprivation of downstream flow combined 
with the development of agricultural activities in the valley has led to the degradation 
of the natural estuary of the valley and the delta of Mornos, which in their natural state 
and with contemporary legal standards would have been characterised as especially an 
important and under protection natural reserve (Hatzibiros and Papagrigoriou, 1994). 
The impacts of the dam in Evinos cannot yet be evaluated since it was constructed very 
recently. The diversion of significant quantities of water towards Athens can affect the 
replenishment of groundwater horizon and discharges in the downstream springs of 
the city Naypaktos (south of the reservoir). Furthermore the flow at the delta of the river 
can be affected, impacting on the natural reserve of the lagoons of Mesolongi (part of 
a Ramsar Convention – protected site). Reduced downstream flows may also impact 
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recreational activities in the middle route of the river (Hatzibiros and Papagrigoriou, 
1994, Heurteaux and Soulios, 1993).
Network and consumption
Four Drinking Water Treatment Units (WTUs) in the areas of Galatsi, Menidi, Kiourka 
and Mandra, supply the network (total mean supply capacity of 1.46 hm3/day reaching 
1.94 hm3/day in peak days - EYDAP, 1996). EYDAP supplies with water almost all the 
population in the region of Attika. The traditional “service area” of the company almost 
coincides with the administrative boundaries of Athens-capital. Its “jurisdiction area” 
expands to cover most of the region. Some municipalities in the periphery of the region 
retain the responsibility for the operation of their networks, only receiving treated 
water from EYDAP. Few small municipalities use local sources for their supply (either 
exclusively or in addition to EYDAP supplies) (Map No 4).
Map No 4: Athens, ΕΥDΑP and municipal networks
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The distribution network of EYDAP has a length of over 7,000 km and serves 
1,650,000 ‘customers’ (number of connections-meters). The peripheral municipal 
networks are catered through large supply pipes. There are no data for the municipal 
networks. The total length of municipally-owned networks was estimated to be over 
3,000 km in 1992, serving some 160,000 connections (Vafiadis, 1992).  
EYDAPs’ annual abstractions from the reservoirs are about 400 hm3 (EYDAP, Water 
conveyance office). Approximately 7% water abstracted is lost during conveyance or 
processing to drinking water. From the treated water that comes out of the WTUs, 76% 
is measured by end-use meters and priced (EYDAP, annual statistical report 1999).  The 
remaining 24% is lost due to cracks in the pipes or other undetected leakage or relates 
to under-measurement by old and faulty meters. Losses are higher in the municipal 
networks ranging from 10% to over 50% depending on the age and type of the network 
(Vafidis, 1992).
The distribution of consumption for the different categories of charged users is 
presented in Chart No 4. The “common” use category includes domestic and small 
professional users, “industrial” use includes industries and big professional users 
(companies, big stores, etc), “municipal” use includes the treated water supplied to 
municipal networks, “public” use refers to public institutions (ministries, municipal 
authorities, schools, churches, etc) and “other uses” includes a range of specific 
users charged with special rates (e.g. Port of Pireaus, firefighting authorities, etc). The 
distribution of the final water consumption per category of different use is presented in 
Chart No 5. As mentioned some municipalities utilise local water resources in addition 
to those of the network of EYDAP. Groundwater is used through drillings for irrigational 
and industrial uses. These are estimated at 50 hm3/year while the direct withdrawals 
from private and public drillings (watering gardens etc.) are estimated to be up to 30 
hm3/year (Dandolos and Papapetrou, 1994).
Chart No 4: Water use per charged category - average 1996-2000
    Source: ΕΥDAP, 2001
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Chart No 5: Water use per type of use in 1999
  Source: ΕΥDAP, 2000.
Sewerage and waste-water treatment
In the sewerage sector, EYDAP since 1980, when it incorporated the pre-existing 
“secretariat-organisation for Athens’ sewerage management” (OAP), has undertaken 
the conveyance of municipal and industrial wastewaters from the urban area of Athens, 
80 Municipalities are under EYDAP jurisdiction. Since the beginning of EYDAP operation, 
Athens wastewater network was expanded and many kilometers of pipes were added to 
it. Among these, there is also another big diameter pipe, the Supplementary Interceptor 
Sewer (SKAA), in the 1980. 
The Sewerage of the Athens Metropolitan Area consists of both, storm water runoff 
and sewage pipes. The storm water runoff flows reach, by gravity, to the sea (Saronic 
Gulf), and the sewage pipes discharge at the Psyttalia island sea region after undergoing 
wastewater treatment at the Psyttalia w/w treatment Plant. The total length of the 
network is 5,800km and covers 92% of the wastewater needs of the area. Sewerage 
connections are fewer than water supply. The large diameter sewers (ΚΑΑ, SKAA etc.) 
run through areas where the slopes permit the conveyance of the wastewater by gravity 
(gravity sewers), with only exception the Saronic Gulf Coastal Collector, which operates 
with the assistance of 42 pumping stations.
In the early 1980s, the planning of an integrated sewerage and wastewater treatment 
system was finalized. The planning suggested the construction of a wastewater and 
septage treatment plant at Metamorphosis Attica and another wastewater treatment 
plant on the island of Psyttalia. The Metamorphosis Plant is in operation since 1985 
giving primary and secondary treatment. The Plant treats waste from the remaining 
sewerage pits in Attica and part of the sewerage of the northern suburbs of Athens. It 
has a nominal capacity of 24,000 m3/day from sewerage pits and 20,000 m3/day from 
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the sewerage network, corresponding to a population equivalent of 250,000. Secondary 
treatment is provided currently for about 21,000 (8,000 + 13,000) m3/day of sewerage.
The Psyttalia Plant is the main waste-water treatment plant of Athens. Its construction 
started in 1983 with the aim of receiving all the waste-water of the region of Attica. The 
first phase of the work was completed in 1993 with a total cost of 81 MEuros. It consists 
of pretreatment, primary treatment and management of the sludge produced. Athens’ 
sewerage (about 750,000 m3/day) undergoes a pre-treatment (screening, etc) in the 
coastal location of “Akrokeramos” and then through a pipe is transferred to the islet of 
Psyttalia in the Gulf of Saronikos, where the treatment plant is located. Primary treatment 
has led to a reduction of suspended solids by 43% (expected concentration 200 mg/
lt) and BOD by 38% (expected concentration 155 mg/lt). The second phase works are 
under construction and the include aeration and secondary, biological treatment. Upon 
their completion, suspended solids are expected to decrease to 35 mg/lt and BOD to 
25 mg/lt. 
Characteristics and Trends of Water and Sanitation Services
Trends in the distribution network
The founding law of EYDAP in 1980 defined as the service area of the company a 
wide area around Athens-capital. With the addition of some further separate bi-lateral 
agreements between EYDAP and individual municipalities, the service area of EYDAP 
today covers nearly 99% of the total population of the Attica region. The government’s 
policy objective (“consciously” or “unconsciously”) was that all population of the 
metropolitan area is provided with an adequate and affordable continuous water 
supply service. In the early 1980s this was nearly the case in the core of the Athens 
agglomeration supplied by the predecessor of EYDAP (connection coverage reaching 
96% of the population - KEPE, 1990), but was not generally so for the municipalities of 
the periphery which relied on local resources of questionable quality and intermittent, 
low pressure supplies. Population growth in peripheral communities led to the 
abstraction, pollution and eventually deterioration of local resources which, coupled 
with the increased demand, stressed further the need for access to the central supplies 
of EYDAP. While some municipalities were incorporated in the EYDAP network some 
others opted to retain control of their networks. Instead, a special arrangement was 
developed by which EYDAP could supply municipalities with bulk quantities of water 
and then the municipalities be responsible for distribution to individual users.  
The 1980s was a decade characterised by the extension of the network both to new 
users within the already supplied areas (and incorporation of whole municipal networks) 
and to new bulk municipal users in the wider Attica region. Data in Chart No 6 and the 
accompanying table illustrates the trends in internal extension.
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Chart No 6: Evolution of network 1981-1997
Source: EYDAP data.
As the data shows the number of customers in the 1981-91 period grew by 19.6%; in 
comparison, in the same period the number of households in the Attica region grew 
only by 6.63% (4.31% in the Athens agglomeration) (ESYE census 1991, data processed 
for present research). Thus the overall growth of the network was primarily due to the 
incorporation of whole municipal networks within the service area and less due to the 
natural rate of increase of customers within the pre-existing service area.
The extension of the network to supply water to municipalities in the wider periphery 
of the Attica region was also important. Customer and network length figures can 
not grasp the width of this expansion but it is illustrative to note that water use by 
municipalities in bulk rose from 2 hm3/year in 1982 to 41 hm3/year in 1997, accounting 
for about 15% of total water use. 
For EYDAP the reluctance to uptake some municipal networks may be attributed to 
the high costs related to improving the condition of such networks, their character (e.g. 
supplying to dispersed ex-unlicensed residences, non-horizontal residential units, etc.) 
and the lack of a sewerage network in the areas. Municipalities on the other hand have 
also in many cases refused to hand over networks to EYDAP for several reasons. These 
include the importance of water charges as a source of municipal revenue; the potential 
threat to local activities that received water free of charge and concerns for the fate of 
the municipality personnel working in water supply.  
Provision of water from EYDAP to Attica’s municipalities has been typically followed 
by an increase in total water use and the partial or, more often, complete abandonment 
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of the local utilised resources. The deterioration of the quality of the local resources, the 
competitive cost of EYDAP water and its ensured drinking water quality have contributed 
to this outcome. 
The cost of water to the municipalities has been heavily subsidised by EYDAP, reflecting 
a government’s “policy” for cheap water provision to the rural communities of Attica. 
EYDAP’s cost of “producing” and delivering water has been estimated approximately 
at 0.35 Euros/m3; bulk municipal water supplies were charged until recently with 0.19 
Euros/m3. In comparison, during the same period normal household water customers 
of EYDAP’s network in the 5-20 m3/month band were charged with 0.52 Euros/m3. 
On the other hand, one has to note that the additional costs of EYDAP to supply the 
municipalities were also low (given the fixed costs of the existing infra-structure); thus 
the incentive to EYDAP to expand its bulk supply to new municipalities. Many municipal 
authorities, prone to submit to local groups’ and individuals’ pressures, granted water 
free to a variety of users (such as small agricultural production, municipal irrigation, 
churches, schools, or even local “winter” residents, etc). These free uses resulted in a 
considerable dis-incentive for a rational use of water. Even more, many municipalities 
refrained from paying their duties to EYDAP and a significant debt accumulated in the 
years from outstanding charges and/or debts from network-related projects carried 
out by EYDAP and which were supposed under contractual agreements to be covered 
by municipal funds (e.g. for network expansion, connection of mains to municipal 
networks, etc.). In total, 11 municipalities in 1999 owed to EYDAP about 37.2 MEuros 
on outstanding debts (EYDAP, 1999). There are different opinions however on whether 
this accumulating debt is due to financial mis-management on the part of municipal 
authorities, whereby charging their users at normal prices and underpaying EYDAP they 
were cross-subsidising other municipal activities (EYDAP, 1996) or whether the cost of 
operating and maintaining the distribution and sewerage networks was excessive for 
the municipal authorities and not adequately recovered by existing charges (Vafidis, 
1992, Kallis, 2003). 
For EYDAP, recovering its debts from the municipalities has become a strategic 
priority. Cutting off the water supply to whole municipalities is a non-option; moreover, 
as debts have mounted municipal authorities, blaming their predecessors, have declared 
inability to pay them off. The main option left to EYDAP has been the take-over of the 
municipal networks at a price equal to the owed debts. This may raise in the short-term 
the revenue of the company as water use in these municipalities would be charged at 
standard EYDAP levels and as non-charged users would be charged but on the other 
hand, the significant costs for network improvement and maintenance would have to be 
faced. Indebted municipalities also react to this prospect as they value their networks 
higher than the accumulated debt. 
Extension of the network, mainly in terms of incorporating new municipal networks 
and extending to regions beyond Attica, are expected to be the dominating features in 
the years to come (EYDAP, 1999). The expected “extension of housing areas and the 
needs of the 2004 Olympic Games” are the main factors of EYDAPs’ strategic planning 
for the water supply in Athens (EYDAP, 2002: 11.1). In a number of statements, interviews, 
etc., EYDAP and national key actors have defined the strategy of the company as one of 
“becoming a regional water provider” and expanding water supply to remaining Attica 
areas and to surrounding and aqueduct-proxy non-Attica areas..Basic targets are the 
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“the extension of supply network to the consumers, but also to the municipalities of the 
EYDAP responsibility area, in order to ensure nonstop supply”, “the increase of the supply 
capacity of the network” and “the extension to the water supply of municipalities in the 
wider Attica region (NE and NW coast)”. This includes the “take over and improvement 
of municipal networks that are already supplied by EYDAP and the provision of water 
services to the few municipalities that do not receive water from EYDAP as yet” (EYDAP, 
1999). The company has an incentive to expand its network to new municipalities (in 
terms of the economies of scale in providing water through a centralised resource and 
network system and the related increase in revenues) and/or to take over municipal 
networks (as it will increase its revenues through higher charges; it will reduce lost 
water; and it will rationalise its finances with respect to municipal debts). 
It is expected that until 2005 all the municipal water supply networks will be placed 
under the responsibility of EYDAP “due to the incapability of municipalities to maintain 
them, and to pay their debts to the company” (Newspaper “Naytemporiki”, 8/8/01). 
The cost of “internal extension”, meaning the extension of EYDAP’s network to new 
customers within the existing service area and the connection of the last few non-
serviced clusters within it, is to be funded by revenues and by investments made by 
EYDAP (approx. 40 MEuros for the period 2000-2008). The expansion in the Attica 
region and beyond (approx 91 MEuros) is foreseen to be funded by EYDAP’s investment 
program (60% to be secured by European or State funds) (18% of the total investments 
for water supply). An initial estimation by EYDAP for expanding to east Attica and 
Messogia, estimated needs for 1000 km of pipes that would cover more than 200,000 
connections (EYDAP, 1996). Works have already commenced and drinking water and 
sewerage pipes have been laid out to the municipalities around the new airport (EYDAP, 
2001, 2002).  
EYDAP is also planning expansion to municipalities of Attica outside its jurisdiction 
area as well as in areas outside the geographical boundaries of Attica.  Feasibility 
studies have been carried out for the water supply of the islands of Aigina and Ydra to 
the south, Evia, and the region Biotia and the city of Thiva to the north as as well as the 
city of Kornithos to the south (EYDAP information Source, 20: 34). Ann undersea pipe 
as an extension to the already existing one to Salamina, was promoted by EYDAPs’ 
management for the case of Aigina and Agistri with the prospect of setting a water 
supply system for all the islands of the Argosaronikos Sea (Newspaper “Eleytheros”, 
30/3/00 and “Xrimatistirio”, 20/6/00)
Perhaps the most ambitious plan is that concerning the water supply of the island 
complex of Cyclades.  A feasibility study has been appointed by EYDAP to the National 
Technical University. The study will explore the possible ways that EYDAP can 
contribute to the drinking water provision of the islands (including water transfers by 
boats or undersea pipes, participation in partnerships for the construction of local water 
supply works and the expansion/modernization of the networks, transfer of bottled 
water) (Newspaper “Apogeumatini”, 5/5/00). For the transfer of water to islands with 
tankers the necessary installations for loading had been already constructed in the port 
in Lavrio and in 1998, EYDAP had come close to an agreement with Cyprus Republic for 
the transfer of 14.6 hm3 for the summer period. Water would be sold in cost prices but 
the arrangement and the transfer expenses would be covered by Cyprus (Newspaper 
“Ta Nea”. 05/11/98).  
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A recent economic crisis in EYDAP has led to a relative retreat of expansion plans 
and concentration on the “absolutely necessary projects in the service area, meaning 
only the internal water supply network of Attika” (EYDAP information source. 28: 8). Top 
management encourages only projects that have an short-term net profit and expansion 
projects have uncertain and long-term returns (EYDAP interview, 5/12/02). Whether the 
spatial expansion of the network can proceed without some kind of State funding is 
unknown.  According to a study by Knight Piesold (EYDAP, 1996), an expansion of the 
network to eastern Attika could be paid-off within 5 years, but would require a very high 
initial investment of approximately 120 MEuros. The proposal was to fund the project 
only from the extra revenue from new consumers joining the network and paying higher 
prices than they did in the municipal networks. The expansion of the network in other 
areas is considered very expensive since new supply pipes are needed, and it has to 
be set aside as long as there is no State funding or the municipalities are not ready to 
undertake the connection costs.  
Both the pre-existing network of EYDAP primarily in the older parts of the city, and the 
poorly constructed/maintained and spatially-extended municipal networks arefacing 
considerable leakage and losses (KEPE, 1990, EYDAP, 1996). Chart No 7 and the 
accompanying table present the evolution of total un-accounted for water (in EYDAP 
network only) as a proportion of total water input from the treatment plants. 
Chart No 7: Un-accounted for water versus total water input from the treatment plants
Source: EYDAP data.
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It is difficult to assess the extent to which un-accounted for water is due to leakage 
and losses or due to under-registration of final consumption by faulty meters. Since 1991 
EYDAP has undertaken an intense program of meters replacement. This is carried out by 
an external contractor, the costs being covered by the users. In 1996 about 400,000 of 
the 750,000 volumetric meters were replaced while also a program for the replacement 
of old meters started. Today it is estimated that about 160,000 old meters remain in 
the network (of a total of 1,650,000 meters in 1998). Improvement in meter registration 
since 1991 is illustrated in the evolution of un-accounted for water per connection (Chart 
No 8). Nevertheless, the still important and increasing quantity of un-accounted for 
water from 1997-2001 and at near completion of the meters’ replacement programme 
highlights a considerable level of real losses.
Chart No 8: Evolution of un-accounted for water in lt/connection/day
Source: EYDAP – data processed for present research.
Trends in water consumption
Chart No 9 shows the evolution of water use in Athens from the construction 
of the first modern work of the city (Marathon reservoir, Galatsi treatment plant and 
distribution network in central Athens and Pireaus) in 1928 to these days. Water use 
increased many-fold in the post-war decades (1950-1970). This was a period of an 
intense urbanization of the city. Water use increased even faster than the population 
(Table No 7), reflecting a process of new housing. New houses were equipped with 
modern domestic appliances and more water-demanding habits increasing per capita 
consumption.
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Table No 7: Development of population, water use and network
Year
Population 
Athens-capital
Water use 
(hm3/yr)
Network length 
(km)
Connections
1928 802,000 6.1 915 -
1931 - 11.4 - 48,043
1940 1,124,109 20.9 1,295 110,670
1951 1,394,922 21.9 1,386 141,959
1955 - 36.9 - 200,000
1961 1,876,009 70.9 2,458 -
1971 2,540,410 142.9 4,172 -
1977 - 207.2 - 1,017,151
1981 3,027,560 281.8 5,724 -
1989 - - - -
1991 - - - -
Source: National Census, EYDAP archives
Chart No 9: Evolution of Athens’ water use
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Although the population of the city was stabilised in the 1980s, water use continued to 
increase and reached its historic maximum in 1989. This was mainly due to the process 
of expansion of the network to the suburbs and periphery of Athens (see above), either 
by direct incorporation of municipal networks (showing up in the increase of “common” 
use) or by supply to municipal networks (showing up in the increase of the “municipal” 
category) (Kallis and Coccossis, 2003) (Chart No 10).
Chart No 10: Evolution of water use per category of user (1981-1998)
Source: elaboration from EYDAP archives
In 1980 the massive reservoir of Mornos was put in operation, tripling the expected 
annual availability of water per capita. Yet, although population of Athens did not increase 
in the 1980s, in 1989 Athens faced a sever drought crisis, its reserves nearly exhausted 
(Karavitis, 1998). A comprehensive analysis of the factors behind this crisis is provided 
in Kallis, 2003, Chapter 7. Trying to cut down costs, EYDAP used predominantly the 
Mornos reservoir instead of this of Yliki. The result was that Mornos reserves quickly 
decreased but Yliki was also loosing its reserves through the sinkholes. EYDAP was 
under-investing in network maintenance and losses control and did not undertake any 
efforts to control demand or to keep in use the secondary, local sources (Kallis, 2003, 
Kallis and Coccossis, 2003). As abstractions and losses from the reservoirs increased, 
the reserves of the resource system were falling down. A relatively unusual sequence 
of dry years starting in 1988 ended up with a crisis when the reserves of the city almost 
exhausted in 1990 and 1992 (Chart No 11). This however need not have been the case 
total registered 
water use (hm3)
Common (hm3)
Professional (hm3)
Municipal Networks (hm3)
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if EYDAP had had a more balanced share of abstractions from Mornos vs. Yliki, had 
controlled water use or if it had not rushed to supply new municipal networks (Kallis, 
2003).
Chart No 11: Inflows and abstractions from Athens’ reservoirs in the pre-drought and drought 
periods (in hm3)
     Source: based on data by ΕΥDAP
A dramatic rise in prices and an intense media campaign reduced demand while the 
drilling of boreholes in the basin of Yliki provided new sources of supply. It was also 
decided to build a new reservoir in the river Evinos to supplement Mornos. The reservoir 
had important ecological impacts on the downstream wetlands, the flow of the river 
and possibly to the groundwater system of the basin (Hatzilakou et al. 2002). With the 
end of the drought and the addition of the new supplies to the system, supply was 
secured again. Restrictive policies and measures were removed and the policy once 
again one of expansion of the network. Water use increased again and by 2000 had 
surpassed its pre-drought maximum (Charts No 9, 10). A key water policy issue stems 
from this trend of an increasing water consumption. A more accurate estimation of 
source yields reveals that given trends the 1% supply failure risk will be surpassed by 
demand within this decade (Chart No 12), despite expectations that the new water works 
had secured availability of supply until 2030 (Kallis, 2003, Kallis and Coccossis, 2003). 
A potential new expansion of the hydrosystem to the west, potentially to the ecological 
reserve of the Acheloos river, implies detrimental environmental impacts (Kallis and 
Coccossis, 2000). Intensification of abstractions from the Yliki basin breeds conflicts 
with agricultural uses in the basin, especially in drought periods (Kallis, 2003).
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Chart No 12: Forecasts of water consumption and sources’ yield
Trends in sewerage services
The most important development is the progress with the completion of the 
secondary treatment unit at the plant of Psyttalia, which receives the majority of Athens’ 
waste-water. There are also on-going works for energy recovery in the plant and sludge 
treatment and safe disposal.
A key issue is the provision of sewerage services to the urbanising Messoghia plain 
and the eastern coast of Attica as well as the Thriassion plain in the west. EYDAP is 
studying and preparing for the extension of the sewerage network in these areas. There 
is also planning for the construction of smaller, local wastewater treatment plants in the 
eastern coastal areas (Marathon, Ν.Makri, Spata Airport, Anavissos, Saronis, Ρ.Phokea, 
Kalivia Coast, Legrena, Charax, Keratea, Lavreotiki, Lavrio, Ag.Konstaninos) and to the 
west (Thriassion Pedion). Currently sewerage from these areas is directly disposed to 
the sea. 
EYDAP is also studying the improvement of the sewerage network in many areas 
of the city which are currently underserved and where many households depend on 
sewerage pits (collected by trucks and disposed for treatment in the Metamorphosis 
plant). A considerable part of the investment plan of EYDAP (see next chapter) is devoted 
to the expansion of the sewerage network, the replacement and repair of the existing 
network and the installation of new pumping stations that will improve delivery. 
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Another important target is the construction of a supplementary sewerage pipe 
that will receive excess run-off, alleviating stormwater run-off to the Gulf of Saronicos, 
especially from the southern suburbs. 
Policy, Institutional, Socio-political and Cultural Environment
Legal framework and water services pro-privatisation
Until recently (1999), Athens’ water supply and sewerage services were regulated by 
Law 1086/1980, founding law of Athens Water Supply and Sewerage Company (EYDAP) 
S.A. Law 1080/1980 regulated all other municipal water utilities and municipal water 
departments of Greece (including those within Athens, which retained the responsibility 
of their own networks). 
EYDAP was founded as a limited company operating under private law but with 
the objectives of a “public utility”. The Greek State was the sole stockholder. EYDAP 
incorporated Athens Water Company S.A. and the Athens Organisation for Sewerage, 
which was a public body. The supervision of EYDAP was under the Ministry of Public 
Works (MPW).  Later, when the MPW was incorporated in the Ministry of Environment, 
Spatial Planning and Public Works (MESPPW), the responsibility for EYDAP remained 
with the undersecretary with the portfolio for public works.  All the other public water 
companies in the country were under the Ministry of internal Affairs (later it became 
Ministry of Public Management and Decentralisation).  
Presidential Decree 488/1987, activating Law 1365/1983 concerning the “socialisation 
of companies of public character or utility”, set a nine-members Board of Directors, 
consisting of five representatives of the State, two of the employees and two from the 
local authorities serves. The board of directors, the president and the general manager 
of the company (who is in the head of all departments and is the highest executive 
of the company) are determined by the Government with a common decision of the 
Minister of ESPPW (Environment, Spatial Planning and Public Works), the Minister of 
Internal Affairs and the Minister of Economy. The same ministries were to represent the 
Government in the council of EYDAP’s shareholders.  
With the founding law of EYDAP, all assets relating to water supply and sewerage 
of the area of Athens (resources, conveyance and treatment systems included) were 
transferred by predecessor companies and the state to EYDAP (with their pending 
credits). The duty of EYDAP was the operation and development of all necessary systems 
for the supply of its area of responsibility. The area of responsibility was extended from 
that of its predecessor (which was confined mostly to Athens -capital) to all the Attica 
region. The task of the company was to supply all users within this area with water 
and sewerage services of pre-defined standards (for water supply defined in 1983 at 
a charter of service operation). The assets of the company were evaluated and 1,000 
stocks were issued in the name of the Greek State. 
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With respect to municipal networks within the area of responsibility of EYDAP, the 
provision was that within 6 months the company should reach a financial agreement 
with the municipalities for the take-over of the networks. In case an agreement was not 
reached a judicial procedure was foreseen.  
The main sources of revenue for the company are the charges for water supply and 
sewage, a special tax on new buildings and a charge for new connections. The cost of 
pipes serving municipal networks fall upon the local authorities, while the additional 
expense for constructing water supply network outside the conventional housing zones 
burden the customers- house owners. Water prices were designed in order to cover 
capital and operational costs of the company as well as pending credits and interest 
rates. In addition, surplus revenues would be used for long-term investments and for 
paying a dividend to the shareholders (i.e. the State and the municipalities). Tariffs were 
to be decided by a multi-ministerial committee headed by the Minister of National 
Economy (with the Ministers of Public Works, Co-ordination and Internal Affairs) under 
the proposal of the Board of the company with respect to the above objectives. There 
was no provision for a regular review.
Although EYDAP assumed the responsibility for all drinking water and sewerage 
works, it was foreseen for major projects (especially, dams and wastewater treatment 
plants), to delegate (upon the request of the Board of EYDAP) the responsibility for 
financing and construction of the water work to the Ministry of Public Works. 
EYDAP was intended to operate as an independent limited company of public utility 
under public ownership and control (more or less corresponding to a model of a public 
enterprise under “legal privatisation” - Kraemer, 1997). In practice, the organisation of 
Athens water sector in the 1980s and most of the 1990s resembled a statist model, 
EYDAP being managed as a “branch” of the Ministry of Public Works. Directors and 
presidents were directly appointed by the government (and frequently changed). The 
government was directly responsible for hirings and could also transfer employees 
from other public sector services to and from EYDAP. The government had also a direct 
intervention in practical matters such as delivering water free of charge to certain uses, 
etc. 
 EYDAP from its founding was financially burdened with the debts of its predecessors 
and pre-1974 unpaid credits and interests from the Mornos project and from sewerage 
works which were passed to the company in 1980. Moreover, the company undertook 
the task to finish off segments of the Mornos aqueduct and intervene in the considerable 
deficiencies in its construction that emerged in operation. Also, the State delegated 
the task to EYDAP to finance and construct public projects for the drainage and flood 
protection of Athens without economic reward for those. 
On the other hand prices, with the exception of an increase in 1982 were not changed 
regularly and when changed did not reflect the costs of operation of EYDAP but the 
payment of accumulating debts. The institutional role of the board of the company in 
the determination of the prices was sidelined other than in pressing and bargaining 
with Ministers and the government for a review of charges to reflect inflation-growing 
costs and growing annual deficits. Decisions on utilities’ prices were taken by a multi-
Ministerial “Committee of Prices” at irregular intervals. Water prices were kept constant 
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as part of inflation-control policy, in a period where annual inflation rates were in the 
order of 30%. Although increasing water consumption secured that revenues surpassed 
operational costs, EYDAP was fast accumulating a deficit due to the interest rates on 
pending credit (KEPE, 1990). This precluded any sort of a longer-term investment, led 
to poor maintenance of the network and control of losses, and provided a disincentive 
against demand-side management or a wiser use of the Mornos-Yliki system that would 
have prevented the drought crisis (Kallis, 2003). 
In 1992 the state increased its stocks in the company by capitalising its pending 
credits in an effort to rationalise the finances of EYDAP. However in 1993, the state 
withdrew a tax applied to all new building constructions (3% of cost) and assigned to 
EYDAP. The promise was to replace it in due time by a more suitable fund. This created 
a new substantial deficit in the budget of the company, which reacted by not allocating 
to the state the fee it collected from water bills for the repayment of the Mornos project. 
Moreover, administration offices and buildings and the municipalities often refrained 
from paying their water-use duties to EYDAP. In this way, the state and EYDAP were 
indebted one to the other with contested amounts.  
As EYDAP and municipalities did not reach an agreement in all cases for a hand-over 
of networks, a provision was made for the supply of water in bulk quantities to the 
municipalities at a subsidised price. Decision on the expansion of supply to new 
municipalities and/or incorporation of networks became also a political decision, 
EYDAP having to follow the orders of the government whose decisions reflected more 
general political objectives and specific (electoral-driven) relationships with some 
municipalities. Detailed pre-expansion cost-benefit assessments were not taken; as a 
result EYDAP took over a number of problematic and costly networks. 
The process towards privatisation: arguments and conflicts
The process
The process of regulatory change of Athens’ water supply in Athens demonstrates 
that these changes were determined by the goal of privatisating EYDAP per se, rather 
than the other way round, i.e. privatization being considered as one among several 
options to achieve certain regulatory goals. Ideally, first the needs of a sustainable water 
supply system should have been analysed in order to design a supportive institutional 
framework, and then the most suitable organisational form should have been chosen 
for EYDAP.  
With the Presidential Decree 139/22.4.92, EYDAP along with other public organizations, 
was removed from the control of the public sector.  The model of privatisation that was 
promoted by the then government wanted the creation of a subsidiary company with 
the participation of a multinational “strategic investor”.  According to information that 
leaked to the press there was an intention for an agreement between the Government 
and British Thames Water Utility Ltd.  EYDAP would maintain the 51-60% of the 
subsidiary’s stocks but would be administrated by Thames, which would appoint the 
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General Director and the managers, have full control over the operation of the company 
(EYDAP information Source, 4, 3). Preparing the ground for privatisation, the government 
took a series of measures for the clarification of the situation with EYDAPs’ finances. The 
debts of EYDAP to the Greek State from various loans were capitalized with an increase 
in the capital of the company and State’s share.  Furthermore, an increase of prices the 
same year did not only aim at the reduction of demand, as was argued by officials, but 
also “in order to increase the revenue and attractiveness of EYDAP (Apostolakis, 1999). 
The view of Kaika (2000) is that the government took advantage, or even 
intentionally dramatized the water drought crisis (1990-1993) in order to prepare the 
ground for privatisation.  The increase in prices, which the public would only accept in 
a crisis situation, greatly helped EYDAP become more attractive to private investors. 
Furthermore the water shortage crisis supported arguments of public “mismanagement” 
of water services, justifying calls for privatisation. 
Law 2065/92 deducted from EYDAP the 3% tax it collected from new building 
constructions. The excuse was that this measure was “within the framework of solidarity 
to property developers for the reduction of construction costs and the revitalisation of 
the real-estate market” (EYDAP Source of Information, 9, 5). After removal of the tax, 
results in the annual balance of EYDAP were particularly negative (Apostolakis, 1999) 
supporting governments view that EYDAP had a deficit.  The law however, planned for 
the tax to be substituted at a later time by another equivalent charge from the state 
budget, although it was not specified when this would be done. Therefore, while EYDAP 
appeared deficient in the short-term, justifying government plans for privatization, 
it could easily be turned into a profitable enterprise, when the building tax would be 
reconvened. 
The privatisation program of the conservative government of the time met great 
opposition. The new social-democrats government in 1993 won the elections with the 
promise to modernize the economy, but without privatisation.  Law 2414/1996 “for the 
modernization of public companies and organizations”, defined EYDAP as a “public 
utility company” (PUC). Part of the so-called “modernization” programme for public 
utilities was the re-enforcement on management independence and the definition and 
regulation of precise relations with the State and consumers. The Law required that 
the Board of directors puts together a Strategic (10-20 years) and a midterm Master 
Plan (3-5 years), which would be approved by the Ministers of National Economy and 
MESPPW. The Master Plan ought to specify aims, time of implementation, means and 
actions and internal monitoring processes. It would form the basis for the “Management 
Contract” between the board of directors (BOD) and the two ministers for the duration 
of the term of the BOD. The contract included the monitoring of financial indicators and 
the company was obliged to produce an annual progress report. The law also set a fair 
and independent process for selecting the General Director of the Company, who would 
now concentrate most responsibilities in his/her hands. The composition of the BOD 
became more operational with the addition of specialised general managers. For the 
first time productivity incentives were allowed for the personnel. The scale of wages was 
liberated without interference though to existing employee contracts. Finally another 
novelty was the obligation of EYDAP to provide the MESPPW with a “Consumer Charter”. 
The Charter describes a series of obligations from the part of EYDAP (e.g. minimum 
response time to written demands, response time for service problems) and defines 
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fines in cases of failure to meet these standards.  
For critics, the PUCs Law was just a first, mild and “hidden” step towards privatisation, 
since it allowed the “change in the stock capital” of the companies and asked that the 
companies “operate with the rules of private economy” (Article 2). The president of 
EYDAP assured the staff that “the rumour that law was the first stage for privatisation”, 
was false and unsubstantiated and misinterprets the spirit of the Law (Article in EYDAP 
Source of Information, June 1996, 4: 3). The government though, soon changed the – 
hesitant as far as privatisation was concerned - president of EYDAP. The new President 
did not hide that his main responsibility was the process of making available part of the 
stocks of the company to private shareholders. In his first interview in a newspaper, he 
advised Athenians to “drink without hesitation water from EYDAP and in the future also 
buy EYDAP” (Newspaper “Ta Nea”, 26/05/98). The new General Manager had previous 
experience as head of the National Salt Industry which was privatised through a staged 
process of first making part of the company’s shares available to private investors 
(Interview, January 1999, EYDAP Information Source, 13, 4). According to the press 
the positioning of a new president and the choice of a general Manager with relevant 
experience clearly stated the adoption by the Government of a “hard privatisation policy 
for EYDAP” (EYDAP Information Source, 12: 10) and the government’s intention to “quickly 
introduce the company in the stock-exchange market” (Newspaper “Apogeumatini”, 
13/6/98).  
The term ‘equitisation’ replaced this of ‘privatisation’. Equitisation referred to the 
preservation of the majority control of the company from the State, but the disposition 
of either ‘part of its shares..or new shares that resulted from the company’s stock capital 
increase’ in the stock-exchange market (Apostolakis, 1998:25) with the aim to ‘draw 
capital without the need for subsidies from the State Budget and without needs for 
unfavourable loans from banks’ (Interview of EYDAP’s President Mr. Papavasileiou, 
September 1998, EYDAP Source of Information, 12:11). This conciliatory model between 
full privatization of assets and continuation of public control had already been in 
practice in other PUCs in Telecommunications and Electricity services. The companies 
were enlisted in the stock-exchange market and then a large (but minority) share of 
equity was sold to new dispersed shareholders. In this way, the State retained also the 
option to move in a next stage to moves that had caused much reaction in the past, i.e. 
sell its stock to a large shareholder that would take all control rights or form a strategic 
partnership and delegate management by selling a small part of its stock (Xenos et al, 
2001).
The Hellenic Bank for Investments for Industrial Development (ETEVA), was contracted 
by the government as the consultant for the equtisation of EYDAP. The experience from 
different schemes of private sector participation in water services around the world was 
reviewed together with an analysis of the fiscal data of EYDAP.  The conclusion was that 
the high fixed costs of EYDAP with their low return were rendering the company of low 
interest for investors. The proposal was against the equitisation of the full company, but 
for the establishment of a subsidiary, which would retain only the ‘commercial part’ of 
EYDAP. This would avoid problems in the assessment of the property assets and would 
remove the ‘burden’ of the non-profitable, low-return fixed assets (dams, channels, etc). 
The exact objective of the subsidiary was not defined but the intention was to focus on 
network operation and ‘service delivery, provision of treated water and the collection 
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of customers’ revenues and debts. renting the network from the State. buying refined 
water. and (operating according to a predefined) agreement on prices’ (Interview of 
EYDAP President, op cited.: 12).
The model that was finally selected (see details in next chapter) did not opt for the 
establishment of a subsidiary company, but in the spirit of the above removed from 
the equitised EYDAP S.A. the fixed assets (reservoirs and aqueducts) and shifted them 
to the ownership of a newly established state organisation, ‘EYDAP Fixed Assets 
Company’ (EPEYDAP). EYDAP S.A. resumed the right for the operation and exploitation 
of the distribution network from Treatment Units to effluent discharge, for twenty years 
and as defined by the rules set in the Contract with the State.
The majority of EYDAP’s shares remained under the ownership of the State with 
a minority package plus the increase of stock capital becoming available to private 
investors. As regards to the form of private participation, it was decided that shares 
should be traded in the stock exchange market so as to ‘guarantee that there will be a 
wide dispersal, which would protect the company (and its public nature) from the control 
of foreign strategic investors’ (Speech of General Manager of EYDAP to employees, 
September 13 1999, EYDAP Source of Information,17:16). However, the government was 
criticised that its choice did not stem from its intention to protect the company from 
foreign owners but from its wish to exploit the favourable conditions of the stock exchange 
market at the time which led to an overestimation of the value of most companies 
entering the market (between 1998-1999 the stock exchange index had increased by 
300%. Indeed, in the initial public offering of the stock of EYDAP in December 1999 
there were 104,661 applications registered demanding 248 million shares, for just 31.5 
million available shares (Newspaper «Adesmeutos Tipos», 30/12/99). The first month 
of trading, EYDAP’s share which was introduced with a 2,500 drachmas value reached 
5,300 drachmas. 
Although there were many reasons for the change of the regulatory framework of 
Athens’ water supply, as there were many shortcomings in the operation of EYDAP 
in the past, the procedure was planned primarily as a response to the conditions 
dictated by the dominant financial and political climate at the time. The privatisation 
of EYDAP was promoted along with those of other PUCs as part of a programme for 
the ‘modernisation’ of the Greek economy. In most cases the equitisation ‘model’ 
was followed. The particularity of water resources and their distinctive environmental, 
technical and social-regional characteristics were not considered important in the design 
of the regulatory model. Indicatively, according to the General Manager of EYDAP ‘most 
characteristics of EYDAP are similar to those of the petroleum sector .. which is a sector 
intensely competitive and which saw globalisation long before globalisation started 
affecting other sectors’ (interview of the new President and General Manager, 2002, 
EYDAP Source of Information, 26, 6-8). Likewise, according to the Deputy Minister for 
National Finance there were no reasons why the government policy for EYDAP had 
to be any different than those in other privatisations. Answering to protests raised by 
Parliamentarians that water is a distinct good he responded that ‘the canal of Korinth 
(another public venture that had been privatized) is not just cement either, but..a valuable 
historical and symbolic element’ as also is the ‘International Fair of Salonica, which has 
certain elements of historic character which have a uniqueness’ (Parliamentary minutes, 
28/09/99, 1191). 
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Arguments and counterarguments
According to critiques of equitisation, like the Trade Union of EYDAP, organisational 
weaknesses were already addressed by Law 2414 for PUCs and there was no need 
for the equitisation and partial privatization of the company. In their view, EYDAP did 
not have significant deficits other than those caused intentionally by the government 
by abolishing the 3% building tax and would be profitable if municipalities and public 
authorities were forced to respect their commitments and pay pending debts to EYDAP 
(Interview of the President of Workers Federation, EYDAP Source of Information, 2, 
16). A crucial question is why did the option of equitisation prevailed over one of an 
administrative modernization of EYDAP as a PUC? The answer is enlightening to the 
“shadow dynamics” of the privatisation process. 
A fundamental argument in favour of equitisation was the need for drawing private 
capital and investments ‘since in order to reduce public debt for the accomplishment 
of EMU convergence criteria, the State could no longer finance EYDAP. The necessary 
infrastructure works require enormous amounts of money and if not privatised ... company 
borrowing will soar’ (Speech of retiring Managing Director of EYDAP to employees in 
1998, EYDAP Source of Information, 12:8). The reply to the question of ‘who will finance’ 
(the necessary investments) was ‘simple and clear: the private sector’ (General Manager 
of EYDAP; Xenos et al, 2001).
However, in the Contract accompanying the partial privatization of EYDAP, the State 
not only agreed to pay its debt to EYDAP but also committed to an annual subsidy 
of 44 MEuros per year for the next 3 years (as a compensation for the removal of the 
buildings’ tax) (EYDAP, 1999). According to a financial plan for EYDAP that had been 
prepared prior to privatization by the English consultancy Knight Piesold, EYDAP could 
self-finance an ambitious investment programme for fifteen years, even if it remained 
a PUC, if only it increased tariffs to the levels of real cost and adjust them annually to 
inflation, together with a strict control of operational and personnel expenditures and 
with the assistance of a possible external loan to finance new infra-structure from an 
international credit establishment such as the European Investment Bank (EYDAP, 
1996: 8, 9). The argument therefore that EYDAP could not survive financially without 
the support from private capital does not stand up against closer scrutiny. As explained 
later, private capital from the stock exchange market accounts only for a small part of 
EYDAP’s investment needs. The greater share is sought through financing by the State 
or the E.U. 
The government was accused of promoting EYDAP’s equitisation as a short-term fiscal 
measure. Yet, as claimed in Parliament by the Deputy Minister of National Economy, the 
funds that the State received from the sale of the shares would be essentially returned to 
EYDAP through the three-year annual subsidy (note however that revenue from the sale 
of EYDAP’s shares would be added to the state’s budget of 1999, an important year for 
the judgment over the approval of Greece’s entry in the EMU, while the obligations would 
be spread out over the next years). Even if such thoughts played a role, the main reason 
for the equitisation of EYDAP could not be simply the short-term artificial reduction of 
public deficit, since countries like Italy, with a large public deficit were accepted in the 
EMU.
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Speaking to an audience of private investors the Managing Director of EYDAP was 
more honest and enlightening as to the logic behind the choice to go forward with 
equitisation: ‘the principal advantage of gradual privatization  through trading of shares 
in the stock market is the minimisation of the adjustment cost, that is the cost resulting 
due to the transition from the old status of a national and public corporation to a new 
private company.This cost can be very high and derail the whole process in a dead end’. 
Cost does not refer only to the financial cost but also to ‘any possible reaction form 
employees, customers and suppliers .. The process of gradual privatisation provides the 
necessary time to each side to adapt to the new conditions.. and the necessary time to 
the government to decide on the final ownership structure of the company’ (Xenos et 
al, 2001)
Therefore, the equitisation of EYDAP, despite proclamations for the opposite (see 
speech of Deputy minister of National Economy in the Parliament, 28/09/99) was an first 
stage in the –hesitant- political and financial programme of the government towards the 
complete privatisation of PUCs. The government was careful to avoid the acute social 
reactions that such a programme could raise, trying to even out consequences. The EU 
did not request the privatisation of EYDAP per sé. Asking however, for the ‘convergence’ 
of the Greek economy, it was pressing for the adoption of the internationally prevailing 
political and economic programme of reducing the public sector and ‘liberating’ the 
markets. The equitisation of EYDAP was only a small part of a broader government 
policy of adjusting to the requests of the European and international political and 
financial environment. As Bakker (1999) argues with respect to the privatisation of water 
services in England, the process of privatisation is first and foremost a political ‘project’. 
It is based on a blind faith to its results rather than a careful assessment of its – difficult 
anyhow to predict and evaluate - results. 
The equitisation of EYDAP reflects a general, although slow, course of Greek economy 
from the public to the private sector, and from state control towards the ‘market’. The 
belief was that after the equitisation the company would become more independent 
from the State and that the ‘supervision’ of the shareholders would ‘force’ it to improve 
(Interview of Managing Director, EYDAP Source of Information 18,10) something that 
could not be done while it remained a PUC, despite the law’s provisions. As a result, the 
equitisation of the company was a goal in its own sake and not the selected response 
to achieve a specific set of goals.
Responding to criticism for privatising a strategic, public resource, the government 
maintained that with the separation of fixed assets from privatized EYDAP ‘the control 
of the state and the ownership of the natural resources and EYDAP’s property assets 
were secured’ (preamble in Parliament, Session ΛΘ΄, 28/09/99,1181). The State, the 
argument was, maintained in this way national resources of ‘strategic importance’ and 
was ensuring that no private interest could act opportunistically on these property assets 
‘of major importance for the country’ (Xenos et al, 2001). This justification though, is not 
convincing since the State could tailor regulation so as to maintain the ownership of 
the ‘water resources’, by licensing and setting terms on their use, while leaving the fixed 
assets (dams, pumping-stations) to the ownership of EYDAP. The reason behind the 
transfer of the assets was a logistical one and had to do with the proposal of ETEVA 
that EYDAP with the fixed assets under its possession would not be ‘attractive’ for 
investors. According to the managing director of EYDAP ‘before privatization .. due to 
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the calculation of reservoirs in the fixed assets of the company .. capital return was small 
.. and though satisfactory for a public corporation.. it was too low compared with other 
industrial sectors.. and clearly not acceptable for a private company’ (Xenos et al, 2001). 
Presenting EYDAP S.A. to institutional investors, the President of the company asserted 
the attractiveness of its share since ‘all of you who are familiar with financial procedures 
(know that by) transferring the fixed assets to the newly established public entity we 
have a reformed, lighter budget.. with smaller amortisation.. and therefore more profits’ 
(EYDAP Source of Information, 18:14). 
The legal framework was not deigned with water resource management in mind. The 
issue was how to secure the success of the equitisation (which was supposed that in 
turn would lead to an improvement in the performance of EYDAP in all areas, including 
resource management). As it will be argued though in the ninth chapter, the separation 
of the reservoirs from EYDAP S.A. and the guarantee the State provided of securing 
treated water to EYDAP may contribute to the financial viability of EYDAP S.A and 
its attractiveness in the stock market, but it poses important dis-incentives against a 
careful, long-term-wise control of water consumption.
The new legal framework and the new EYDAP Ltd
The new regime
The new legal framework for water supply in Athens is defined in law 2744/1999 on 
the “regulation of EYDAP issues” (Government Journal 222Α, 25/10/99, 4307-4316) and 
by the Contract between the Greek State and EYDAP in December 9th 1999.  
EYDAP S.A., a Limited Liability Company of private law, was separated from EYDAP 
Fixed Assets (EPEYDAP), a public enterprise operating under public law. EYDAP was 
given the exclusive right of providing water and sewage services to the area of its 
jurisdiction for a period of twenty years, under the terms of the Contract with the State. 
Property assets of the company are those fixed assets that remain under its ownership. 
These include the Water Treatment Units, the water-sewage networks and the Sewage 
Treatment Units. Reservoirs, aqueducts, boreholes and pumping-stations passed under 
the ownership of EPEYDAP. 
The State can make available to private investors up to 49% of the total stock capital 
of EYDAP.  Chart No 13 shows the composition of the shareholders of EYDAP in 2001.
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Chart No 13: Shareholders
      
     Source: EYDAP, 2002.
Rights and responsibilities
With the new regulating framework the spectrum of activities in which EYDAP can 
operate was expanded significantly. 
1. The procedure for the expansion of EYDAP to other regions beyond its 
geographical jurisdiction was simplified. Instead of the previously required presidential 
decree, a direct agreement between EYDAP and the local authority was enough, under 
the clause of approval from the Ministers of National Economy, Internal Affairs and 
ESPPW. According to a common decision of the aforementioned ministers the activity 
of EYDAP could extend to whole geographical areas beyond the region of Attica (Article 
2). 
2. EYDAP is no longer restricted to water and sewage services (as it was before), 
but can provide technical and consulting services, it can establish companies or co-
operatives, or participate in them, ‘within Greece or abroad’, as well as undertake any 
commercial or other activity directly or indirectly connected with its cause (Article 1). 
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With this regulation EYDAP is ‘liberated’ from the previous geographical and service 
boundaries of its jurisdiction, since it can extend either the direct (water supply) or the 
indirect (studies, technical support) activity further than Attica- and in the second case 
beyond Greece- while it can also participate in ‘multi-utility services of public importance’, 
providing also other than water and sewerage services. This comes under the clause 
that ‘the ability to finance its running obligations is not negatively influenced’ (Article 1). 
There are no specific rules or criteria however to assess the above. 
The mutual responsibilities of State and EYDAP are determined in the Contract 
(EYDAP, 1999). The State has the responsibility of supplying raw water to EYDAP 
and to partly finance its investment programme. On the other hand, EYDAP has the 
responsibility for the installation and operation of the fixed assets of the distribution 
network as defined in the Charter for ‘operation regulation of the water-supply network of 
EYDAP’ (Government Journal 52B, 1/2/84) and for the provision of services to consumers 
according to the ‘Consumer Charter’. The company is obliged to comply with all existing 
legal regulations including quality standards for drinking water as these are defined by 
legislation and to apply all standard water sector practices and methods. 
According to the Contract, EYDAP should execute an 8-year investment programme 
(Table No 8).
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Table No 8: Investment Plan 2000-2008 in Million GRD (1 Euro= 340 GRD)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Treatment - - - - - - - - - -
Upgrading 
Treatment 
Plants
100 100 4,601 2,558 830 0 0 0 0 8,189
Distribution - - - - - - - - -
Network 
Expansion 4,928 5,625 4,000 3,635 3,690 2,400 2,100 2,100 2,100 30,578
Network 
Replacement 
/renewal 
2,713 4,000 3,000 4,500 3,973 4,000 7,649 8,000 8,000 45,835
Extension 
of existing 
networks
1,910 650 1,700 1,700 1,700 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 13,660
Storage 
reservoirs 
/ pump 
stations
2,610 5,411 3,398 3,026 2,900 2,968 3,225 3,739 3,676 30,953
Meters 
replacement 800 800 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 6,500
Losses 
reduction 748 845 730 730 730 730 730 730 730 6,703
Other 
investments 800 800 800 800 600 600 600 600 600 6,200
Small scale 
works 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 18,000
Distribution 
total 16,509 20,131 16,328 17,091 16,293 14,898 18,504 19,369 19,306 156,519
Capital 
investments 7,680 7,023 6,371 6,180 1,950 900 900 900 900 32,804
Sewage 7,940 16,020 25,101 26,009 21,494 20,272 17,200 8,959 8,817 151,812
Waste-water 
treatment 6,797 10,783 6,809 6,898 8,477 9,957 9,386 3,565 2,244 64,916
Total 39,876 54,057 59,210 58,736 49,044 46,027 45,990 32,793 31,267 417,000
Source: EYDAP, 1999.
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Economic regulation
Economic relations
With the new law the financial relations between EYDAP and the State got clearer. 
The debts that the State owed to EYDAP from the removal of the 3% buildings’ tax were 
offset by the pending debts of EYDAP from past loans. A difference emerged in favour 
of EYDAP (35.8 MEuros) but was found as equal (sic.) with an obligation of EYDAP that 
emerged after a new tax check of the period 1989-1998 (EYDAP, 1999). 
The State undertook the duty to pay EYDAP for the three first years after the 
equitisation (1999-2001) with 44 MEuros per year, as a compensation for the 3% tax. 
Moreover it guaranteed the subsidisation of EYDAP’s investment programme for 
the period 2000-2008 ‘either through Community resources or through the Public 
Investment Programme’. The law refers to, rather vaguely, that the subsidies ‘cannot 
be greater than 60% of the investment programme’ (Article 7) but in the contract it is 
defined exactly that the amount ‘will reach a total of 60% of total capital investments of 
EYDAP .. and will not be greater than 735.3 MEuros’ (Annex 4 of the Contract). 
EYDAP is liberated from its duty to carry out the non-profitable stormwater and flood 
defence works. It can be contracted however to carry them out as any other private 
entity by MESPPW. 
As for the debts from municipalities, favourable incentives were introduced to speed 
up reimbursement (exemption of municipalities from added charges for the lump 
sum payment). In the case of persistent non-payment, EYDAP could collect the debts 
directly from the Deposit and Loans Fund, with direct deduction of the amount from the 
respective Local Authorities financing by the State (Article 7).
Regulation
The new legal framework does not provide for the establishment of a specific 
authority assigned with the regulation and monitoring of the contract terms. A previous 
draft of the law, which had leaked just a month before the publication of the final text 
(Newspaper ‘To Kiriakatiko Vima’, 22/08/99), was establishing a ‘National Committee 
for the Management of Water and Waste’ (EEDYA). The Committee’s responsibility would 
have been to issue licenses for new public-private water companies throughout Greece, 
to inspect and control the commitment to contractual terms and the recommendation 
for emergency measures whenever needed, in addition to consultation on relevant 
questions/requests put forward by ministers in charge. The framework, planned for 
the authorisation of licenses, was almost identical in structure to the eventual contract 
between State and EYDAP. The ‘National Committee” would also have the responsibility 
of determining the water tariffs. In the end, the ‘National Committee’ was not established, 
possibly due to the concerns of the government that ot could be accused of pushing 
forward a liberalisation of water services throughout the country. According to some 
sources, the initial thought of the government was that EYDAP could constitute the basic 
shareholder of new private-public co-operatives that would take up the water supply 
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of municipalities all over Greece (Newspaper ‘To Ethnos’, 21/08/99). The model of the 
EYDAP-State Contract has already been applied for the equitisation of the Municipal 
Water and Sewage Company of Salonica (Newspaper “Ta Nea”, 13/10/00).  
Another possible reason for rejecting the establishment of a regulatory authority is 
possible the additional bureaucratic and fiscal costs. The supervision of contractual 
commitments of EYDAP was possibly thought of as unnecessary for the time being as 
the State remains the principal shareholder of EYDAP. Thus the EYDAP-State Contract 
is essentially regulated by the court, to which the contracting parties can turn to 
resolve any violations of the agreed terms (Xenos et al, 2001b). In the case of technical 
disagreements, the expert opinion of an engineer appointed by the Technical Chamber 
of Greece is required, while for economic disagreements a chartered accountant from the 
Chartered Accountants Association is foreseen. EYDAP is expected to submit periodic 
reports to the Minister in charge (MESPPW) with annual results on specific performance 
indicators, a fixed assets record. In addition, EYDAP should publicise an abstract of the 
annual edition for the consumers. Performance indicators include data on “un accounted 
for water”, “number of properties that are under the risk of low water pressure”, “areas or 
streets subject to unscheduled supply cuts of a 12-hour duration or more”, “number of 
properties subject to flood risk”, “number of enquiries that did not get a response within 
the declared number of working days”, “number of written complains that did not get 
a response within 15, 30 and over 30 days”, “number of received phone calls that did 
not get a response within the declared number of minutes” and “population subject to 
restriction of use”. The responsibility of assessing the performance and the adherence 
to the contract terms belongs to the State, i.e. the MESPPW and the Ministry of National 
Economy. There is not however a specific authority, administration or department 
delegated the duty to conduct this assessment.
Pricing
Water supply tariffs are to be determined every five years “within the scope of 
governmental policy as to ensure a reasonable return of EYDAP’s investments and 
the financing of its activities in a rational way” (Article 3). By reasonable return the 
possibility of profit yield to the company through the tariffs mechanism is established. 
Both the Ministers of ESPPW and National Economy decide one the levels of the tariffs 
after taking into account the proposal from the board of directors of EYDAP. The new 
prices were determined in 2000 for a five-year period, with the anticipation of an annual 
adjustment to the preceding year’s inflation.
The contract also stipulates the formation of a category of “protected customers”, 
referring to economically weak groups of customers, subject to “special treatment” 
regarding “potential water supply cuts”. The definition of the group and the special 
treatment will be defined according to decisions of the board of directors of EYDAP and 
with the approval of the Minister for ESPPW (Article14).
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Waterworks and resource management 
Under the new legal framework, the State retains the sole responsibility for the water 
resources and the water conveyance system. The dams and reservoirs of Marathon Lake, 
Mornos and Evinos River and the works and installations in Yliki Lake, the groundwater 
boreholes and the aqueducts, along with their high amortisation costs, passed on 
to EPEYDAP. The total or part of the operation of these assets and the necessary 
maintenance works can be carried out by EYDAP for a reasonable payment by the 
State. The regulation regarding aqueducts consisted of an accounting trick. Logistically 
EYDAP was relieved from the high cost of the aqueducts amortisation by transferring 
them (as allowed by the law) to EPEYDAP. However, the law also allowed for “EYDAP 
to be responsible.. exceptionally for the operation and maintenance of the aqueducts .. 
if it requests to take up their operation and maintenance on the company’s expense” 
(Article 6). Thus, EYDAP maintained the responsibility and the cost of operating the 
aqueducts as well as that for accomplishing the works in progress in the aqueducts 
(funded by the EU Cohesion Fund, for a total amount of 125,3 MEuros), without however 
the aqueducts being counted in EYDAP’s fixed assets. In a second logistic trick, the cost 
for EYDAP of operating and maintaining EPEYDAP’s fixed assets (reservoirs, aqueducts) 
was found as equal (sic.) with a charge it was supposed to the latter for the supply of raw 
water. Thus, while in practice there was no shift in operational responsibilities, EYDAP 
was logistically relieved from big assets and pending loans.
The State through MESPPW retains the responsibility for the “study, construction and 
operation of new, and for the operation, maintenance and expansion of existing” water 
supply works for the needs of Athens. The Ministry for Development was entrusted 
with the study and collection of water (Article 6). It is the responsibility of the State to 
supply EYDAP with raw water “as to ensure the reasonable consumption on behalf of 
the consumers of EYDAP” (Article 6). Raw water must meet the quality standards of the 
A2 category as defined in EU regulation (Article 15-1c of the Contract). The price of the 
raw water is determined upon a “written agreement between the two parts, depending 
on the cost of maintenance and operation of the fixed assets and in connection with 
the government’s tariff policy and definitely taking into account the price of raw water 
provision from EYDAP to third parties” (Article 15-1a of the Contract). As mentioned 
above, for the first five years, the price of the unrefined water is compensated with the 
cost of the services that EYDAP offers for the maintenance and operation of the fixed 
assets belonging to EPEYDAP and the cost of the annual operation of EPEYDAP. 
In the case that additional water abstractions will be necessary from those available 
from the Mornos, Evinos and Marathon reservoirs, EYDAP is entitled an additional 
compensation from the State, corresponding to additional the cost of operation resulting 
from the increased energy consumption. 
EYDAP’s obligations regarding the management of the water resources are defined 
in the Contract. First of all, EYDAP has the obligation to draft a five-year plan for the 
management of the available water resources and the water supply network and to 
submit it for approval to the Minister of ESPPW. The use by EYDAP of the costlier Yliki 
Lake branch and the groundwater boreholes, and its duration, is to be determined 
according to this Resource Management Plan. 
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It is also the responsibility of EYDAP to keep “unaccounted for water” of the network 
within predefined upper limits. These are defined according to a gradual long-term 
programme for the reduction of leakages from the “existing real losses” (as in 1999) up 
to the “economic level of leakage” by 2014. The above technical definitions are to be 
agreed upon by EYDAP and the State. In the case of exceeding the intermediate annual 
limits, a fine of 6 Euros per 1,000 m3  of lost water is foreseen. In the case of achieving 
the goals, the State commits to provide to EYDAP a quantity of raw water, equal to the 
quantity saved by reducing the losses, for free (Contract, Annex 1). The results and the 
progress in the reduction of losses should be included in the annual report to MESPPW 
and consumers.
The water resources legal framework
The Greek common law defines riparian water use rights. Water-use rights however 
have been traditionally unclear and a source of conflict. Land property rights in Greece 
after liberation from Ottoman rule (1830) have been notoriously contested (especially 
with regard to public lands vs. individuals’ claims). Conflicts have also arisen around 
shared water resources and interconnected hydrological systems (esp. groundwater). 
Until 1987, water abstraction did not require a license nor was there a register of 
water uses. The State retained the right to expropriate land and water resources for 
waterworks of “public importance” and to assign them to specific uses/users. This led 
to a complex and fragmented series of laws regulating different uses (urban, agricultural 
and industrial) or specific water bodies / waterworks. Athens’ and EYDAP’s waterworks 
(river reservoirs) were conducted in this way, the State first expropriating land, then 
building the reservoir and assigning its use (by law or decree) to EYDAP. 
In 1987, the Government with Framework law 1739/1987 “for water resource 
management” attempted to put an end to this situation (YBET, 1988). The law assigned 
the responsibility for licensing and allocation of water resources to the State.  Although 
water property remains riparian, the State partly controls water use as it resumed the 
responsibility for licensing new water uses. 
The concept behind the 1987 law is that water is a unified resource and its best 
allocation in competitive uses (including the environment) requires that the responsible 
parties and users are coordinated at a national and regional level. The law created 14 
water districts with corresponding Regional Water Departments. Their responsibility 
was the creation of long term plans for the allocation of the available water resources 
within the district according to the “needs” of the competing uses and the planning 
of the necessary actions for their “exploitation”. In national level and for projects of 
significant importance, an Interministerial Committee was set up, comprising of the 
Minister for Development, supervising ministry for the management of water resources 
in the country, along with the ministries of ESPPW, Internal Affairs, National Economy 
and Agriculture. At a regional level the Law required User Assembles consisting of 
representatives from regional, prefectoral and municipal authorities as well as the 
Technical Chamber of Greece and agricultural co-operatives.  
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According to the law, it was the duty of regional authorities or the respective 
ministries governing specific uses, to issue lisences for new abstractions or for new 
hydraulic projects. An exemption was foreseen for water companies, which needed only 
an agreement of the Interministerial Committee. In theory the licences should take into 
consideration the regional management plans, which allocate resources to different 
needs. Plans and decisions must take care of the “needs” of the aquatic ecosystems, 
which according to the law,  precede all other uses.  
The law constituted a “framework” and the specific provisions (e.g. the content and 
the plans’ drafting procedure, the definition of ecological needs etc) were to be specified 
in a series of Presidential decrees or governmental decisions.
The law actually did not influence the regulation of the water resources management of 
Athens, reflecting a broader failure with the enforcement of the law so far. Implementation 
of the Ministerial decisions and presidential decrees necessary for enactment of certain 
provisions was delayed. The drafting of a national plan and the approval of the regional 
management plans are also still pending. With a more recent Law, the regional water 
departments, initially foreseen as autonomous units operating at the river basin level, 
were incorporated within existing regional administration structures. The process of 
establishing the Regional Water Departments was complete  just recently. Existing 
authorities are understaffed (often with unqualified personnel) and have restricted duties 
(ΥPΑΝ, 1996, OECD, 2000). Administrative plans have been proposed for ten out of the 
fourteen water districts (OECD, 2000). However, these plans do not constitute a real 
regional planning since they were not prepared by the regional authorities themselves 
but were set up centrally by a team of specialists from the National Technical University 
on behalf of the Ministry for Development. The plans consist of rough water balances 
of supply and demand for every c district (Ministry for Development, 1996). “Needs” (e.g. 
for irrigation) are taken as granted (e.g. based on land reclamation plans of the Ministry 
of Agriculture) and are not subject to planning. In the plans there is no reference to the 
needs of the ecosystem, probably due to lack of data since their drafting was based on 
a review of the already available information. Despite the approval of the presidential 
decree for establishing minimum environmental flows, this has not happened (save for 
standards set though Environmental Impact Studies of new projects). 
The licensing system has had a limited effect on the control of large uses and 
projects, since in effect, the same ministries responsible to issue the licenses for the 
projects are in most cases the ones that carry also the projects themselves (!) in the 
absence of binding regional water plans. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture is 
planning, authorising and carrying out the hydraulic projects for irrigation while it is also 
responsible for their funding. Likewise, the MESPPW, is responsible both for planning 
and constructing new the new water projects for Athens as well as issuing the necesary 
licenses subject to an agreement by the Inter-Ministerial Committee. The water supply 
system of Athens was exempted from the regional water plans of Western and Eastern 
Sterea Ellada as the reservoirs were allocated for the use of Athens exclusively (Ministry 
for Development, 1996). In practice therefore, Athens water demand and abstraction 
policies remain beyond any external control or licensing scheme.
As for the smaller abstractions, the licensing system functions satisfactorily, but 
controls only the new and not the older extractions, which make up the majority of 
WATERLATGOBACIT
WATERLAT-GOBACIT  Working Papers
Research Projects Series - PRINWASS Project  - Vol 4 Nº 1 / 2017
118
the existing uses. The licenses may state the upper extraction limits but there are 
problems since there is no control and penalising mechanisms for violations (Ministry 
for Development, 1996). Upper and lower limits have been established with presidential 
decrees for different uses, but without any effect on real decisions. 
Although the pricing of water in different uses has been enforced by a presidential 
decree, no user in Greece pays for raw water (OECD, 2000). 
Environmental and health regulation
EYDAP operates within the rules of the legal framework governing drinking water 
quality and environmental protection. Before the adoption of European Community law, 
there was no specific legal framework for the quality of water resources, even for those 
destined for human consumption. Athens’ water sources were separately regulated with 
Ministerial Decision A5/2280 in 1983, which defined specific rules for the protection 
of the quality of Marathon, Yliki and Mornos from pollution. The law set a minimum 
distance of 1.5 km for any human activity from the city’s reservoirs, prohibited the direct 
disposal of waste to the lakes or in their basin and set zoning and controlling rules for 
all types of activities, such as installation of industries, construction of buildings, use of 
sewerage pits, etc.
The entry of Greece into the European Common Market (1980) led to a drastic reform of 
the national environmental legislation. Ministerial Decisions 46399/1352 and A5/5180 
in 1986 implemented the EC directives for drinking water quality (75/440) and for the 
quality of surface waters intended for drinking (80/778). The quality of Athens’ water 
sources qualified easily for the existing level of treatment (A2) and for the drinking water 
standards, though the new EU legislation provided an impetus for a modernization of 
the monitoring and reporting systems. 
Directives (76/160) for the quality of bathing waters and 91/271 for the level of  urban 
waste water treatment had also an important impact and led to the decision to build 
the first waste-water treatment plant of the city in Psytalia (sewerage was previously 
discharged untreated to the Gulf of Saronikos). 
Law 1560/1986 provided the first framework law for the environment; a requirement 
relevant to the water sector of the city of Athens included the provision for Environmental 
Impact Statements for all new infrastructure projects, including water works. 
Water governance
Charts No 14 and 15 depict graphically the water governance structure in Athens in 
the period before the partial privatisation of EYDAP and after (Chart No 15 shows only 
changes relative to Chart No 14). 
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Regulatory roles were exposed in the previous sections. Briefly, the Ministry of 
Environment, Spatial Planning and Pubic Works (MESSPW) has the responsibility 
for Athens’ water supply. Water resource planning at a national and regional level, 
albeit inactive, rests to the Ministry of Development. The Ministry of Finance has the 
responsibility for the programme for the modernisation of public utilities and thus 
EYDAP. MESSPW has also the responsibility for environmental regulation (EIS, water 
quality) and reporting to the European Commission. This responsibility lies to the 
General directorate for Environment of the Ministry in contrast to the oversee of EYDAP 
which lies to the directorate for Public Works.
The Greek political bureaucratic system is highly centralised, most responsibilities 
concentrated at the central government level. MESSPW has had a central role in all 
matters relating to EYDAP (pricing, financing, planning and construction of water works), 
whereas the process towards privatisation has been driven solely by the Ministry of 
Finance.  
The Hellenic Technical Chamber (TEE), the formal professional association of 
qualified engineers, has an institutionalised (by law) role in decisions and design for all 
public works of national importance (including Athens’ water works). Its representatives 
played a central role in the design to the response of the city’s drought in 1990-1993. TEE 
and more generally the construction industry has traditionally a very powerful political 
role, given the importance of the construction sector for Greece’s economy. In many 
ways, this has lead to a waterworks-driven approach to water resource management. 
Engineers from universities and consultancies dominate scientific analysis for water 
resource management. Their expertise concentrates mainly on hydrology and hydraulic 
engineering. Water issues have seldom been approached from a social science 
perspective and even economic theory has played a very limited role in water resource 
management, other than the general discussion for the privatisation of public utilities in 
general. Engineers from universities and consultancies are often inter-related with the – 
powerful – construction industry interests benefiting from new hydraulic works (Kaika, 
1999, Kallis, 2003). The same persons have occupied positions in the directorates of 
EYDAP and TEE, the National Technical University and consultancies or construction 
companies (Kallis, 2003). The notion of an “iron”, “hydraulic community” (del Moral et 
al., 2000) describes more or less accurately water governance in Greece.
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Chart No 14: Water governance in the statist era
Chart No 15: Changes in water governance after the partial privatisation of EYDAP
Majority of shares
Financing of investment programme
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Around the dominant, waterworks-driven paradigm, there is a broad social consensus 
between:
• the State, which providing drinking water and infra-structure at a subsidized cost 
and supporting Athens’ urbanization substitutes for the lack of real developmental 
and social policy,
• Athenians, whose cost of living and housing is maintained low by the low-cost 
and subsidised provision of basic services
• The regional communities from where the resources are transferred and who, at 
least until recently, were content with the positive developmental side-effects from 
the works (e.g. construction of roads) or the (direct and indirect) compensations 
given by the State,
• The construction sector, dominating the Greek economy, which benefits both from 
the maintenance of the urbanization pace of the city and from hydraulic works.
 
“Clientelism” and “favourism” are strong in all facets of Greek pubic life (Leontidou, 
1997) and public construction works, prominent among which have been waterworks 
(including those of Athens) have been ridden with accusations for interests’ favourism 
and economic scandals (Kaika, 1999, Kallis, 2003).
Reactions from environmental organizations and more recently some regional 
communities, or the accusations for mishandling of public money in the way hydraulic 
works are contracted and conducted, remain marginal in a context where key decisions 
are taken under the pressure of an imminent crisis (droughts). From this perspective, 
the postponement of decisions until a drought appears is not only a case of accidental 
mismanagement, but instrumental to the continuation of the dominant expansionist 
paradigm (Kaika, 1999). Environmental NGOs have only a marginal role and have little 
social support. Local and regional authorities are politically and financially powerless. 
During the drought, there was for the first time a fierce reaction from local communities 
and local NGOs against plans of the government for an – unwarranted – additional 
transfer of water from the eastern basins of Greece to Athens. The local authorities, 
however, did not react to the environmental and local impacts per se, but asked for 
compensatory investments from the government for local infra-structure (e.g. new 
highways, connection to the national highway grid, local irrigation waterworks). 
One might argue that there is limited awareness of the environmental dimension of 
water management in the Greek society relatively to other western societies. Partly, this 
might be related to the lack of enjoyment practices of inland waters, most recreational 
activities concentrated in the coastal zone of Greece and the sea, for which environmental 
awareness is higher.  
A different set of “actors” was active in the discussion for the privatisation of EYDAP. 
The “policy arena” in which the institutional change of Athens’ water supply service 
was planned, was that of “national economic policy” (programme of privatizations). The 
ministry responsible for EYDAP’s law was the Ministry of National Economy and not 
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the supervising MESPPW. Indicatively, MESPPW was not even present in parliament 
during the discussion of the bill (Parliamentary Minutes, 28/09/00, 1182). Throughout 
the planning process of the “privatisations”, the Ministry of National Economy was 
supported technically from several management and investment consultancies or 
banks (such as ETEVA or the British bank Rothschild). 
The policy network around regulatory change, although completely different from 
this of hydraulic works, was equally “closed”. The equitisation of EYDAP was planned by 
the Ministry of National Economy, the consultants (ETEVA) and an “Official Committee” 
composed of “high ranking executives” of EYDAP, which officially was following the 
study by ETEVA, but essentially headed the preparation for “privatisation”. In this 
way the Board of Directors, in which local authorities and employees’ representatives 
participated, was sidelined from information and discussion over privatization plans. 
Likewise the common procedure for notification and discussion of new laws that 
affect employment relations with a Financial and Social Control Committee in which 
several civic bodies participate was also sidelined (EYDAP, Source of Information, 13, 
6). The government was criticized for the lack of dialogue with Trade Unions and local 
authorities and for the lack of transparency, since the plans for the EYDAP privatisation 
only became known “from the news agencies (when) the block of measures regarding 
EMU converngence were announced by the Minister of National Economy at Brussels”. 
The decision to place EYDAP in the stock market did not face strong reactions from 
the society.  In contrast to the experience in other countries (e.g. Latin America), water 
services are relatively unproblematised in Athens. Service has been universal, water 
quality good (due to the recourse to the mountainous resources of Mornos) and prices 
maintained relatively low. Privatisation was not followed by a significant change of 
prices. This might partly explain the “low profile” in mass media and in public debate on 
the discussion for the privatisation of EYDAP. 
The Trade Union of EYDAP was the only organisation that strongly resisted equitisation. 
Its position was in favour of the company’s “modernization”, but without private capital 
participation. Even though the syndicate was threatening with intense mobilisations 
and started up a campaign with broadcasts in national radio and television, it had lost 
its previous strength and resonance to the company’s employees (see editorial article 
EYDAP Source of Information, 4, 10-11). The participation of the staff in the last strike was 
just 9%. The president of the Union recognised the breakdown of the union movement 
(Interview with the President of EYDAP’s Trade Union, EYDAP Source of Information, 12, 
15-18). The management of EYDAP offered to employees company shares in privileged 
prices (20% lower than official prices), while an amount of the State’s revenue from the 
shares would be offered to the employees’ pension fund (EYDAP, 1999).  
Nonetheless, compared to other public services’ equitisations, the one of EYDAP 
generated the most intense political reactions. All political parties of the opposition 
(conservative and communist) stood against the bill, while many parliamentarians from 
the governing (social-democratic) party in an exceptional move defected from party line 
and voted against the equitisation of EYDAP.  The bill was finally approved with a slim 
majority (Newspaper “Ta Nea”, 22/09/99). 
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The government took had taken advantage of the circumstances to avoid social 
reaction. The bill was presented in the days immediately after the great earthquakes 
in Athens and while the employees of EYDAP were burdened with emergency works 
to correct damages in the network. At these times, a strike was out of the question 
and the law did not get much attention from the general public. The bill was discussed 
in the summer session of the parliament, where discussion time is limited and fewer 
parliamentarians vote. 
Many of the critical arguments in the parliamentary discussion of the bill for the 
privatisation, were focused on the special nature of water as a “strategic” “common” 
good.  The government, however, at least at the level of discourse, did not argue against 
the public and strategic dimension of water services. The argument was that by keeping 
the ownership of resources and majority ownership of EYDAP (more so avoiding to 
delegate management to foreigners but distributing private “ownership” to small, 
individuals shareholders) these were safeguarded, while increased private participation 
would increase financing opportunities and efficiency in the achievement of the public/
strategic goals.
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Part B – Assessment of findings
Economic and Financial Performance
The economic situation of EYDAP after partial privatisation
The improvement of the official financial data of EYDAP S.A. after equitisation (1998) 
was impressive. The profits of EYDAP, which were already positive from 1992 (due to the 
capitalization of its debts and the increase of prices), increased substantially after the 
adjustments brought by the new legal framework (Chart No 16). 
A first observation is the continuous increase of the revenues from water services 
(Table No 9). The increase of water consumption by 21.1% between 1998 and 2000 was 
primarily due to the rise of the quantity of water consumed (by 15.3%) and secondarily 
due to the increase of the revenue per unit of water consumed (not so much due to 
the increase of rates per rate, since the only substantial increase was in municipal 
rates, but due to the fact that high-rate consumption increased) (EYDAP, 2001). The 
major economic indicators of EYDAP (profit margin and capital return) demonstrated 
impressive improvement after the equitisation (the margin for net profit increased 
from 13.2% in 1996 to 37.5% in 2001) and the return on capital (assets) from 2% to 14.8% 
respectively. As for the municipal debts, these decreased by 43% in 2000 (-13.2 MEuros). 
As a consequence of the excellent results, EYDAP yielded dividends of 13 Eurocents per 
share in 1999, 21 Eurocents per share in 2000 and 22 Eurocents per share in 2001. The 
total amount of share dividend for the period 1999-2001 reached 59.4 MEuros.
Chart No 16: Revenue–Expenditure and profit EYDAP, 1995-2001
      Source: Xenos et al., 2001b, Annual Bulletin EYDAP, 2001, 2002)
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However, “all that glitters is not gold”. The General Manager of EYDAP may have 
presented the improvement in the financial position of the company as a result of the 
“privatisation” (Xenos et al, 2001), but reality is much more complex. 
1. The improvement in returns on assets was not so much the result of actual 
improvements in productivity, as to the logistical transfer of the major fixed assets 
of EYDAP to the State (EPEYDAP). The ownership value of these fixed assets 
was estimated at 873 MEuros in 1999 and their non depreciated value at 659 
MEuros (EYDAP, 2001). The result of transferring these assets was the substantial 
reduction of the total cost for amortisation of EYDAP, a reduction that reached 
20 MEuros in 2000, contributing to the reduction of the company depreciation 
costs (Table No 8). This cost of course did not “disappear” but was transferred to 
the State. 
2. A second observation concerns the considerable annual subsidy, in replacement 
of the building tax of 3%, which EYDAP received for the period 1998-2000 (44 
MEuros per year), included in the “other revenue” category (Table No 9). Without 
this subsidy, which according to the terms of the Contract stopped in 2002, and 
without a change in the method of revenue calculation for 2001, “the profit before 
tax in 2001 would have been 41 MEuros from 60 MEuros in 2000 and the net 
profit margin would have been 15.37%” (EYDAP, 2002). The total profit as well as 
the profit margin would have been around pre-equitisation levels.
The above observations recall some of the issues that had been raised by the critics of 
the equitisation (see Parliamentary proceedings, 28/09/99) concerning the justification 
of a continuous subsidisation from the State of a - partially private - company, which 
allocates dividends from its earnings to private investors. Without the subsidy and the 
transfer of the fixed assets, the dividend to the shareholders would be much smaller. 
This subsidization might have been justifiable before privatisation, when EYDAP was 
public, but it becomes questionable after the partial privatisation. 
Another observation, which is investigated further in chapter nine, relates to the fact 
that the sustenance of an increasing revenue based on an increase of consumption 
(increase of water demand, reflected both in revenue from water supply and from 
sewerage – see Table No 9) entails a considerable “external” cost, since in the long-term 
it increases the chance for utilizing the energy-expensive sources and/or building new 
water works.
If the goal therefore is not just the financial appearance of EYDAP S.A. but the broader 
economic well-being of the water sector, it is questionable whether equitisation has 
brought improvements. 
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Table No 9: Revenue and costs by category in MEuros
1998 1999 2000 2001
Revenue from water supply 169 177 198 217
Revenue from sewerage 50 52 59 71
Other revenue (incl. state 
annual subsidy 1998-2001)
42 49 49 49
Other revenue 16 15 9 10
Interests 5 4 8 5
Total revenue 283 297 323 352
Sales’ costs 113 118 118 131
General expenditure 59 64 69 76
Special costs 15 6 6 9
Interest rates 5 3 2 1
Depreciation costs 44 44 24 27
Gross costs 236 235 219 244
Profit pro tax 47 62 104 108
Taxes 12 23 36 39
Net profit 35 39 68 69
Source: ΕΥDΑP, 2001, 2002.
Investment and Financing
The investment programme (Table No 8) foresaw investments of 117,3 MEuros within 
2000, which would be covered by:
• the increase of share capital (41,2 MEuros);
• financing from the State via the Community Support Framework (CSF) or if not, 
from the National Programme for Public Investments (PPI) (70,3 MEuros);
• from the capital stock of EYDAP itself.
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Although the General Accounts Office of the State anticipated an “undefined” 
expenditure from PPI for the investment programme of EYDAP, until now the State has 
not financed any of EYDAP’s programmes. Instead of the foreseen state contribution, 
EYDAP covered the first year of the investment programme through its own funds (49 
MEuros) plus the 41,2 MEuros raised from the increase of the stock capital (EYDAP, 
2001). The level of fulfillment of the investment programme goals for 2000 was 20,4 
MEuros less than foreseen, according to EYDAP due to “internal difficulties” (EYDAP, 
2001).
For 2001, contrary to 2000, in the annual information report to its shareholders, 
EYDAP avoids to provide detailed data for progress in the investment programme. In 
an editorial in the Public Relations magazine of the Company, concerning the economic 
results of 2001 it is noted that “an important reason that influences the investment 
programme is the fact that the State has not fulfilled its contractual obligations according 
to which it should subsidise 60% of annual investments for the 2000-2008 period” 
(EYDAP Source of Information, April 2002,27: 3). The result of this is a significant delay in 
the progress with the investment programme and significant cutbacks in expenditures 
(Interviews EYDAP,05/12/02, 10/12/02)
Despite oft-repeated references to financing the investment programme from CSF, 
EYDAP appears to have done very little to apply for Community funding (e.g. prepare 
a detailed plan-proposal, etc).  The general feeling in top management was that “in 
any case, and if not from Community funds, financing of the investment programme is 
anyhow guaranteed by the State” (Interview EYDAP, 5/12/02). As a consequence of this 
inaction, with the exception of an ongoing CSF-funded investment programme for the 
improvement of the aqueducts which had already been secured before the equitisation 
(1994), only minor works of the investment program benefited from Community 
financing. The fulfillment ambitious eight-years investment plan for the amelioration 
and expansion of the network is questionable now “that privatisation is not a priority 
and the government is distracted from other current issues loosening up its [obligations] 
towards EYDAP “(President of EYDAP, 25 July 2001, EYDAP Information Source, 24: 16). 
Therefore, despite some improvements in planning and investment management that 
had occurred anyhow before equitisation, it is questionable whether  
Although EYDAP protests to the State for breaching the contractual terms by deferring 
from financing the 60% of the investment program, the question is how could it ever 
be expected from the State to finance from the PPI a programme of 735 MEuros in 
the midst of an austere public expenditure policy, restrained from convergence criteria. 
After all, the very reason for the equitisation of EYDAP was precisely the disengagement 
of the State from the need to subsidise the water services of Athens. Hence, critics 
of privatisation were partly right asking “what is the privatisation for, if a large part of 
capital investment is already ensured from the PPI or the EU”. 
Neither does the stock exchange market appear to offer the cheap access to capital 
promised. Capital raised from the increase of the stock capital of EYDAP (41,2 MEuros) 
corresponds to only 3.4% of the anticipated 8-year investment plan. Between 1999 and 
2001, 16.2 MEuros were returned as dividends to shareholders. Expectations that “EYDAP 
would be able to collect significant financial resources in order to fund its investments 
by [exploiting in the future] the rise of the Stock Exchange market”(Xenos et al, 2001b), 
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have not been fulfilled. EYDAP’s share followed the post-1999 dramatic fall of Athens 
Stock Exchange (despite being relatively “more robust” than the majority). In 2001, its 
value fell by 19% (c.f. a 23.5% decrease of the market indicator). Its value on 2 December 
of 2002 was 1,465 GRD as against 2,500 GRD in January 2000.
The main source of investment funding remains therefore the self-financing from 
tariffs and possibly lending from international donors, as it had been proposed by Knight 
Piesold long ago and without the need for equitisation (EYDAP, 1996). The proposals of 
consultancy were three:
1. to define a borrowing policy for EYDAP and include it a contract with the State
2. long-term planning of tariffs
3. preparation of a detailed investment program and submission to an international 
donor (such as the European Investment Bank).  
This proposal for a serious planning of investment needs and a careful study of self-
financing and borrowing opportunities was never taken up. The Ministry assigned to 
another consultancy (Welsh Hyder) to draft the investment plan (i.e. the actual 8-year 
plan) to accompany equitisation and entry of EYDAP in the stock-exchange market. 
This was not a detailed study. As a senior manager of EYDAP confessed in an interview 
to us “it was done in the rush to catch up with the deadline for equitisation within 1999 
.. The investment plan was not based on detailed analysis of the needs, capabilities and 
technical peculiarities of the system of EYDAP ... but taking as a starting point that the 
State was committed for a subsidy of 60% of the project up to a maximum limit of 735 
MEuros, a total of 1,226 MEuros was inferred, and then with rough judgements allocated 
to various projects”! (Interview EYDAP, 5/12/02).
Pricing policy
The 1996 Plan that Knight Piesold had prepared recognized that the ability of EYDAP 
to self-finance its investment programme would very sensitive at the level of tariffs 
(EYDAP, 1996: 8): “If tariffs increase annually a net 2% (i.e. on top of adjustment to 
inflation), then the investment program can be materialised rapidly. If the increase is 
by 2% smaller than annual inflation then EYDAP might be able to finance just half of its 
investment programme. With constant nominal prices, EYDAP may bankrupt by 2002”.
Likewise, the possibility of EYDAP turning to external loans with favourable terms 
would depend directly upon the guarantee of future income and therefore to the 
guarantee of a given tariff policy. The proposal of the 1996 Plan was to increase tariffs at 
least up to the cost of water supply faced by EYDAP and readjust the prices to inflation 
since the last change. With this level of tariffs, EYDAP would be able to pay off its 
investment programme although with some delay, creating initially debt, which would 
be paid off as profits would increase with an increasing consumption. 
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The government decided in 2000 to increase tariffs of common consumption to 
186 GRD/m3 (instead of the proposed in the Plan 220 GRD/m3). The tariffs though for 
municipalities was decided to be increased progressively to levels even higher than 
those proposed (Table No 10). A rough estimation based on the above is with the tariff 
development foreseen, the option of self-financing EYDAP is limited.
Table No 10: Water supply tariffs 1999-2004
Source: EYDAP Website
Whether the government will fulfill the plan of tariff development foreseen is 
questionable. On the one hand, there is a pressure for “effective” pricing and self-financing 
of investments, but on other the so-called “social mission” of EYDAP continues to be 
considered important (EYDAP, 1999). The Government is also prone to use utilities prices 
in order to control inflation pressure, which after a period of cessation has reappeared 
with the shift from drachmas to Euros. Table No 10 refers to the expected readjustments 
to inflation, as defined in the Contract between State– EYDAP. However, in the “frame of 
governmental decisions on freezing the tariffs of PUCs”, the tariffs of EYDAP were not 
readjusted in 2001, while, after the revaluations that followed the adoption of Euro in 
2002, the planned change for 2002 was suspended for April. At the time of writing this 
text (March 2002), the last price change was this of 01/07/00. 
On the other hand, the lack of a clear regulatory system for determining prices 
generates other concerns. The definition given in the law of setting tariffs based on a 
“legitimate return on investments” (Article of 3 Law 2744/1999) is so broad that allows 
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the government “to fix arbitrarily the value of capital”. The State becomes in practice the 
“guarantor of the profitability of the shares” (Parliament Proceedings, 28/09/99, 1225) 
with no defined and transparent rules however, governing its decisions. 
Relations between State and EYDAP
The above analysis of the issues with the investment program and pricing policy, 
suggest that many of the of the pre-equitisation problems in the relation between State 
and EYDAP persist.  
Public sector debts from unpaid bills to EYDAP increased by 21% between 1999-2001, 
reaching 22,3 MEuros (EYDAP, 2002). Municipal debts, after an initial reduction in 2000, 
increased again in 2001 by 4,4 MEuros (25%) probably due to the substantial increase 
of municipal tariffs. Despite the relative provision of the Law, municipal debts have not 
been retained by the Treasury.
Also, EYDAP retained the responsibility for flood control protection, without however 
being paid by the MESPPW for its services nor even for its related expenses (EYDAP, 
2001). Drainage and flood protection projects together with the investment program 
for the aqueducts are 85% financed by the CSF and the Cohesion Fund by the KPS. 
However, until 2001, while EYDAP was paying the expenses for the necessary works, 
the State had not even paid the European contribution!  
With the end of the annual subsidy of 44 MEuros in 2001, the logistical results of 
EYDAP deteriorated considerably. In the first semester of 2002 (a period where the 
tariffs remained unchanged), pretax profits of the company were 19,5 MEuros, down 51% 
in comparison to the first semester of 2001 and despite an 8% increase of turnover 
(EYDAP Source of Information, 28, 16). The fiscal situation of EYDAP is even worse yet, 
since payments from the State for works that have been already carried out and paid by 
EYDAP are still pending.
From jubilations after equitisation for the “new millennium, which finds EYDAP 
more powerful and more competitive than ever” (EYDAP Source of Information, 12), 
two years later there is talk about the “unbearable .. current reality and the threat of 
bankruptcy”! (EYDAP Source of Information, 28, 8). Given the still considerable – albeit 
reduced - profits and the return of considerable dividends to shareholders, referring to 
the option of bankruptcy is probably more as a means of the company to press the State 
to settle its debts and undertake the subsidy of the investment program that an real 
threat. Nonetheless, the General Manager of EYDAP evokes a “careful management 
of investments and activities” and an editorial in the company’s magazine refers to a 
“drastic reduction of expenses” (op cited, 28, 8). 
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Organisational and Service Performance
Managerial changes and Internal Planning 
Starting in 1996 after the PUC Law and before the equitisation, EYDAP management 
proceeded with a restructuring the company’s organization, aiming at the improvement 
of functionality and the potential for investment implementation. 
The first key change was the integration of the General Secretariat for Water Supply 
(WGS) with the Sewerage General Secretariat (SGS) under a Networks and Installations 
General Secretariat (NIGS). This corrected a functional division between the water supply 
and sewerage sectors which had its origins in the pre-1980 period when each was a 
separate entity (Xenos et al, 2001a). 
A second important innovation was the establishment of a Planning and Development 
General Directorate and, for the first time, a special Directorate for “Programming and 
Planning”. The role of this directorate was mainly to monitor and carry out the EU- funded 
projects (aqueducts and drainage) (Xenos, 1999). The establishment of the directorate 
and the appointment of an out-sourced project manager for the works was a response 
to the EU requirements for CSF-funded projects (EYDAP, 1996). 
Regarding the company’s internal structure, new directorates have been set up 
aiming at internal control, functional renovation and better financial and operational 
administration (Xenos, 1999).
Although there is lack of specific data that would allow an informed judgment, a 
rough appraisal is that administrative modernisation has led to a relative improvement 
in the capacity of EYDAP to carry out projects and investments. The 1996 Plan had set 
as a goal an increase of investment rates from 20,5 MEuros/yr (actual investments in 
1996) to over 60 MEuros/yr. In 2000 investments in the network were 88 MEuros while 
investments in the aqueduct projects were 82 MEuros (EYDAP, 2001, 44-46). 
Improvements in the field of information technology and telecommunications were 
also substantial. These tasks involved the amelioration of computer automation and the 
installation of an internal and external network, the installation and operation (for the 
first time) of on-line software to manage accounting data and bills, the development and 
use of hardware and software systems for the plotting and management of networks 
and the remote monitoring of aqueducts and pumping plants (EYDAP, 2001, 2002). 
The above improvements, however, had been already underway since the law for 
the modernization of public utilities in 1996. It is difficult to judge the extent to which 
these changes are related to equitisation - partial privatisation and the change in the 
ownership structure of EYDAP per se, or if they would have taken place anyway.   
Long-term planning is an essential element of a contemporary business and it is a 
prerequisite foe the more “rational” management of the water supply system. The already 
mentioned 1996 Master Plan prepared by Knight Prieslod on beahlf of EYDAP was 
mandated by the 1996 law for PUCs which required that all PUCs submit an operational 
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and strategic plan to the State. The plan, despite its technical competence, was not really 
part of the internal operational planning of EYDAP. It was an external study carried out by 
consultants and never assimilated in the day-to-day operation of the company. Despite 
provisions in the law for three-year or five-year updates of the Plan, no such updating 
has been carried out. The so-called “Master Plan” is a useful reference report but it didn’t 
become a truly instrumental platform for long-term planning. It is indicative that despite 
the existence of the Master Plan, the Ministry of National Economy assigned anew to 
a consultant the preparation of a new investment plan before equitisation. The new 
investment plan, which was prepared without any contribution by EYDAP executives 
is, according to the opinion of a high rank executive of EYDAP “maybe appropriate for 
some Nordic country but totally inapplicable in Greece” (EYDAP Interview, 5/12/00). 
Accountability
One of the main arguments in support of equitisation was that it would lead to an 
increase of the accountability of EYDAP’s, since (in the words of the Minister of National 
Economy) “the stock exchange market puts every company under constant scrutiny 
and control from consumers and investors” (Parliament Minutes, 28/09/99, 1191). The 
assumption was that with the State at “an arm’s length” from the company and with 
clear contractual rules upon specific Level of Services obligations, it will be possible to 
monitor and assess EYDAP’s performance (Xenos et al, 2001). 
However, the annual service performance reports that EYDAP had to submit to the 
MESPPW and to the consumers, despite being clearly mandated in the State-EYDAP 
Contract, 5 years after have not yet been available3.  Furthermore, there is no regulatory 
or monitoring mechanism in the Ministry to check and evaluate such reports and related 
data, even if they were available. 
The assumption that the introduction of the company to the stock exchange market 
and its monitoring by the shareholders would provide an incentive for improvement 
and enforce greater “discipline” to the company can not yet be verified. The dramatic 
decline in the value of the share of EYDAP is certainly not connected to the performance 
of the company itself. Similarly however, the initial rise of the share value had nothing 
to do with EYDAP’s performance and prospects. The “immature” and unstable Greek 
stock exchange market provides little control and guidance. The little scrutiny that the 
highly ambitious but completely unrealistic investment programme of EYDAP received, 
serves as a testament. Certainly, the introduction of the company in the stock exchange 
market makes difficult the reappearance of deficits in the future, but if this is to be done 
by State support it doesn’t mark any real progress.
3   A closer look at the performance indicators reveals that they have been directly adopted from the 
England & Wales Water Industry Benchmarking System (see OFWAT, 2000), probably owing to the fact 
that the consultant who proposed them, Hyder, is a Welsh water company. Some of them have little 
applicability to the Greek context. For instance, the indicator “hosepipe bans” relates to a particularity of 
English law (bans applied to public and garden hosepipes in cases of drought), but bears no relevance 
whatsoever to Greece were there are just a few hosepipes
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Independence
As discussed in another section, the Government has not respected its contractual 
obligations with respect to pricing policy (prices have not been automatically adjusted 
to inflation rates), the subsidization of the investment programme nor the recovery of 
the debts of local authorities (the Government has not proceeded to withhold the debts 
from the public funds of the local authorities). Moreover the Government has delayed 
payment of the costs undertaken by EYDAP for flood protection and drainage and for 
the modernization of the aqueduct system. These tasks have been removed from the 
competency of EYDAP and the company was supposed to carry them out on behalf of 
the State with due compensation. EYDAP is still a majority public company and has not 
tried to challenge judicially the breach of the contractual agreements on the part of the 
State. 
EYDAP’s top management is still closely linked to the MESPPW and the government. 
The resignation of the President and the General Manager of EYDAP in March 2002 had 
to do with the internal politics of the ruling political party and the change of Minister of 
ESPPW. According to the newspapers the new President of EYDAP is deemed to be a 
“person of trust” of the new Minister. Note that while the President of the Company is to 
be appointed by the government, the General Manager, who has most executive powers, 
is to be hired through an independent, open tender, on the basis of merit. However, 
exploiting a clause of the Law, which assigns the tasks of the General Manager to 
the President until a competition for the position takes place, a forced simultaneous 
resignation of both President and General Manager facilitated the concentration of both 
powers to the new appointed President (Newspaper Eleutherotypia, 03/03/02 and 
06/03/02). This situation has not changed up to now (September 2003). So much for 
the proclaimed “autonomy” of the company from the government after equitisation.
However, some improvements can be observed in comparison to the period of full 
public control. For example there is greater freedom and more meritocracy in personnel 
policy (see below). EYDAP has also been given more freedom in the assignment 
of subcontracts and the procurement of materials. This had been a major cause of 
inefficiency in the past, as contracts even for the simplest purchases, were subject to a 
lengthy bureaucratic process following several authorisations from different Ministries 
(Xenos, 2001). The extent however to which such improvements necessitated the partial 
privatisation of EYDAP, or could be achieved within a framework of “modernization” of 
EYDAP as a public utility is questionable. 
Personnel policy
Voluntary retirements have decreased the real number of employers (from 4,804 in 
1996 to 4,262 in 2001) and have increased the index of personnel per connection (from 
3.0 in 1996 to 2.6 in 2000). Nevertheless, both the cost of items sold and the general 
expenses have also increased (Table No 9) and it is difficult to evaluate real changes 
in EYDAP’s productivity. The increase of “sales’ cost” is mainly due to the increased 
cost for “repairs and maintenance” and new supply connections, while the increase of 
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general expenses is related to the raise of salaries granted to the administration and 
network personnel. The salaries of managerial staff have significantly increased (from 
0,97 MEuros in 1998 to 1,45 MEuros in 2001, with the maximum annual salary being 
100,000 Euros in 2001 up from 70,000 Euros in 1998). Nevertheless they are still far 
from the extreme salary increases for top management observed after privatization of 
water services in other parts of the world.
Hiring of the new personnel of EYDAP is conducted through the High Personnel 
Selection Committee for the Public Sector (ASEP). This mechanism is a definite 
improvement to past practices, increasing meritocracy. New hiring are no longer decided 
on an ad hoc “clientelistic” basis from the ruling government, but with due consideration 
to the specificities and needs of EYDAP. Internal transfers of employees between 
EYDAP and other public bodies (e.g. ministries, local authorities, etc) were frequent in 
the past, resulting in excess, non-specialised staff in many positions, often “absent from 
the productive process” without punishment. The more reliable procedures applied 
by the High Personnel Selection Committee have lead to the employment of highly 
educated and specialised individuals for the new working positions (EYDAP Information 
Source, 27, 15). Note however that this is a change that stems from improvements in the 
employment policy of the public sector and not the equitisation/privatization of EYDAP.
Diversification of activities and multi-utility operations
Concerning the export of “know-how”, EYDAP has worked as a consultant to prepare 
water supply and sewerage plans for the Prefectures of Cephalonia and Ithaca (Sarrou, 
2000). Abroad, EYDAP undertook the preparation of an integrated project programming 
plan for the improvement of the water and sewerage networks in three cities of the 
FYROM. This project, with a budget of 300,000 Euros, has been funded by the Ministry 
of National Economy, within the framework of a Greek-FYROM co-operation programme 
(Newspaper “Niki” 23/10/01). Recently, EYDAP joined in a strategic agreement with the 
Vivendi multinational company, for the development of joint business activities in the 
countries of South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa (EYDAP 
Information Source, 27: 23). 
EYDAP has also initiated business activities in fields other than water services, such as 
the marketing of bottled water, as well as in the liberated markets of telecommunications, 
energy, and natural gas. A feasibility study regarding the production of bottled 
water from the high quality groundwater boreholes of the company in the area of 
Mavrossouvala is under preparation, while eleven applications have been submitted for 
the development of energy production units, out of which seven relate to hydroelectric 
installations in aqueducts and reservoirs of EYDAP for a total maximum capacity of 5 
MW (Xenos, 2001). Since 2001, EYDAP participates by 25% together with other PUCs, in 
the “Alternative Telecommunication Networks S.A.”. This joint venture aims to attract a 
strategic investor as partner for the development and commercial exploitation of a digital 
telecommunications network with optic fibres in Athens. The underground networks of 
EYDAP can be used as paths for the new digital network (EYDAP, 2002). Furthermore, 
given its expertise EYDAP intends to undertake the task of installing and managing 
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small domestic pipes for the main natural gas network in several neighborhoods of 
Athens.
Service performance
There is not publicly available data on network services, such that would allow a 
comparison of service performance before and after the partial privatisation of EYDAP. 
Although it’s a contractual obligation of EYDAP to collect relevant data (e.g. on pressure 
of supply, delay until complaints are answered, interruptions – see Consumer charter 
and Contract State-EYDAP) and submit reports to MESPPW and to the public, such 
reports have not been available to date.
In comparison to the Latin American and African cases examined in the PRINWASS 
project, connection to the network is not an issue in Athens. Connection coverage is in 
the order of 97% of urban households. 
Performance with respect to resource management (delivery efficiency, water demand 
management, etc) is examined and assessed separately. 
Social Equity
Subsidies and distributional issues
Under the new regulatory regime, EYDAP is now a company 30% owned (soon 49%) by 
private shareholders. The notion that the State (or the EU) can subsidize the investment 
program of the company requires closer scrutiny, to the extent that public subsidies 
may be used to support private profits. For example, the expansion of the water supply 
network to the periphery of the city may be justifiable as a public policy of extending 
drinking water and sewerage provision to underserviced areas but it also increases the 
assets and the customers base of a partly private company, with public funds. 
Having the security of state subsidy for core services, EYDAP might also devote its 
resources to activities that are not related to its utility services (e.g. bottled water or 
optical fibre network). This might also be the case even if the State does not subsidize 
core services, in a worst-case scenario that EYDAP might underinvest in core services in 
order to undertake more profitable subsidiary activities. This raises a question of hidden 
cross-subsidies, where EYDAP could devote both financial and human resources in 
profitable activities (in multi-utilities like natural gas pipeline installation, the production 
and marketing of bottled water or granting the use of its ducts for the optical fibre network 
–fields in which it is already involved, EYDAP, 2001, 2002), cutting on its investments in 
non-profitable core activities, i.e. leakage or consumption control. As discussed above, 
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the limited regulation monitoring and the practically inactive Level of Services contract 
provide little control over such situations. 
The assumption is that profit will result from the “decrease of costs through more 
efficient human resources with increasing productivity and improved exploitation of 
infra-structure and technology” (Minister for National Economy speech, Parliament 
Minutes, 28/09/99). In simple words, the assumption of the proponents of equitization 
was that the privatised EYDAP will fulfill at least the same goals as it did as a Public 
company, and at the same time make profit by performing its activities in a more 
cost-efficient way. But how can this be assessed without a proper regulatory-auditing 
system? Such a system should have defined and monitored a framework of goals and 
performance indicators and relate them to profit. 
In practice, the costs of EYDAP have not decreased after equitisation, despite the fact 
that its profits have multiplied (Table No 9). Cost increase could be due to increasing 
investments for the upgrading of infra-structure (e.g. investment in information 
technology). However, lacking a monitoring mechanism that could provide information 
one the above, one might equally well speculate that EYDAP makes profit and pays 
dividends to its shareholders based on State subsidisation and benefiting from an 
uncontrolled increase in consumption, which is unsustainable in the long-term. 
Openness and democratisation of decision-making
The activation of a Public Relations Directorate and the publication of annual reports 
by EYDAP (Annual Statistic Report, Annual News Bulletin for the Stock Exchange) have 
improved the availability and the transparency of internal information to external parties. 
In the period 1993-2000, EYDAP has attempted an opening towards the broader public 
(customers and later, potential investors). On the contrary, during the period of drought 
(1990-1993) and under fire for mis-management and political scandals, EYDAP was 
much more reserved regarding information and data disclosure. It only remains to be 
seen whether the relative openness during the last years will be maintained in a future 
period of crisis. 
The annual shareholders report for 2002 raises some doubts in this respect. It looks 
like EYDAP is trying to confuse the picture regarding its financial situation, which 
deteriorated considerably because of the end of the State’s annual subsidy and the 
lack of public financing for the investment program. In comparison to the report of 2001 
there is no information whatsoever regarding progress with the investment program (!).
The annual report of EYDAP to the consumers (foreseen in the Contract between 
State and EYDAP) has not been available to date, although the company is committed 
by law (“Consumers’ Charter”) to produce and disseminate such information. 
A further problem is that there is no external mechanism to check and validate the 
data that is given in the various reports.
With respect to participation in decision-making, there has not been any major 
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change after equitisation. In the past (1987), the social-democratic government had 
passed a law for the “socialization” of all public utilities, including EYDAP. This included 
setting up a “Representative Committee of Social Control” in each utility, consisting of 
9 representatives of the State, 9 of the employees, 4 from local authorities and 5 from 
associations such as the National Workers’ Association, the Association of Employees 
in the Public Sector, the Technical Chamber and the Chamber of Commerce and the 
National Association of Farmers. This Committee was supposed to have an advising 
role in the approval of the annual budget of EYDAP and had to be consulted in all major 
policy and planning issues. It had also the right to ask for the resignation of Members 
of the Board. In practice this institution remained inactive and was formally abolished 
in 1992.
Another mechanism of “social control” introduced by the social-democratic 
government upon its return in power in 1993 was the setting of a “Social and Economic 
Committee” to oversee legislation that would impact on labour relations (mainly relating 
to “privatisations”). This Committee, consisting basically of the same principal social 
actors as the PUC’s Representative Committees, assumed an advising role in many 
relevant laws. According to proponents of the institution the Committee has fulfilled its 
role. According to critiques, control and participation have been superficial, in practice 
legitimising decisions already taken. For the case of EYDAP, and as mentioned in another 
section, the government was criticized for sidelining the official role of the Committee, 
passing the law without previous debate and under the provision of emergency in the 
summer period of the legislature. 
At the level of resource planning, there are no active participation mechanisms neither 
at the level of EYDAP nor at the level of the broader river basins, whose water resources 
are utilized by Athens. The National Water Framework Law 1739/1987 “for water resource 
management” foresaw the establishment of “Councils - Assemblies” at the regional 
level, consisting of the principal regional social actors (professional associations’, 
local authorities, etc), responsible to oversee the drafting of the regional water plans 
and abstraction licensing procedures. These committees have been inactive and did 
not affect in any way the management of Athens’ water resources. At the urban level, 
planning and management of water resources is considered an EYDAP-only matter and 
there is no provision for involvement of the public at any level. 
Cost of water and social impacts  
Chart No 17 illustrates the monthly cost of water services for a family of four 
consuming 200 m3/year (average household consumption as set by the International 
Water Services Association), on the basis of the water tariffs each year and in deflated 
1999 prices (obviously an average family in the 1960s would consume much less, but 
the same index is used for comparative purposes).
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Chart No 17:  Monthly deflated cost of water services for the average family of four, in drachmas 
(1Euro = 340 drachmas)
A general observation is that the cost of water has remained roughly constant through 
time, although average household incomes in the same period have increased a lot (20% 
between 1981-1991). Peaks relate to changes in the tariffs. These are typically followed 
by a period of unchanged prices, real prices decreasing due to inflation. As mentioned, 
prices from 1999 should (at least, in principle) be adjusted to annual inflation. This has 
led to a relative stabilisation of the cost of water since 1998 onwards as depicted in 
Chart No 17. 
Although low in absolute values the price of water in Athens is comparable to that of 
other Western cities (Table No 11).
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Table No 11: Cost of a water supply-sewerage bill in Athens for an average household, compared 
with other cities
US$/m3
Milan 0.13
Rome 0.32
Los Angeles 0.60
Bologna 0.63
Paris 0.73
Berne 0.74
Washington 0.80
Athens 0.87
New York 0.88
Thessaloniki 0.94
Bordeaux 1.08
Porto 1.23
Lisboa 1.24
Coibra 1.28
Geneva 1.35
Zurich 1.36
Lyon 1.38
        Source: OECD, 2000; data for 1995.
According to a market research of EYDAP customers, average houeshold expenditure 
for water supply and sewerage is 7.6€ per month for low income households, 10.6€ per 
month for average income households and 14.7€ per month for high income households. 
This relates to about 1.4%, 1% and 0.6% of their incomes accordingly (Kanelopoulou, 
2001). If data is accurate, this suggests that the cost of water is generally affordable.
However, 52% of the people interviewed in the above market research consider the 
cost of water supply as high (38%) or very high (14%), although only 3.8% of the households 
interviewed spend over 3% (acceptable cost-poverty threshold) of their stated income for 
water supply and sewerage services (and not all of them are low-income households) 
(Kanellopoulou, 2001). This suggests for a significant potential of social resistance to 
water price increases and partly explains Government’s hesitation to transform water 
pricing policy. 
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Regarding the municipal networks, the anticipated increase from 1999-2004 is as high 
as 98% in fixed prices (Table No 10) (higher even than the proposal in the 1996 Master 
Plan for a 77% increase in order to recover supply costs) (EYDAP, 1996). The situation 
is complex. EYDAP’s stance that the supply of treated water to the municipalities is 
charged below the cost of production and that municipalities make profit by charging 
water to their citizens at prices similar to those of “common consumption” in the 
EYDAP network (EYDAP, 1999, 2001, 2002) is not necessarily accurate, at least not 
for all municipalities. Municipalities face a high cost for distribution, including the 
installation and maintenance costs for the network, which due to scale effects is 
probably much higher per unit of water delivered than that in the main EYDAP network. 
Municipal networks tend also to be much more spatially dispersed than central Athens’ 
network. Vafidis (1992) argued with gross calculations, that even with the low prices that 
municipalities were charged at the time, water distribution induced financial damages, 
even with the insufficient investment on network maintenance and repairs that the 
municipalities carried out. Therefore, there is a question of whether municipal water 
supply is possible at the new increase prices. Furthermore, EYDAP’s argument that 
municipalities receive water below production cost is only partially true. EYDAP refers to 
fixed average cost. But when the municipalities were connected to the central network, 
this was precisely because the additional cost for EYDAP to supply them with water was 
very low, as there were minimum demands for new infra-structure (just a central pipe 
to municipal networks). This was a main reason why EYDAP at the time preferred this 
form of agreement with many municipalities than take over the whole networks (Kallis, 
2003).
The new increase in municipal debts during 2001 suggests there is a problem. The 
municipalities refuse to surrender their networks to EYDAP because they deem that 
the compensation offered is low (in most cases equalized with debts) and there is a 
growing reaction against the rising charges seen as an instrument by EYDAP to acquire 
the networks. 
Despite the apparently low cost of water supply, potential effects of rising prices 
on lower income groups should not be underestimated. The pressure for a prices 
increase will intensify in the future, given the financial problems that EYDAP faces and 
the lack of funds for its investment programme. The lack of scientific information and 
analysis with respect to the income elasticity of demand does not allow for any definite 
conclusions. Still neither should “market research” on ability to pay be taken for granted 
as scientifically it is very inaccurate. 
According to unverified sources, increase in prices during the 1990-1993 drought 
impacted disproportionally on lower income groups (Kaika, 1999)4.  In England, the 
increase in the cost of water that followed privatisation led to a significant increase of 
disconnections of poorer households from the network due to failure to pay (Bakker, 
2000). On Athens there is a special provision in the Contract between State and EYDAP 
for the assignment of a category of “vulnerable consumers”, deserving special treatment 
4   Kaika refers to information presented before the Parliament, according to which, following an increase 
of prices, 18% of domestic consumers were responsible for 60% of consumption. Nevertheless, it is not 
defined upon which data this information was based.
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in terms of disconnection, but there is no progress to date in defining and protecting 
such customers.
Although an increase in prices might involve social impacts, from a social equity 
perspective neither does the past model of a generalised subsidy of the cost of Athens 
water supply constitutes a solution. Note than the “non-recovered” (that is non-recovered 
from prices) cost is somehow covered (subsidized), e.g. from general taxation. Subsidies 
could be substituted by the pricing mechanism in so far as the latter endorses notions 
of fairness such as those of the taxation system, and avoid a disproportional burden to 
the weakest groups in the name of economic efficiency.
Servicing new areas and inter-regional equity issues and conflicts
Drinking water supply is universal in Athens but a critical issue is the connection of 
the peripheral municipalities (along the coast and the northern and western parts of 
Attica) as well as proxime regions to the EYDAP network. 
The continuous, abundant and high quality drinking water supply of Athens is not the 
rule for the rest of the country, where generally network supply is only rarely potable. The 
level of water and sewerage services enjoyed by Athenians connected to the network of 
EYDAP is unparalleled in the rest of the country. 
In many islands for example, bottled water presents the primary source of drinking 
water. This situation is faced in many of the surrounding municipalities in the fringes 
of Attica as well as “satellite” towns in neighbouring regions. In the city of Korinthos 
for example, network water supply comes at a low pressure and is of unreliable quality. 
Local groundwater sources used in the past by municipal networks are limited for 
the rising demands of a growing (“suburban” or secondary-house) population and 
exhausted (with the effect of salinisation in coastal aquifers) and often polluted from 
overland urbanization (or even where not, there is a growing mistrust from the public) 
(Vafidis, 1992).
The expansion of the network first to eastern Attica and then to western Attica is 
considered as “contributing to the social mission of the company” (EYDAP, 1999: 177). 
Similarly, the transfer of water to the islands (Argosaronikos, Cyclades and Cyprus in 
periods of droughts) is considered as in line with the “social role” of EYDAP.
On the other hand, the expansion of water services in the regional periphery of Attica 
and the increasing water resource consumption it entails, have a broader inter-regional 
dimension. EYDAP transfers water from the far hinterlands of the west (Mornos, Evinos) 
and from the rural and agriculture-based Biotikos Kifissos basin (Yliki) to satisfy demand 
in the wider metropolitan area of Athens serviced by its network. 
The transportation of water resources from the under-developed, yet rich in waters, 
Western Greece areas for the needs of Athens, is characteristic of a broader pattern of 
centralisation, supported by State policies (Burgel, 1981). Electricity for Athens is also 
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brought by remote energy plants in South, Western and Northern Greece (Burgel, 1981: 
50-51). 
Regional disparities in water supply services have been remarkable. In the prefecture 
of Phokis, crossed by the river Mornos, only 15.8% of the population received full water 
supply services in 1980, while 84.2% had access only to limited services (KEPE, 1990). 
For the construction of the Mornos river dam, approximately 2,500 hectares of 
agricultural fields had to be confiscated. The construction of the dam led to the desertion 
of the area. Indicative of demographic decline the number of pupils in the Phokis 
elementary schools, 4,000 in the year 1975 (before the construction of this work) reduced 
to 1,850 in the middle 1990s. The six elementary schools in the fourteen municipalities 
surrounding the dam have been all closed (Prefecture Document submitted to the 
Parliament Operations Interruption Department, Ref. no 901, 27/09/99). The dam also 
caused the inundation of an area of rich cultural and historical importance including a 
the 19th century stone bridge, a famous old Pension and the remnants of the ancient city 
of Kallipolis, an Aetolian city destroyed by the Gauls during the 3rd century B.C. (Mitsios, 
2002). The landowners of the fields confiscated for the construction of the dam received 
compensation. Given population statistics they too, like many other Greeks from rural 
areas moved to Athens investing their savings to the housing market (Burgel, 1981). 
In August 1997 the Phokis Prefecture organised a rally to the Mornos River dam 
(Newspaper «Ta Nea», 16/08/97). The Prefecture Council stated that the dam had 
adverse effects to the local economy, increasing road access times and preventing 
surrounding areas from being cultivated; the Council demanded financial compensation 
from EYDAP. Moreover, there was an attempt to “institutionalise” this compensation, 
demanding a 6% charge on the price of water in Athens and the payment of the resulting 
sums to the Prefecture of Phokis. The representative of the area to the National 
Parliament requested this to be introduced as an amendment in the new law for the 
equtised EYDAP (Parliament Minutes, 28/09/99, 1207). Nevertheless, the Minister of 
National Economy rejected this amendment as being beyond the realm of the Law (the 
petition was rejected by the Parliament). 
Reactions from other hinterland regions against water transfers to Athens have 
intensified. The Prefecture of Aetoloacarnania strong opposition to the transfer of the 
waters of the Trichonis Lake to Athens during the water shortage is indicative of this 
situation (Kaika, 1999, Kallis, 2003). Members of Parliament from the Region submitted 
before the National Parliament a series of petitions drafted by citizens’ pressure groups, 
like the “co-ordination committee” against the Acheloos River diversion, and the transfer 
of the waters of Lake Trichonis, the “Aetolian Environment Protection Organisation”, 
and the Municipalities Union of the Prefecture (Parliament Minutes, Session ΡΑΓ΄, 
21/5/93 and ΚΔ΄, 22/7/93). Their main argument was that the constant “bleeding”–in 
some cases referred to as “robbery”– of the area’s water resources from the rest of the 
country has to stop, especially when, as in the case of Lake Trichonis, no real needs were 
attended but instead “fictitious” reasons were used to justify the transfers and other 
badly scheduled work that was being implemented to serve Athens. The Prefecture of 
Aetoloacarnania is second in land area in all Greece but only 48th in terms of GDP. It 
is a rural area and the largest part of the population lives from agriculture. Only 50% 
of fields are irrigated, while many municipalities, even those located on lakesides and 
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riversides, have rudimentary water supply networks. Locals questioned whether the 
“needs” of Athens should constitute an absolute priority against the development 
needs of the area. The threats for violent reactions against the work that had been 
heard at the Parliament are indicative of the violent opposition this work would face had 
its implementation begun (finally, the decision was cancelled following the end of the 
drought and other economic scandals following the work). Although it is not known to 
what extent these threats actually affected the final decision for the cancellation of the 
project, they certainly played an important role.
Similar reactions were induced by the boreholes in the Biotikos Kifissos River. 
According to newspapers, farmers of the municipality of Elatia even got armed, 
threatening EYDAP managers who visited the area. The farmers’ reactions take place 
every time water is drilled from EYDAP’s boreholes in the area. This usually happens 
during drought periods, when underground resources are naturally low aggravating 
the impacts on farmers’ boreholes. During the summer of 2001 “police forces came to 
prevent the farmers from taking the law into their own hands in the areas of Lokris and 
Boeotia. The farmers attempted to stop the drilling from the groundwater boreholes of 
EYDAP”. “Mayors and local producers filed complaints against the managing director of 
EYDAP, as well as against the Area Manager” (Newspaper “Ta Nea”, 25/07/01). Given 
that, in the summer of 2001 EYDAP groundwater boreholes were only partially used, 
reactions and conflicts might turn out much more intense in the future, if a serious 
drought event takes place. 
This opposition reflects a growing resentment of the water-abundant regions of the 
west to water transfers to the east. The diversion of river Acheloos to the irrigation plains 
of Thessalia had been one of the most ecologically and regionally controversial water 
projects in Greece to date. 
Isolated from its broader context, the improvement of water services in the 
metropolitan area of Athens and the islands is a justifiable social goal. On the other hand, 
there are important wider distributional issues underlooked. For example, the increase 
of water use in the metropolitan periphery is partly the outcome of an unrestrained 
and environmentally wasteful process of suburbanization. These processes of urban 
expansion have been intensified by the decision to locate the new international airport 
in the Messoghia plains (Map No 2) and improving transport connections to Athens, 
opening-up new residential areas. Far beyond reflecting “local needs”, the growing water 
demand in the coast of Attica relates to the increase of secondary and more recently, 
primary residential housing. New residential developments are characterized by 
gardening patterns contrasting the local aridity (e.g. lawns, swimming pools). The same 
holds for the islands of Cyclades, where the rapid and unplanned growth of tourism and 
secondary housing, typically without respect to local environmental and water resource 
conditions, has led to a manifold increase of water demand. Subsidising therefore the 
transfer of water from the west and the expansion of the service area of EYDAP is not 
a “neutral” response to social demands but it contributes to a reconfiguration of space 
with important distributional implications.
As discussed before, opposition from locals to water transfers does not reflect so 
much a reaction against the dominant “hydraulic model” (saving for environmental 
organizations, local and national), as much as a demand for compensatory investments 
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in the region. Expansion of EYDAP infrastructure and services to the communities in 
the proximity of the reservoirs and the aqueducts is a popular demand from regional 
authorities. This points to a potential scenario of “regionalization” of the water system 
of EYDAP serving an extended area including the regions where the water resources are 
found and the aqueduct passes up to the wider metropolitan area of Athens. Although, 
probably more “equitable” from a socio-spatial point of view, still such a scenario 
might have detrimental ecological impacts (Kallis and Coccossis, 2000). The riverine 
ecosystems of western Greece relate to one of the most important and few remaining 
wetland complexes of Greece and Europe (the “Messologhi” lagoons). To this we turn in 
the next chapter. 
Resource Management and the Environment
Incentives and disincentives from the new legal framework
Private sector participation entails an institutional change or a “re-regulation” in the 
water sector. In this section it is examined how the institutional change accompanying 
the partial privatisation of EYDAP structured the incentives and disincentives for and 
against a cautionary management and conservation of water resources in the case of 
Athens.
In a previous section the legal framework governing Athens’ water resource 
management was presented. Essentially the legal framework sustains the “protection” 
of EYDAP and of Athenians from the rising cost of water. The cost for Evinos dam, built 
(1993-2002) to augment the supplies of the city, has been subsidized 85% by the EU 
CSF and 15% by the State. This cost will not be reflected in water prices. 
Furthermore in the Contract between State-EYDAP, the first has committed to cover 
any incurred additional cost that may result from the use of the energy-intensive lake 
Iliki or the boreholes. Likewise, the responsibility for the financing and construction of 
any future major hydraulic work that may be necessary in case of an increasing water 
demand, rests also on the State. This means that EYDAP is insulated from the cost of 
an increasing water consumption that would make necessary the utilization of the more 
expensive sources or the development of new ones. 
Although there was in the Contract a provision for charging EYDAP for the abstraction 
of water, in practice this charge has been equated with EYDAP’s cost for operating and 
maintaining the (State-owned) reservoirs and aqueduct. The State retains however the 
right to impose such a charge after the first five years, although there is no specific 
reference to the form of this charge. 
Therefore, EYDAP and consumers will continue to face only the operational cost of 
water supply, with the capital expenses being covered by the State. And even some costs 
that are classified as “operational” could be covered by the State as there is a provision 
for subsidization (by public or EU funds) of investments such as network maintenance 
and renewal, leakage detection and control, etc. 
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These provisions maintain an “asymmetry” of incentives for EYDAP against a 
demand-oriented management of water resources. With prices set for a five-year period, 
EYDAP has limited motive to control the increase of demand. On the contrary it has an 
incentive to see increases in demand, as water sales are the main source of revenue. The 
additional income in 2000 relative to 1998 from water supply and sewage service sales 
was 38 MEuros (Table No 9). This increase derives “mainly from the overall increase 
of consumption in volume by 15.3%” (EYDAP, 2001: 51). With a hypothetical demand 
management policy that would limit consumption to 1998 levels (for example through a 
media campaign or with incentives for the repair / replacement of household hydraulic 
installations), the only economic benefit for EYDAP in 2000 would have been from the 
State subsidy. That is, without subsidy and with demand controlled under constant 
prices, EYDAP would not be profitable. 
Similar disincentives work against leakage control. EYDAP does not face the real 
cost of raw water and has its supply guaranteed. On the other hand, measures for 
leakage reduction would increase short-term operational expenses. Leakage reduction 
is pursued only to the extent that it can be financed (see: subsidized) through the 
investment program and as a side-effect of broader investments on network renewal 
and expansion. Given the problems with the investment program, expenditures for 
leakage control were among the first to face cuts as they increase short-term costs 
without contributing to an increase of revenue (save for the reduced treatment and 
distribution costs which however have not been quantified). 
Theoretically, the aforementioned disincentives should be counterbalanced by 
the terms of the Contract between EYDAP and the State, which asks that the former 
establishes a five-year resource management plan and submits it to the MESPPW for 
approval. The plan, which is discussed in more detail in the next section, indeed reduces 
the risk of careless management such as that recorded in the 1980s (where the reserves 
in Mornos were overexploited while water available from Lake IIiki was left unused, 
because abstraction from the latter was more expensive – Kallis, 2003). Note also that 
EYDAP no longer faces restrains in operating the Yliki lake pumps and the boreholes 
since the State guarantees that it will cover for the additional expenses.  
A fine is also foreseen in the case that EYDAP does not meet the leakage reduction 
targets. But this is very small at about 6 Euros / 1,000 m3 lost above the maximum 
leakage target. Up to now the State and EYDAP have not determined the annual “optimal 
level of leakage” in order to specify the annual goals for leakage reduction as foreseen 
in the terms of the contract. There is no mechanism as yet to distinguish leakage from 
under-metering (which forms a substantial part of un-accounted for water) nor other 
standard process to determine the actual level of leakage. Basically, EYDAP is free to 
calculate the level of leakage as it wishes and the end result in easily to be manipulated 
by changing the assumptions concerning the extent of meter under-registration.  
The problems highlighted above raised again the broader issue of the external 
monitoring and control of EYDAP. This is relevant also for the five-year resource 
management plan. In theory, the plan should be checked and approved by the MESPPPW. 
Within the Ministry however there is no specialised office or personnel to undertake 
such a task. The State therefore has no capacity to ensure that, for example, EYDAP will 
not allow an uncontrolled increase of demand (and extension of the network), that will 
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be very expensive in the medium-term (use of Iliki and boreholes, possible new project 
expenses for increasing of water resources) for the State. The assumption is that as 
long as EYDAP remains majority State-owned, there is no need for separate control 
as there was no specific control when EYDAP was fully public. However, in the 1980’s 
when EYDAP was a public company, similar economic mal-incentives were behind an 
unwarranted increase of demand that led to the costly paid drought (Kalis, Coccossis, 
2000). Now that EYDAP has been partially privatized and entered the stock-exchange 
market, the pressures to maintain profit pose even more serious threats of “externalizing” 
costs by underinvesting on resource management and misusing the resources.  
The above analysis may convey the wrong impression that the State, if it had the 
full information and control of the system, would care for the control of water use as 
its increase entails substantial long-term costs. The experience from the last drought 
suggests otherwise as it is elaborated in detail in Kaika (2000) and Kallis (2003).
Official statements of EYDAP confirm the linkage between profits and a rising water 
consumption. According to the report submitted by the company upon entrance in the 
stock-exchange market, a major attractive factor for EYDAP’s share is the “continuous 
increase of priced consumption” (EYDAP, 1999: 179). In the presentation of EYDAP to 
investors, the General Manager made explicit that a main advantage of the company is 
that “the consumption of water over the last years shows a growing trend; on average 7% 
annually.. we expect that over the next five-year period there will be an intense growth of 
consumption because of the expansion of the company, specifically in Attica” (EYDAP, 
Source of Information, 18: 16). In another similar venue the General Manager underlined 
“the advantages that result from secured raw material that (EYDAP) processes, the 
monopolistic character of product that it manages... and the progressive expansion 
of the areas of activity that will result from the swift built-up growth of neighboring 
Municipalities and Communities (EYDAP, Source of Information, 29: 7). 
In a response to criticisms of the equitisation policy made by Parliamentarians who 
claimed that the partial privatization of EYDAP may lead to an overexploitation of 
water resources, the Minister of National Economy responded that “when a company 
manages a good in relative scarcity.. it attends to its long-term safeguarding.. which 
yields a lot more.. profits for the company as well” (Proceedings of Parliament, 28/09/99, 
1231). However, as we argued above, this needs not be the case, in so far as the legal 
framework distorts incentives. 
The new legal framework for EYDAP does not attempt to address, much less 
“internalize”, the environmental and regional dimension. This does not come as a 
surprise since, as argued in another section, the law was not formulated in order to 
transform urban water management but in order to make the equitisation financially 
viable. Indicatively, the Contract recognises only the cost of maintenance and operation 
of the fixed assets as factors to be taken into account when (if ever) a charge for raw 
water is applied to EYDAP (EYDAP, 1999). No reference is made whatsoever to the 
possible “environmental”, “scarcity” or other external costs of water. 
During the discussion of the Law in the Parliament, the Minister ignored repeatedly 
the interventions of the MP from Fokida who demanded for a charge to be recovered 
from the price of water as a compensation for the Mornos reservoir region. In the end 
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he briefly responded that, “this is not the right moment to discuss this issue” (Minutes 
of Parliament, 28/09/99). His response makes clear the dominant thinking which sees 
the legal framework of EYDAP as dissociated from broader issues of water resource 
management, environmental protection or regional equity. The presumption is that 
these issues are settled separately with respective laws and that EYDAP operates within 
those.
However, the national regulation framework for water resources management and 
environmental protection, as expressed in law N.1739/1987 remains inactive. Even 
though particular decrees of the Law were activated during the 1990s, the situation 
remains unchanged. Regional water planning does not take place, regional authorities 
do not have regulatory powers and there is no mechanism to complying with ecological 
or other standards. As a result the regional planning of water resources management 
has not influenced the strategy of EYDAP for the water supply of Athens at any point. On 
the other hand, the incentives set by the new legal framework of EYDAP for expansion 
and increasing water use are real and pressing.
A typical response, however, is to downplay the importance of regional disparities 
and issues in water allocation, in so far as Athens is concerned. According to such views 
the supply of potable water to the capital of the country, where 35% of the population live 
is seen as something of outmost priority that cannot be wasted in outdated agriculture 
in Viotikos Kifissos or because of the ecological quality of some little-known rivers in 
Western Greece (Interview EYDAP, 3/12/02). The above simplification however, which 
positions the water supply of Athens as of “prevailing public interest” is part of the 
problem. The “needs” of Athens are not given. An increase in consumption is not the 
inevitable result of demographic and socio-economic changes, as popularly thought, in 
so far as it can be controlled, for example through: 
• the pricing mechanism,
• leakage detection and control, 
• controls on the expansion of the network vis. a vis.  protection and upgrading of 
local resources 
• land-use planning and development control policies for Athens, 
or other mechanisms available to exercise public control, which are not implemented 
because they are contrary to the profit-oriented motives of the privatised EYDAP. 
Therefore the issue is not about the “needs” of Athens but about properly balancing 
different goals, e.g. the preservation of ecological quality of Western Greece rivers vs. 
the maintenance of low cost water for Athenians or the profitability of EYDAP and the 
income of its shareholders. 
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EYDAP’s water resource management policy
The logic that governs water resources management in the period after the end of the 
drought (1993-today) and the addition of the Evinos Reservoir to the supply is that there 
are enough surplus reserves for the satisfaction of the increasing demand, and for the 
expansion of the network to new regions, with due care however to restrain “wastage” 
of water. The goal is expressed as “rational management of existing sources and not 
the development of new ones” (EYDAP, 1999: 175). This does not mean long-term 
restriction of demand or control of network expansion. The term “rational” refers to a 
better management of reserves, a limitation of distribution losses and the reduction 
of “wastage” during use. Emphasis is put on monitoring the system so that drought 
phenomena are timely identified and dealt with (Kuriazis, 2002). 
According to the General Director of EYDAP the goals of the new policy are that 
“the growth in water consumption should be restrained at the internationally accepted 
levels of 1.5-2% per annum… Increasing consumption … and expansion of EYDAP to 
other regions … necessitate the timely preparation of a study by the Ministry for the 
development of new sources. In the meantime the reserves should be managed 
rationally and exclusively for the needs of Athens” (Newspaper “Kathimerini”, 24 March 
2002, our translation and emphasis)
Modernisation of resource management
Since 1994 EYDAP is carrying out works on the aqueduct system, with a total budget 
of 147 MEuros to guarantee the safety of water supply through the provision of alternative 
routes and interconnections between the aqueducts. There are also projects for the 
upgrading of existing aqueducts. Works include among others increase of the supply 
capacity of segments of the Mornos-Athens aqueduct, strengthening of the aqueduct’s 
walls, construction of inter-connecting aqueducts between the Yliki and the Mornos 
aqueducts. Apart from increase of supply capacity and improved flexibility in using (or 
combining use) of the different resources of the system, there are certain benefits in 
terms of resource use. The particularity of the water supply system of Athens where 
Lake Yliki looses its reserves due to bottom sinkholes, means that an improvement 
of the aqueducts system can allow a more flexible distribution of abstractions from 
Mornos and Yliki and thus reduce total losses from the system (EYDAP, 1996).
The allocation of abstractions between the different sources of Athens (Mornos, 
Evinos, Yliki, boreholes) is of major importance. Since 1999, EYDAP commissioned 
a five-year research project to the National Technical University (NTU) for the 
“Modernisation of the supervision and management of the water resources supply 
system of Athens”. The objective is the development of a Decision Support System, 
based on modern simulation models of the hydrological data aiming at the optimisation 
of abstractions from different sources for given safety levels of demand satisfaction and 
(energy-related) cost (Koutsogiannis et al, 2000). The model had already been used for 
the production of the Water Resources Management Plan for the period 2000-2005 as 
required by the EYDAP-State Contract (see above). At a later stage of development, the 
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model should be fed with real-time data and depict them in a Geographical Information 
System, allowing the prediction and adjustment of the abstraction policy in real time. 
The model was put in operation in 2000. Before, abstraction policy was based 
on empirical observation of the levels of the reservoirs. Since 1993 and after the 
intensive use of the boreholes, the supplement of water from Evinos and a sequence 
of good hydrological years, the Mornos reservoir filled up leading gradually to end the 
abstractions from Yliki Lake and the boreholes. Losses however from the reservoirs 
have increased as Yliki is filling up again. According to the management plan, which is 
based on long-term hydrological predictions, “until the project of Evinos River functions 
fully, there will be a demand for greater contribution from Yliki Lake and groundwater” 
(Koutsogiannis et al, 2000, 94).  
Expansion of the EYDAP network to municipalities has been typically followed by an 
abandonment of local resources previously used. In the new plans for expansion, and 
despite calls for integrated water management, there are no provisions to maintain some 
of these resources, at least for secondary uses. It is difficult to estimate the potential 
contribution of such sources given their deteriorating quality due to aquifer pollution. 
The lack of interest on such options per se is illustrative.
Losses control and demand management
During and after the drought, there was an effort to reduce the quantity of un-
accounted for water. This effort centred primarily on the replacement of old, faulty 
volumetric meters, which under-registered consumption considerably, by new velocity 
meters. This led to a significant reduction of the difference between the output from the 
treatment plants and the final consumption metered, increasing the revenue of EYDAP, 
but had nothing to do with the reduction of the actual losses from network leakage.
In the investment programme for 2000-2008 it is anticipated that 19,7 MEuros will be 
allocated to leakage detection and control and 134 MEuros invested for the “replacement 
and restoration of the existing network”, aiming at the increase of the supply capacity 
and a more rational arrangement of the network. This modernisation of the network 
should also lead to a reduction of leakage.
However, up to now, progress in leakage control has been limited. Since 1996, 
reference has been made to a pilot programme for measuring, locating and repairing the 
leakages in an area accounting for about 14% of the total length of the EYDAP network 
(Kyriazis, 1996). This program was completed in 2001 (EYDAP, 2002). The conclusions 
“were very important for the further organisation of actions and investments..and it 
is possible to save significant quantities of water from locating and treating leakage, 
with the assistance of special equipment for their detection” (EYDAP, 2002). But these 
proposals have been already made since 1994 (EYDAP 1995) without real progress. 
Some detection units have been bought but do not operate due to expenditure cuts and 
lack of technical operators (EYDAP interview 10/12/02).
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The end of the drought signified an end to the efforts to control demand. Restriction 
measures were removed. Newspapers announced to Athenians that now they can 
“water their gardens and lawn and wash their cars without restraint” (Newspaper “Ta 
Nea”, 28/02/95). When in April 1997 the city’s reserves reached 1 billion m3, the General 
Manager of EYDAP declared that “we can start now seeing more systematically ...the 
upgrading of the role of EYDAP and the expansion to new areas” (Newspaper “Ta Nea”, 
30/04/97). Management executives of EYDAP, although reminding the public that 
excessive water use and wastage should be avoided, they made sure to stress that the 
water scarcity and the danger of water shortage was past and that EYDAP was now 
in a position to supply regions that faced droughts with water. The General Manager 
declared in 1998 that “the boreholes and the works carried out in the last few years plus 
the substantial rainfall, have created reserves for the city ... that will last for 20 years”. 
He talked about transporting water to Cyprus and the Cycladic Isles (Newspaper “Ta 
Nea”, 05/11/98). With these statements and by discontinuing the information campaign, 
the message the message to control water consumption that the public was receiving 
through media campaigns  faded.
Since 1992, tariffs remained practically unchanged (Table No 10) in line with the 
historical pattern of periodic price changes in periods of crisis followed by long periods 
when prices remain unchanged and fall in real value due to inflation (Chart No 17). The 
decrease of the cost of water combined with an environment of sufficiency explain the 
rapid increase of water use in all user categories (Chart No 10). Note that the influence of 
water prices on demand does not depend only on the absolute price levels but to a large 
degree on their design and structure (bands, switch levels and price differences) vis a vis 
demand characteristics (Hanemann, 2000, Dalhuisen et al, 2002). In 2000, and after 
the equtisation / partial privatisation of EYDAP, new tariffs were introduced. These tariffs 
were designed on the basis of cost recovery and safeguarding the economic viability of 
EYDAP (EYDAP, 1996), but the structure of the tariffs remained unchanged.  In Athens 
the greater part of consumption (about 90%) falls into the two lower price bands (EYDAP, 
2001, 2002). Strengthening of incentives to save water would require more bands and 
price differentials within those two bands to provide more incentives for saving and 
have real impacts on consumers’ behavior, with sharp increases of the price for high 
consumptions (in EYDAP’s case, greater than 20 m3/month) (Hanemann, 2000). Such 
a policy may have better results in terms of demand reduction, but offer less safety of 
returns, since the bulk of consumption might shift to lower bands. This is problematic 
for the partly privatised EYDAP, making more difficult the prediction of future profit, as 
reducing high-level consumption would have a negative impact on revenues. EYDAP 
itself recognised in its annual report that increasing revenue from water sales in 2000 
was primarily due to an increase of consumption in the highest band (EYDAP, 2001).
The change of tariffs in 2000 was not followed by any particular publicity campaign. 
Consumption in 2000 continued to increase in comparison to 1999. 1999-2000 was 
a poor hydrological year. Athens’ reserves declined and the “drought alarm bell rung 
again” (Newspaper “Ta Nea, 10/01/01). EYDAP started anew a publicity campaign to 
control consumption, although this time the messages did not have the intensity of 
those circulated during the previous drought. Consumption in 2001 stabilised and in 
the common category slightly fell (Chart No 17). This documents the immediate results 
of a publicity campaign, in connection perhaps with a –slightly delayed- realisation of 
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the increase in prices. The fall of consumption was more noticeable at the high charge 
bands, aggravating impacts on EYDAP’s revenue in 2001 (EYDAP, 2002).
With the return to normal rainfall patterns in 2001-2002 and the beginning of full 
operation of the Evinos reservoir, reservoirs replenished. The message of EYDAP asking 
for restrain on water use was quietly withdrawn. The control of consumption in 2001 had 
contributed to the poor financial results. With the guaranteed water supply of Evinos, 
there was no longer urgent need to control consumption. The debate turned once again 
to the plans of EYDAP for expansion. Already, and in the midst of the publicity campaign 
for the restriction of consumption, an Interministerial Committee on Water was deciding 
that the drought faced by the Islands of the Cyclades should be solved with transfers 
of water from Athens (Newspaper “Eleutherotypia”, 12/04/01). EYDAP soon announced 
that it will go ahead with the extension of the network to other regions as soon as it 
secures sufficiency of water (Newspaper “Ta Nea”, 28/06/01).  
Recently EYDAP went ahead with commissioning a study to the consulting company 
Knight Piesold for the restructuring of tariffs, which provides insight to its future pricing 
policy (if the State adopts a policy of price readjustment, something that does not 
seem possible so far). The criteria given to the consultancy for planning prices were 
the “increase of EYDAP revenue according to its financing needs and the maintenance 
of the water price within acceptable levels. Demand management was not set on the 
table for discussion” (interview EYDAP, 10/12/00). Since demand management was not 
set as a goal, there was no analysis of demand characteristics, which is a basis for 
any long-term, conservation-oriented tariff policy. The assumption was that, firstly “the 
rise in prices is enough for constraining demand”, and secondly that “if there is ever 
need for further control of demand it will be done with special restraining measures 
and tariffs, as in the last water shortage” (NTU Interview, 28/11/00). The study proposed 
the compression of domestic tariffs into two bands aiming at the simplification of the 
administrative burden (and cost) of EYDAP, and also the securing of returns, since a 
system with fewer bands allows a safer prediction of returns (Hanemann, 1998).
Neither does EYDAP’s network policy indicate a cautionary approach to water 
resource management. As soon as the reserves replenished, EYDAP put in motion 
expansionist plans for extending the network to new municipalities. According to 
predictions, a full-scale expansion of the network to the broader metropolitan area and 
beyond will add a further 550,000 people to the network and will increase water use 
by about 100 hm3/yr (Koutsogiannis et al. 2000). Such a scenario looks more unlikely 
given the current economic recession of EYDAP and the lack of investment funds. A 
more restrained expansion scenario predicts an additional population of 200,000 
people and an increase in water use in the order of 20-50 hm3/yr (Koutsogiannis et al. 
2000). In public debate there is no reference whatsoever to the implications in terms 
of demands for water resources of such an expansion. Nor are there intentions to 
conserve and use (at least in secondary uses) the existing local sources. Although this 
might not be in all cases relevant or feasible, the total lack of discussion on the issue is 
indicatory of the continuation of the expansionist model, which wants a replacement of 
local sources from the central EYDAP system and their subsequent abandonment. 
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Prospects 
Is the goal of EYDAP, for rational development within the limits of existing sources 
through an efficient use of reserves, achievable or only wishful thinking?    
Chart No 10 showed the trends in Athens’ water consumption and presented 
different scenarios. The most recent ones are those performed by Koutsogiannis et 
al., 2000 for the water resource management plan of EYDAP. As evident in the chart, 
actual consumption has already surpassed the scenario of low consumption. Trends 
in 2000 and 2001 suggest a high demand scenario. Consumption has already gone 
over the threshold of the safe “economical” yield of 410 hm3/year (i.e. yield safeguarded 
under abstraction practices that minimize operational cost – i.e. priority abstraction 
from Mornos-Evinos). In practice, this means that if EYDAP continues to use primarily 
the Mornos-Evinos reservoirs and keeping Lake Yliki as an emergency supply, the 
possibility of error of the system increases with the rise in water use and reaches 100% 
for a consumption of 440 hm3 (Koutsogiannis et al, 2000:76). Of course, in practice 
EYDAP has already started using Yliki and groundwater boreholes as reserves fell and 
following the proposals of the model and the plan. However, even the safe yield of the 
system (480 hm3/year with a certainty of 99%) will be surpassed according to the high 
demand scenario in 2006, while according to an intermediate demand scenario will 
surpass it by 2009 (see Chart No 10).  
Therefore, the rise in demand will meet the limits of the resources of the system 
within this decade. The danger of a new water drought will increase. The five-year Water 
Resources Plan proposes to take controlling measures to restrict demand within 410 
hm3/year. This does not seem to be happening. Losses for example, which in all scenarios 
of the plan are considered as limited to 90 hm3/year, in 2001 reached 100 hm3 (Chart No 
10). The leakage control programmes and those of maintenance/ refurbishment of the 
network are the first to suffer the results of the 2001 expenditure cuts. Even if the cuts 
of the investment programme restrict the expansion of the network, the rise in demand 
within the existing network is enough to exceed the safety limits set for water resources 
(Kallis, 2003). 
The fact that a demand management policy is not implemented is not the result of 
omissions or lack of programming, but as it was argued earlier, it is an outcome of the 
institutional framework and the fact that EYDAP does not face the cost of increasing 
abstraction while water sales are its main source of revenue. As a result, EYDAP does 
not have serious incentives for a long term and persistent limitation of demand, but only 
for short-term controls when reserves are close to their limits and for expanding anew 
when sufficient reserves have been secured, or, even better, the next resource has been 
added to the system. 
Improvement of delivery efficiency (e.g. limiting losses of aqueducts and network) 
happens only as part of interventions which in the long-term increase production 
capacity (increase of supply capacity of water system, upgrade of network and its 
supply capacity). The structure of the eight-year investment programme (Table No 8) is 
indicative: 30% would be given for the expansion of the network, 30% for replacement 
/ renewal and only 4% directly to leakage detection and repair. The network upgrading 
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programme may have leakage reduction as a side-effect, but its main goal is the 
increase of the supply capacity and therefore the preparation for satisfying higher water 
demands (EYDAP, 1996).
The main potential water resources to respond if water demand continues to grow, 
are located in Western Greece and in the vicinity of the Mornos-Evinos complex. 
Potential projects would have a significant one-off cost (in the order of 150 MEuros), high 
operational costs as pumping will be required to the higher-altitude Mornos aqueduct 
(in the order of 5-10 MEuros per annum), and they will most probably generate regional 
and environmental conflicts, given the importance of the Messologhi lagoons complex 
with which most potential resources are linked (Kallis, 2003). 
We do not claim that a drought crisis or new waterworks are inevitable in the near 
future. There is nothing to render impossible choices such as the systematic control 
of demand and leakage, a joint management of the Biotikos Kifissos River basin 
with farmers securing groundwater, or the improved exploitation of new groundwater 
boreholes (EYDAP Interview, 05/12/02). A prevailing view among experts confirmed in 
our series of interviews for the PRINWASS project  was that with a large increase of 
prices and the enforcement of demand management measures like those implemented 
during the previous drought, consumption could be constrained within the limits of 
the sources in the short-term, while in the long-term a systematic pricing policy could 
maintain demand within serviceable levels (Interviews NTU, EYDAP). The question is why 
such policies have not been implemented so far and why demand was left to increase 
so much since 1993. Our answer shifts attention to the continuation of disincentives 
against water conservation under the new legal framework for the equitised EYDAP.
Pricing instruments are important if consumption is to be controlled and water 
resources conserved, but the issue is much more complex than a simple increase of 
prices. As discussed in a previous section, a rise in prices may face public reaction and/
or have distributive impacts on the less well-off. This partly explains the hesitance of 
the government in authorizing a raise of prices. With respect to water conservation, an 
important issue is where will a surplus that may occur as a result of price rising go. If it is 
reinvested into the network expansion program, as EYDAP intends, then the dynamics 
of a long-term increase in water use are maintained. If due to the increase in prices there 
is an increased profit for EYDAP, then issues of social justice arise, since EYDAP will be 
rewarded possibly without having improved its performance. Lack of a regulation and 
supervision system for EYDAP is making monitoring of all the above difficult. Another 
issue is that the impact of prices depends on their design and the “information” that 
accompanies price change. However, as the experience since 1993 shows, even if the 
prices rise, EYDAP does not attempt to induce reduced water use among the public.
Concluding, institutional change following the partial privatisation in Athens WSS 
seems to maintain, if not reinforce, the structural disincentives against water resource 
conservation seen in the pre-privatisation period. Within a context of more or less constant 
prices, rising water use provides a main source of profit for the partially privatised EYDAP. 
This maintains a pattern of increasing water use, which in the long term might lead to 
significant environmental impacts, if a new water work becomes necessary. Therefore, 
EYDAP claims for a “rational” and “environmentally friendly” use of water following 
the “modernization” of the company are questionable. As Kallis and Coccossis (2003) 
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discuss extensively in their analysis, the regulatory regime (“institutional arrangement”) 
determines what counts as “rational”, i.e. cost beneficial, and for whom. What appears 
as “rational” from the perspective of EYDAP in a given legal framework and set of 
economic incentives may not be rational in toto and from a broader social perspective. 
The institutional arrangement following the partial privatisation of EYDAP continues 
to displace the cost of water use in the metropolitan area to the source regions, the 
environment, and the future. 
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Part C : Key Findings of the case study
The context: PI in Greece and the case of Athens
Until the mid-90s all water utilities in Greece but Athens’ were “fully public utilities” 
under municipal control. WSS in most small municipalities were provided by WSS 
municipal departments. In bigger municipalities, towns and cities, WSS were provided 
by so called “Municipal Enterprises of Water Supply and Sewerage” (DEYA). These are 
publicly owned, public-style managed (though some are private law companies) and 
should be positioned somewhere between fully public and corporatised utilities in the 
heuristic diagram of Figure No 1.
Athens’ water supply and sewerage enterprise (EYDAP Inc.) has been an exception. 
From 1928 to 1974, EYDAP was a private company owned by the U.S. Ulen Co and 
operating under a BOT concession by the State. In 1980, EYDAP became a state-
owned, private law enterprise (“corporatised utility”). In comparison to the rest of the 
country where municipalities had the responsibility for WSS (under the supervision and 
financing of the Ministry of Interior), in the case of Athens it was central government 
(through the Ministry for Public Works) that had the responsibility for the management 
of the enterprise (strategy, selection of president and board, prices, etc). 
This situation changed in 1996 when under a law for the “modernisation of public 
utility companies” (PUC law), EYDAP, together with other major public sector utilities 
(electricity, telecommunications, etc) was distanced from the public sector becoming 
a public plc, i.e. a private style company with increased autonomy in management and 
investments, but under public ownership. In 1999, the capital of EYDAP was “equitised” 
and a minority of its shares was made available by the State to private investors through 
wide distribution in the Stock exchange market (Chart No 18). An 8-year investment 
programme was set, prices were fixed for a 5 year period and a Concession Contract was 
signed between State and EYDAP describing respective duties and rights. A Regulatory 
Act institutionalised the contract and settled the economic differences of State and 
EYDAP. The same PI model was followed for the water utility of the second major city 
of Greece, Salonika (“DEYATH”; Municipal Enterprise of Water Supply and Sewerage 
of Thessaloniki Inc.). Greater Athens (approx. 4 million people) and Greater Salonika 
(approx. 1 million) account for 50% of the population of Greece. The rest of the country’s 
population is still served by municipal enterprises or departments. 
PI in EYDAP is emblematic. It is the first water utility in Greece where PI was introduced 
and is a model that will be followed in other cases of PI in WSS, if and when they take 
place. It concerns the capital city of Greece, its administrative and economic heartland, 
where 40% of its population resides. As the say goes “Greece is Athens” (albeit an 
unpopular and painful say for the rest of Greeks). By looking at the findings from the 
case of Athens, broader lessons for the future of PI in Greece can be drawn. To these, 
we turn next.
WATERLATGOBACIT
WATERLAT-GOBACIT  Working Papers
Research Projects Series - PRINWASS Project  - Vol 4 Nº 1 / 2017
156
Figure No 1: A Taxonomy of Public-Private Organisational regimes
Source: adapted from Blockland et al, 19995  (the red line indicates changes in EYDAP).
5   Fully public utilities include the archetypal types of: government water service departments; “regies” 
(internal municipal government entities but with a defined and separate set of accounts); more independent 
publicly owned, public law utilities (typically municipal and rarely provincial or state-based). 
Corporatised utilities refer to public law companies that resemble private companies in terms of managerial 
independence and flexibility.    
In Private limited companies water services are provided by fully private utilities with ownership of 
infrastructure assets and full responsibilities for all operations, maintenance, revenue raising and 
investment. 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) refer to organisation models where ownership of the system (or part of 
it) remains in public hands and its operation (or part of it) is delegated to private entities. 
Public limited companies (PLCs) (state or municipal) have a corporate structure with a managing director 
and a board of directors. Unlike the corporatised utilities, they are commercial business operating under 
private (company) law. Unlike a private company however, their shares are owned by government (local, 
provincial or national). Minority private shareholding is also possible. 
Co-operatives are enterprises (public or private law) owned and controlled by the users of the goods and 
services provided (consumers, employees -e.g. trade unions- or producers of products and services).
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Chart No 18: EYDAP’s shareholders
Socio-political issues
Key	findings:
1. The process of PI in Athens’ WSS has been a deeply political process. The move 
towards privatization and the selection of the equitisation model was not designed 
as a means to achieve a goal of better water services and resource management, 
but as a goal in itself. The underlying belief was that a move towards more PI will 
improve the performance of the utility in all aspects and will attract much needed 
financing. 
2. Choice of the equitisation model (minority private sharehold dispersed in the stock-
exchange market) reflects the dominant socio-political conditions: European 
Monetary Union (EMU) convergence-driven dictated private participation in public 
utilities, in order to reduce in the short term public deficit and to “show to Brussels” 
commitment to reforming and liberalising the economy. On the other hand, 
popular unrest derailed the conservative governments’ privatization programme; 
the new government had committed against “privatization”. Equitisation was 
seen as a third-way, in between. The same model has been applied in all Public 
Utility Companies (PUCs). There was no concern in the design of the model for the 
particularities of the water sector. 
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3. There have been no new mechanisms to foster public participation and 
democratization of water service and resource management. The provision for 
the – largely dysfunctional – “Social Councils” (part of the 1987 “socialization” of 
Public Utilities Act) was formally removed after PI. Municipal authorities’ and union 
delegates in EYDAP’s Board have seen their influence in decisions weakened. 
Formal consultation bodies and the Board were sidelined by top management and 
the Ministry in the preparation of the equitisation. There was limited public debate 
before equitisation with institutionalized social actors (trade unions, citizens 
organizations, etc), although law provided for a formal consultation process.
4. The activation of a Public Relations Directorate and the publication of annual reports 
by EYDAP (Annual Statistic Report, Annual News Bulletin for the Stock Exchange) 
have improved the availability and the transparency of internal information 
to external parties. These improvements however had already started with the 
1996 PUC Law and should not be attributed only to the PI process. Controversial 
financial information in the last year has been disclosed from the annual report 
to investors, raising doubts whether transparency has indeed increased. Financial 
data put in the company’s website in 2000 has not been updated since then.
5. PI in EYDAP was relatively free of social conflict. The Trade Union of EYDAP was 
the only organisation that strongly resisted equitisation. Even though the union 
started up a campaign with broadcasts in national radio and television, its power 
was limited (9% of its members participated in an anti-PI strike). The management 
of EYDAP appeased employees by offering them company shares in privileged 
prices (20% lower than official prices). Also a portion of the State’s revenue from 
the shares was offered to the employees’ pension fund.
6. Compared to other public utilities’ privatisations, PI in EYDAP generated intense 
political reactions in the Parliament. All political parties of the opposition 
(conservative and communist) stood against the bill, while some parliamentarians 
from the governing (social-democratic) party in an exceptional move defected 
from party line and voted against the equitisation of EYDAP (the bill was approved 
with a slim majority). Opponents stressed the public good character of water. The 
PI model followed was exactly designed as a “half-way” privatization that would 
appease concerns and avoid the popular reaction that derailed the previous 
government’s privatization programme. Majority public control was maintained, 
whereas private shareholding was distributed to small individual investors and 
not to a foreign multi-national. Furthermore, ownership of “water” and related 
assets (reservoirs) was removed from the capital of EYDAP and remained in 
the public sector. As the managing director of EYDAP put it: “the principal 
advantage of gradual privatization through trading of shares in the stock market 
is the minimisation of the adjustment cost that is the cost resulting due to the 
transition from the old status of a national and public corporation to a new private 
company. This cost can be very high and derail the whole process in a dead end’. 
Cost does not refer only to the financial cost but also to ‘any possible reaction 
form employees, customers and suppliers. The process of gradual privatisation 
provides the necessary time for each side to adapt to the new conditions and the 
necessary time to the government to decide on the final ownership structure of 
the company’ (quoted in Kallis and Coccossis, 2003).
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7. Water prices for individual customers have not increased; they have only been 
adjusted to inflation rates. As a result, there have been no popular protests 
against PI in EYDAP. Significant increases however have been applied to the 
price of bulk water supplied to some municipalities in Greater Athens that retain 
the ownership and management of their networks. Water to these municipalities 
was previously supplied subsidized, below production cost. EYDAP wants to take 
the ownership of the networks from the municipalities in exchange for municipal 
debts accumulated over the years. Municipalities complain that increasing prices 
is part of a strategy of EYDAP to take the networks free of cost. This situation 
breeds a serious conflict but note that this is not a popular conflict, but rather an 
inter-administrative one; citizens in the municipalities probably prefer the higher 
quality – lower cost services of EYDAP.
Financial and economic issues
Key	findings:
8. Financing of the substantial investments needed for Athens’ WSS by the private 
sector was the main claim of government and EYDAP directors in favour of PI. 
The evidence available five years after does not support this claim. Funds drawn 
from the stock-exchange market sufficed for financing less than 1/8 of the 8-year 
WSS investment program set in the contract. Dividends paid to shareholders more 
or less equaled the funds raised by the stock exchange market. Given current 
conditions in the market, drawing more private funds from the Stock Exchange 
market in the future looks highly unlikely. 
9. EU Support Funds appear as the main source of external financing for the 
investment programme. PI was intended to lead to improvement of the long-term 
planning capacity of EYDAP, supporting the preparation of an investment plan 
that could be used to apply for external assistance from the EU or investment 
banks (e.g. European Investment Bank). Such an investment plan has not been 
prepared (other than one prepared by a consultancy before the PI) and there has 
not been any application for funding from the EU or international banks.  
10. State subsidies remain the main source of financing for EYDAP. This however runs 
counter to the rationale of PI, i.e. that it would lead to attraction of private funds and 
would reduce the burden for the State. The Concession Contract foresees that if 
EYDAP does not manage to secure external financing from the EU, then the State 
should cover up to 60% of the funds for the 8-year investment programme. This 
looks highly unlikely given the tight fiscal policy of the government. Furthermore, 
if it does take place, then it raises social and regional equity concerns. First, public 
subsidies will be used to increase the value of partially privately-owned assets 
and contribute to private profits and dividends to shareholders. Indeed, in 2002 
the State did not pay any subsidy to EYDAP leading to a considerable decrease 
of revenue and a plummeting of its share in the Stock Exchange market. The 
following year, the State partly financed the investment programme and revenue 
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and dividends to shareholders increased considerably. Second, Athens’ WSS will 
continue to be subsidized whereas other urban WSS in Greece, with considerably 
inferior standards of service, do not receive state support.  
11. The part-privatisation was followed by a reform of the price system. First, prices 
were increased to adjust to inflation change in the previous 5 years (a period 
during which prices had remained nominally unchanged). This change however, 
can not be attributed only to the drive from the equitisation of EYDAP. A pattern 
of price adjustments after long periods of unchanged prices is common in the 
history of Athens’ water supply. Second, it was agreed that the tariff structure 
will remain unchanged for a 5 year period, but that prices will be automatically 
adjusted to the inflation rate each year. The government however has not kept up 
this legal commitment. 
12. Current price levels do not suffice to recover funds for the financing of the 
investment programme. The government is hesitant to allow an increase of prices. 
It even delayed the annual adjustment of water to inflation in 2003 prices (together 
with other utilities’ prices) to control the public impacts from high inflation in other 
consumer goods following the shift from drachmas to Euro. 
Institutional (regulatory) issues
Key	findings:		
13. Majority shareholding by the State and the Concession Contract are the two 
ways of public control of EYDAP. The Contract defines the duties of the company, 
including among others, customer and service standards (and indicators to 
monitor them), water efficiency standards and preparation and implementation of 
a water resource management plan.
14. The Offices of the Ministers of Public Works (supervising Minister) and of National 
Economy (responsible for public utilities price setting and investment programmes) 
are policically responsible for EYDAP but there is no formal mechanism actively 
overseeing the operation of EYDAP (regulatory office, department or other).
15. There is no available data or benchmarking system to allow an accurate assessment 
of EYDAP’s performance. EYDAP has not complied with the provision made in 
the Contract for submission of data and publication of an annual review report 
available to the public. 
16. There are no formal and transparent regulatory principles and mechanisms 
governing profit returns, price-setting or subsidies. The law states that prices 
should be determined in order to recover costs and investments plus a “reasonable 
return” for EYDAP. Decision on the actual definition of these terms and the 
determination of prices rests on an inter-ministerial committee. 
17. The contract and the regulatory framework were designed on the basis of making 
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the PI attractive to investors. Resource issues were subsumed under this goal and 
included as an ‘add-on” (e.g. by requiring EYDAP to prepare a resource management 
plan and implement a leakage reduction programme). However, many structural 
incentives stemming from the legal framework act against the achievement of 
some of these performance criteria. For example, the State guarantees to cover 
additional costs of water supply in drought periods or costs for a new expansion 
of supply (waterwork, etc). This provides a disincentive for EYDAP to invest on 
water saving.
18. The legal framework allows EYDAP to be active in non-core activities (overseas 
operations, network provision for gas and telecommunications utilities, etc), upon 
the criterion that this does no incur revenue losses or negative impacts in the 
provision of the core services. However, there is no regulatory mechanism or 
standardized assessment framework to judge on these. 
Assessment of service and resource management performance
19. The new legal framework maintains, if not intensifies, structural dis-incentives 
against water saving. Increased water demand is the key source of revenue and 
given the reluctance of the government to increase prices, it is unlikely that EYDAP 
will put effort to control demand in the future. Indeed in the report to shareholders, 
EYDAP emphasizes the prospects of increased revenue from “water sales”.
20. Some projects, investments and techniques that combine improvement of 
environmental performance with potential increase of revenue have been adopted 
(e.g. enlargement of conveyance and distribution networks, development of 
hydroelectric plants, recovery of energy from wastewater treatment plants).
21. Business operation and customer services are improving through the 
modernization of managerial and office infrastructure (adoption of information 
technology, etc). These processes had already started prior to the equitisation 
though, with the 1996 PUC law.
22. It is not possible to assess trends in the actual quality of WSS, because there is no 
formal data/indicator assessment system. The Concession Contract mandated 
that EYDAP should collect data on indicators such as level of leakage, number of 
dwellings served with pressure below standards, average time of responding to 
complaints, days of cuts per year, etc. The data should be compiled in an annual 
report submitted to the overseeing Ministry plus a summary report available to 
the public. None of these have taken place.  
23. Meritocracy in personnel policy has improved but this is not a result of equitisation. 
Improvements were a result of broader changes in the legal rules and processes 
for recruitment in the public sector and the establishment of the Higher Committee 
for Public Sector Employment (responsible also for hirings in EYDAP). There were 
no forced personnel firings after equitisation. Top management salaries have 
increased but within reasonable range.
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24. In terms of independence of EYDAP from the State, some improvements are 
evident (e.g. autonomy in subcontracting and in selecting suppliers) but these 
were underway since 1996 (after the establishment of EYDAP as an autonomous, 
publicly owned, private PUC). The Government has still a strong say in the 
selection of the top management and the company’s decisions and policies (e.g. 
legal procedures against debtors).
Lessons from PI in Athens
L1. There is nothing in the performance of Athens’ model of “half-way” privatization 
to support its transfer to other cities in Greece or abroad. Seen however as a variant of 
public control, equitisation provides a sound model for compromise in cases where the 
State wishes to distance itself more formally from the Utility and inviting some private 
sector participation, while retaining control and avoiding shift to majority private control. 
This might be a useful compromise when there is popular reaction against privatization, 
but there is a need to proceed with some reform of the water utility (of course there are 
also other possible options, such as a public plc or a cooperative, which can equally well 
lead to reforms in the management of the utility).
L2. The main – presumed and real - advantages of the partial privatization / 
equitisation were linked to the reduction of direct interference of the government in the 
operation of the Utility and the separation of regulator and regulated. The question of the 
critics is why could this not be done without privatization, i.e. through the mechanisms 
foreseen in the 1996 PUC Law?  Is not this a self-admission on the part of the State of 
a failure to perform appropriately its role? Is this a “keep-it-away-from-me” rationale of 
governments a sufficient justification to move towards privatization?
L3. The role of the State remains as important after PI as it was before. Delegating 
responsibility to the private sector, does not absolve the State from the settling of 
complex trade-offs in water pricing and financing, regulation of the Utility, and investment 
on environmental and social goals, etc. The emphasis should be on policy reform of 
WSS and not on PI itself. The degree of private and public control is incidental. Different 
models will be applicable to different contexts; none will be functional though if the 
State and regulation systems are weak. 
Scenarios
The four scenarios
Table No 12 presents four different, Greece-specific scenarios about PI in WSS in the 
country. A characteristic title gives the “flavour” of each scenario. The scenarios are 
characterised and differentiated in terms of:
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• Degree of PI in Athens and Salonika’s WSS.
• Degree of PI in the rest of the country.
• Broader accompanying policy and regulatory reforms.
• Source of investments.  
In a spectrum from the lowest to the highest level of PI, Scenario 3 (public sector 
dominance) is positioned on one extreme and Scenario 4 (private sector dominance) 
on the other. In-between is the balanced Scenario 2 and a tendency/business as usual 
scenario 1, which has relatively more PI than Scenario 2, but considerably less than 
Scenario 4.  
The effort is to avoid “normative” (positive or negative) characterisations of the 
scenarios (e.g. whether costs are fully recovered or not, whether public participation 
takes place or not, etc) and to remain purely descriptive at this stage. Then in the next 
sections, each scenario is separately appraised including: 
• An appraisal of the likelihood that it will be realised. This involves a discussion of 
the contextual factors (drivers) that might support each scenario. The emphasis is 
on socio-political factors at the national, EU and international levels.
• An assessment of the advantages and disadvantages (strengths and weaknesses) 
of each scenario with respect to the key assessment dimensions of the PRINWASS 
project: i.e. economic, social and resource/environmental.
• A discussion of the factors that can contribute to the success or failure of 
implementation of each PI scenario (opportunities and threats). These are related 
to, but should be distinguished from drivers; they refer to factors (socio-political, 
economical, institutional) that will decide the effectiveness of the implementation 
and the eventual outcomes of a certain PI model.
The appraisal that follows is unavoidably qualitative, and partly speculative. 
Scenarios are not used as a predictive tool. Thinking about the future is used more as a 
platform of structuring the alternatives and starting a deliberation over the advantages 
and disadvantages of different policy options. Ideally, this “deliberation” should 
be participatory and inclusive and involve a range of stakeholders. However, for the 
purposes of this paper it remains analysis-based drawing only from the findings from 
Athens’ case study (and partly, insights from the other PRINWASS cases). Needless to 
state that interpretation of the results and the making of the scenarios is subjective and 
is affected by the viewpoints of the authors.
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Table No 12: Four Policy Scenarios of PI in WSS in Greece for the year 2015
BUSINESS AS USUAL
“Cautious Privatisation, the third way”
Only slight changes have occurred since 
2004. The State owns the majority (51%) 
of the shares of EYDAP and DEYATH. 
Foreign “strategic investors” (multi-
nationals) participate as minority 
shareholders and have taken over 
the management of the companies. 
The utilities of the other big cities 
of Greece have been also equitised, 
minority shareholding sold by the State 
to private/foreign investors and to 
individual investors through the Stock 
Exchange market. Small municipal 
departments and utilities have been 
unified into larger regional utilities, 
also equitised and with private sector 
participation. Majority shareholding of 
these utilities is shared between the 
State, and local and regional authorities. 
The regulatory model followed for PI in 
EYDAP and DEYATH and the principles 
of their Concession Contracts has 
been formalised and applied to all 
utilities through a Water Services Law. 
Investment funds are based on revenues 
from modestly increased prices, public 
subsidies and individual projects’ 
financing from EU support funds. 
DIVERSIFIED AND BALANCED
“PLCs, the Dutch way”
A return to the 1996 public plc-based 
“modernisation of public utilities” law 
as the basis for WSS utilities’ reform has 
taken place. EYDAP’s and DEYATH’s 
ownership structure has not changed 
since 2004 and the State owns 60% 
of the utilities, the rest dispersed to 
individual shareholders, mainly utilities’ 
employees. Legal and contract provisos 
are strongly enforced. The utilities 
have greater autonomy from the State, 
but there is also greater scrutiny and 
transparency in the assessment of 
their performance. Existing municipal 
plcs in the rest of Greece have been 
modernised. They are autonomous 
and they operate like private sector 
companies; municipalities own the 
companies’ shares. Small municipal 
departments have been unified into 
larger inter-municipal or regional 
PLCs. State intervention is minimal 
and constrained to oversee the 
commitments of a management and a 
service contract signed with the director 
of the plcs. A benchmarking framework 
is established to compare the relative 
performance of the utilities. Utilities’ 
duties include the preparation of 10-year 
investment plans; funding is sought 
primarily from the EU and the European 
Investment Bank.           
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PUBLIC SECTOR DOMINANCE
“Back to the future, the socialist way”
The State has renationalised EYDAP 
and DEAYATH buying back the shares 
from private investors. 30% of the 
shares have been given at preferable 
prices to municipalities in the service 
areas and 19% to employees’ unions. 
Municipal and union representatives 
participate in the utilities’ boards. The 
President and the Managing Director 
are appointed by the Government. A 
“Social Council” consisting of trade 
union representatives and other social 
stakeholders acts as a consulting body 
to the Board and yields a veto power on 
predefined critical decisions. The same 
“corporatised utility” structure is adopted 
in other cities and towns of Greece and 
for the inter-municipal utilities that have 
been formed uniting smaller municipal 
departments. Municipal authorities are 
the owners of these utilities, with the 
exception of some cooperatives, owned 
by trade unions. Utilities are bound by 
general administration law and by the 
rules of a Consumer, a Service and a 
Resource Management Charter. The 
State subsidises capital investments 
and secures low water prices for 
vulnerable groups.
PRIVATE SECTOR DOMINANCE
“Full fledged privatisation, the Thatcher 
way”
Majority of the shareholding of EYDAP 
and DEYATH has been given to private 
multi-nationals. The State maintains a 
minority shareholding (30%) and a veto 
power over some predefined critical 
decisions of the Board. Regional utilities 
serving more than 100,000 customers 
have been formed for the urban areas 
around the other major agglomerations 
of Greece. These have also been 
equitised and the majority of shares 
belongs to private multinationals. The 
State maintains ownership and control 
of water resources and reservoirs. 20-
year concession contracts are signed 
between utilities and the State. A 
regulatory office at the Ministry for 
National Economy is responsible for 
contract negotiation and for monitoring 
contracts compliance and authorising 
tariff changes. Smaller municipal 
departments / utilities have been also 
turned into private companies and 
contracted with leases or management 
contracts to local private investors. BOT 
schemes are utilised for the financing 
of new major waterworks (networks, 
dams, and water/wastewater treatment 
plants) and repaid from charges. 
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Scenario 1 - Business as usual: “Cautious Privatisation, the third way”
Likelihood and Drivers
This is a most likely scenario as long as the current socio-political climate does not 
change. 
Some external factors favouring this scenario include:
• Public and trade unions’ sentiment against a full-scale privatisation programme 
and, especially, against multinationals´ control of water utilities remains strong 
and expressed with reactions whenever such government intentions appear in 
the media. 
• Centrist (centre-right or centre-left) social and economic policies remain dominant. 
Opposition parties maintain an anti-privatisation and anti-multinationals stance.
• Growth of the Stock-Exchange market and rise of utilities’ stock value.
• There is no major shift in international and EU policies concerning water services 
(i.e. no liberalisation policy).
• Greece’s public deficit remains stable; the government does not face pressure to 
reduce deficit by selling assets.
• General satisfaction with the experience from the equitisation of EYDAP and 
DEYATH; no major crisis in WSS (e.g. a drought, a contamination incident, etc) 
favouring a reform of the industry. WSS remaining low in public’s concerns. 
Strengths
• Politically “neutral”: avoidance of social confrontation.
• Distance from direct public interference, with maintenance, however, of some 
degree of public control.
• Import of some foreign expertise in management, with potential benefits also for 
environmental/resource management.
• Access to investment funds from the Stock-Exchange market.
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Weaknesses
• Postponement of resolution of critical issues; continued State subsidisation.
• Lack of significant improvements in resource/environmental management and 
service performance.
• “Unstable” model; it has been envisaged only as a step towards more privatisation, 
rather than a permanent end-state.
Opportunities 
• Retreat of government patronage and clientelistic politics; lack of direct interference 
of the government and municipalities in water utilities.
• Establishment of public utility regulatory structures at a central government level. 
• Decentralisation, support of regional economic development and interest of 
investors in peripheral utilities.
Threats
• Increasing water scarcity, deterioration of water infrastructure and rise of water 
supply and wastewater costs; pressure for substantial investments.
• Increasing pressure to pay dividends leading to revenue secured through State 
subsidies.  
Scenario 2 - Diversified and Balanced: “PLCs, the Dutch way”
Likelihood and Drivers
This is also a highly likely scenario. Instead of the “equitisation model”, the basis for 
reform in this scenario is the 1996 PUC law for the modernisation of public utilities, which 
distanced utilities from the State, setting rules that facilitated their operation like private 
companies, yet maintained public ownership. Private management – public ownership 
is a model advocated by the Netherlands, where there is successful experience with 
municipality-owned, privately managed water utilities (Blockland et al, 1999). For Athens 
and Salonika, this scenario presumes a stabilisation of the current situation. In contrast 
to Scenario 1 however, where equitisation of EYDAP and DEYATH was an intermediate 
stage towards more PI and participation of multi-nationals, in Scenario 2 equitised 
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EYDAP is a public plc operating as a reformed public utility. This scenario is also highly 
likely for the rest of Greece, where it might be difficult to attract private interest and 
reforming public utilities might be the only option.
Some external factors favouring this scenario include:
• A growing sense of  “failure” in other public utilities (electricity, elecommunications), 
where majority private ownership was granted.
• Growing evidence against privatisation of WSS in the international arena, and 
abundance of successful public sector reform cases.  
• Lack of interest of multi-nationals or other foreign investors in the Greek WSS 
market. 
• Dominance of social-democratic political parties and policies in EU and in Greece.
• Continuous flow of EU Support funds for Greece.  
Strengths
• Private style management, with effective public control (important for social and 
environmental “services”, e.g. affordable water prices, environmental protection, 
etc).
• Amenable to introduction of “virtual competition” (e.g. benchmarking, etc).
  
Weaknesses
• If the State is interventionist, utilities might operate more like public departments 
rather than private companies.
• Ability to finance will depend on whether reform is successful; if not, there is 
continuous need for susbidisation. 
• Techno-managerial, financial and human resource weaknesses of municipal 
authorities in Greece; lack of tradition of effective State corporations.  
Opportunities 
• Broader process of modernisation of the Greek public administration and 
decentralisation of powers to regional and local authorities.
WATERLATGOBACIT
WATERLAT-GOBACIT  Working Papers
Research Projects Series - PRINWASS Project  - Vol 4 Nº 1 / 2017
169
Threats
• Continuous dominance of government patronage and clientelistic politics.
• Failure of modernisation of public administration.
 
Scenario 3 - Public sector dominance: “Back to the future, the Socialist way”
Likelihood and Drivers
This scenario of return to the 1980s era is highly unlikely, save for some small 
municipalities where public control and management may remain the norm for the years 
to come. However, one might envisage such a scenario in a case that there are radical 
socio-economic changes at the international level or a general “backlash” against 
neo-liberal policies and privatisation. Some factors that might contribute to such a 
return to State control, include:
• Rising inequalities and a global socio-economic crisis, leading to a shift from 
neo-liberal to Keynesian economic policies.
• Rising water prices causing concerns of affordability in Athens and Salonika. 
• Notable failure of privatisations in other public utilities.
• Water crises, such as drought, pollution incidents, etc., in privatised utilities.
• Dominance of left-of-centre politics and parties.
 
Strengths
• Public control, safeguarding of provision of public goods.
• Legitimate, more accountable in times of crisis. 
Weaknesses
• Bureaucracy and vested interests’ (e.g. construction industry) control.
• Unclear economic and political relations between State and utilities, hindering 
improvements in management.  
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Opportunities 
• Radical reform and improvement of public administration.
• Growth of the Greek economyc: increase of public expenditures / ability of public 
sector to finance investments.
Threats
• Nationalisation in a context of a weak and clientelistic public sector, with limited 
financing capability.
• Polarised party politics affecting public personnel recruitment and utilities’ policies.
Scenario 4 - Private sector dominance – “Full fledged privatisation, the Thatcher way”
Likelihood and Drivers
An extreme neo-liberal scenario does not look very likely at this moment; there seems 
to exist a consensus of the two main political parties around moderate, “centrist” social 
and economic policies. However, liberalisation/privatisation will be a main “pulling 
factor” for the more moderate scenarios 1 and 2. A mixture of the three scenarios should 
be expected, tilting less or more towards Scenario 4 depending on the dominance or not 
of drivers such as:  
• International policies (GATT, EU) for the liberalisation of water services.
• Dominance of neo-liberal politics and political parties in Greece and the EU.
• Successful experience from the privatisation of other public utilities in Greece.
• Public and opposition party apathy towards government plans for further 
privatisation of WSS.
• Pressure for reduction of public deficit, tight public budgetary policy.
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Strengths
• Reduction of direct government intervention and patronage.
• Distance between regulator and regulated. 
Weaknesses
• Monopoly abuse / price increases and affordability concerns, if weak regulation.
• Potential for social confrontation, especially in a crisis.
• Weak, State-dependant and corruption-prone private sector in Greece.  
Opportunities 
• Development of effective regulatory mechanisms.
• Reform of public administration; reduction of corruption. 
Threats
• Corruption (especially of municipal authorities).
• Public administration downsizing; inability to perform regulatory role.
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Strategies for a Sustainable Future 
There are three key conclusions (also of broader relevance) from the findings of the 
Athens case-study and the exposition and discussion of the alternative scenarios for PI 
in WSS in Greece:
C1.     Political factors and changes are the main drivers of change in the degree of PI in 
WSS. Future tendencies of PI in WSS in Greece will depend more than anything else 
on broader socio-political and ideological tendencies, national and international.   
C2.    No matter what is the degree of PI, the public sector remains central in the delivery 
of sustainable WSS. Public utilities underperform where the public sector is weak; 
privatisation regulated by a weak public sector however, is no better alternative. 
PI is no substitute for the modernisation and strengthening of the public sector in 
order to carry out its WSS-related functions (regulation, financing, etc).  
C3.     Focus on PI might distract attention from the key issue of WSS policy reform. This is 
the case in Greece where policy reform is long overdue and problems accumulate. 
PI has not advanced responses to critical issues concerning investments vs. prices, 
regulation of social and environmental goals, etc.
Strategies therefore for a sustainable future should be strategies for the reform of 
WSS and for strengthening the ability of the public sector’s capacity to fulfil its roles. 
The degree of PI is a secondary issue and should be treated as such. Priorities for reform 
include:
1. Set up of an administrative unit (directorate, department or office) responsible for 
a national strategy and for the regulation of WSS.
2. Development of a National Strategy for WSS, outlining key goals (service, 
economic, social and environmental).
3. Formulation of the Strategy into a Water Services Law defining rights and duties 
of water utilities and establishing a benchmarking system for the comparative 
assessment of their performance.
4. Clear definition of service, social and environmental goals and establishment of a 
monitoring system to assess compliance.
5. Reform of the tariff-setting process. Identification of investment needs and 
reform of prices so as to recover investment funds, provide incentives for water 
saving while maintaining low and affordable water rates for vulnerable groups. 
Replacement of the existing inter-ministerial mechanism for tariff setting by a 
multi-stakeholder, science-supported process.
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6. “Investment” in human capacity development both for public administration and 
for the water utilities.
7. Establishment of long-term planning processes within the utilities, preparation 
of investment plans and submission of funding applications to EU or other 
international donors and banks. 
Increasing the degree of PI (i.e. Scenario 4) before satisfying the above conditions 
and without having established a proper framework for the WSS sector is a risky 
strategy. A more reasonable strategy would be based on Scenarios 1 and 2 in the short 
to medium term (i.e. at least for the next decade) with some elements from Scenario 3 
for small rural municipalities (i.e. operate as fully public utilities or cooperatives). Once 
the necessary conditions have been established and a functioning public regulatory 
and planning system is in place, then PI (leases, management contracts or private 
sector / multinationals participation in utilities) could be allowed on a case-by-case 
basis (i.e. no need for a national policy for PI in WSS) through standardised, transparent 
and participatory processes. A national regulator should control this process (some 
responsibility should also be given to municipalities owning the networks, depending 
on the extent that administrative decentralisation and strengthening of local authorities 
has advanced). An ideal future therefore would consist of mixed models of utilities 
(public, cooperatives, plcs and majority private), effectively regulated and strategically 
coordinated by a well functioning public regulatory authority.
Reality does not allow much optimism. Efforts for strategic planning and regulatory 
control in water resources management and water services in the past have totally failed. 
Regulatory offices or plans foreseen in legislation were never realised. The 1996 PUC 
law for example introduced many novelties, which if implemented could have improved 
considerably WSS in Athens (such as the preparation of 5-year Master Plans by EYDAP, 
a consumer and services charter with indicators to be assessed in an annual report to 
the public, etc). All these provisions however were never implemented. Similar was the 
situation with the 1987 National Law for Water Resource Management. This provided 
for a national coordinating committee for water resource planning, regional authorities 
and plans, water allocation mechanisms, environmental standards, licensing of water 
abstractions and of new waterworks, etc. The decrees that would activate the provisions 
of the framework law were never activated (Kallis and Coccossis, 2003). 
Hence, the real challenge ahead is not simply to produce a new strategy or law, but to 
establish the structures necessary for the effective implementation of the substance of 
such policies. This challenge is beyond the strict realms of the WSS sector and relates to 
the fate of policies to modernise and decentralise the Greek public sector. In turn, these 
policies will be determined by broader socio-economic and political developments, in 
Greece and abroad.   
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Abbreviations
c  centigrade
ha  hectare
hm3  cubic hectometre
hm3/yr cubic hectometres per year
km  kilometre
km2  square kilometre
lt  litre
MEuros Million Euros
m  metres
m3  cubic metre
Mm3  Million cubic metres
m3/day cubic metres per day
mg  milligram
mg/lt  milligrams per litre
mm  millimetre
NE  North East
NW  North West
R&D  Research and development
SE  South East
w/w  wastewater
yr  year
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Acronyms
ASEP  High Personnel Selection Committee for the Public Sector
BOD  Biochemical oxygen demand
BOD  Board of Directors
BOT  Build-Operate-Transfer
CSF  Community Support Framework
DEYA  Municipal Enterprises of Water Supply and Sewerage
DEYATH Municipal Enterprise of Water Supply and Sewerage
of Thessaloniki Inc
EEDYA  National Committee for the Management of Water and Waste
EIS  Environmental Impact Statements
ΕΚPΑ  National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
EMU  European Monetary Union
EPEYDAP EYDAP Assets Public Co.
ESYE  National Statistical Service
ETEVA Hellenic Industrial Investment Bank
EU  European Union
EYDAP Athens Water Supply and Sewerage Inc.
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GNP  Gross National Product
IBC  International Broadcasting Convention
KEPE  Centre for Economic Planning Research
MDEV Ministry of Development (see YPAN)
MESPPW Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and Public Works
NIGS  Networks and Installations General Secretariat
NTU  National Technical University
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OAP  Athens’ Organisation for Sewerage
PI  Private involvement
PPP  Programme for Public Investments
PUC  Public Utility Company
SGS  Sewerage General Secretariat
SIWI  Stockholm International Water Institute
SKAA  Athens’ Waste Water Treatment Plant
TEE  Hellenic Technical Chamber
WGS  General Secretariat for Water Supply
WSS  Water Supply and Sewerage Services
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WTUs  Water Treatment Units
YBET  Ministry of Industry, Research and Technology
YPAN  Ministry of Development
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